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INTRODUCTION
Hegemony derives from the Greek word hegemonia, which means
the predominant influence of one state over others. Hegemony has both
economic and mffitary aspects which reinforce one another. Hegemonic
dominance comes not only from a state's economic and military strengths
but also from its ability to obtain consent from other states as well.
Hegemony is one of the most important concepts in Global Political
Economy (GPE) and has generated a continuous debate, especially since
the demise of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and the
oil crisis of 1973 which both appeared to suggest the end of postwar
American hegemony. This thesis investigates the changing basis of
American hegemony during the 1990s.
For more than twenty years after the end of World War II, the
United States dominated the world economy by creating an open
international trade system based on the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GAU) and a stable monetary system based on the Bretton
Woods agreement. However, concerns about American power arose in
the 1970s with the abandonment of the Brefton Woods fixed exchange
rate system and the emergence of a more volatile era of floating exchange
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rates. Although American policy laid the basis for the growing
globalisation of markets, the apparent relative decline of American power
prompted a debate over the ability of the United States to influence the
direction of the world economy.
This situation began to change in the mid-1980s, following the
reassertion of America's international role during the Reagan years (1981-
1989). At the same time, the increasing globalisation of economic activity
and financial liberalisation resulted in the identification of American
institutions with free market ideas. That trend was reinforced by the
activities of international institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which acted in concert to support a free
market orthodoxy which has come to be known as the "Washington
Consensus". As a result, at the beginning of the 1990s and especially after
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, an increasing number of
countries in different continents, each with a different development
experience and with varying economic structures and political systems,
embarked on experiments with market reforms, in line with the
Washington Consensus.
While during the 1990s a large number of countries experimented
with market reforms, there were also periodic financial crises that rocked
these countries and spread across national borders in quick and
unpredictable ways. The most striking examples of such crises have been
the peso crisis in 1994-1995 and the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998).
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These crises have demonstrated the vulnerability of national economies
to variations in the flow of internationally mobile capital arid have posed
serious challenges to the Washington Consensus. At the same time these
crises have simultaneously offered an opportunity to the United States to
further entrench the Washington Consensus via the direct actions of the
US Treasury and the conditionality attached to financial assistance
through the IMF.
In an era of increasing globalisation and interdependence in the
world economy, it is an oversimplification to define the concept of
hegemony in terms of the power of one state relative to other states. The
basis of American hegemony has been changing with an increased
emphasis upon the ideological dimension of hegemony and its
transmission and diffusion by the private sector, i.e the Washington
Consensus of free market orthodoxy. This thesis explores the hypothesis
that the United States has not only retained but also strengthened its
hegemonic position. Therefore, this thesis provides a framework for a
better understanding of the changing basis of American hegemony by
demonstrating how the Washington Consensus was further entrenched
in Mexico and in South Korea after the peso crisis and the Asian crisis
respectively. Methodologically, this thesis evolves around two case
studies of the peso and South Korean crises and relies on primary sources
such as official documents from the US House of Representatives and the
US Senate, the IMTF, the World Bank, Letters of Intent from national
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governments to the IMF, official documents from the US State
Department and the G7 along with interviews, in order to demonstrate
the degree of entrenchment of the Washington consensus in both cases.
The two case studies are symmetrically developed, initially providing a
background to each crisis before examining the goals of American policy
towards Mexico and South Korea.
The first three chapters provide the theoretical background on
which this thesis builds. Chapter One provides a review of different
approaches to hegemony from neorealist scholars such as Robert Gilpin
and Stephen Krasner, neoliberal analysts such as Robert Keohane to neo-
Gramscian scholars such as Robert Cox and Stephen Gill. The aim of
Chapter One is to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of these
perspectives when seen in contemporary context. Chapter Two more
specifically introduces the framework of this thesis and the five
interdependent variables on which it depends in order to provide an
explanation of the changing basis of American hegemony. Chapter Three
elaborates on the framework by providing an account of the economic
policies of the United States during the 1970s and the 1980s that enabled a
shift in American foreign economic policy to more aggressive practices.
In this context special emphasis is placed on Reaganomics and the
construction of the Washington Consensus.
The next four chapters are the main core of the thesis and analyse
the two case studies of Mexico and South Korea. The framework of
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Chapter Two is being tested through the case studies of Mexico and
South Korea in order to demonstrate the entrenchment of the Washington
Consensus in these countries. Chapter Four delivers the first part of the
Mexican case study by providing a contextual analysis of Mexico's
financial liberalisation after the debt crisis of 1982 until the eve of the
crisis in 1994. This chapter gives an account of the role of the United
States in the liberalisation of Mexico's economy and the North American
Free Trade Agreement that aimed to stabilise the economic reforms in
Mexico. Chapter Four argues that the Washington Consensus was
already applied in Mexico before it was challenged by the peso crisis.
Chapter Five, provides an analysis of the response of the United States to
the peso crisis and highlights the role of American interests in the region
that drove the Clinton Administration to bail out Mexico despite
opposition from the US Congress. Chapter Five argues that the
Washington Consensus was further entrenched in Mexico as a result of
American policies conducted through the US Treasury. Chapter Six
introduces the first part of the South Korean case study, providing a
contextual analysis of the Asian developmental state model, South
Korea's economic liberalisation and the events that led to the financial
crisis of 1997-1998. Chapter Six argues that before the crisis of 1997, the
Washington Consensus was not applied in South Korea at the same
degree as in Mexico before the crisis of 1994. Chapter Seven analyses the
response of the United States and the IMF to the South Korean financial
5
crisis and the consequent pressures for further financial liberalisation
deriving from the conditionalities attached to the assistance packages.
Chapter Seven argues that as a result of the American response to the
financial crisis of South Korea, mediated through the IMF, the
Washington Consensus expanded to areas that were not previously
covered in South Korea.
Finally, Chapter Eight concludes the thesis, by providing art
analysis that incorporates all the findings of the two case studies and
discussing the degree by which the framework of Chapter Two has been
confirmed by the case studies of Mexico and South Korea. Chapter Eight
argues that state-centric notions of American hegemony developed
during the postwar period are now being displaced by a new concept of
hegemony in which American foreign economic policy is more concerned
with sefting a market framework based on the Washington Consensus,
through agencies such as the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade
Organisation (WTO). This new concept of hegemony thus challenges
notions of American relative decline. Chapter Eight finally concludes that
the United States is still a hegemonic power, retaining the ability to
establish its preferences about the workings of global economy.
6
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CHAPTER ONE
THE CHANGING BASIS OF HEGEMONY:
FROM HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY TO NEO-
GRAMSCIAN APPROACHES
This chapter provides an overview of the most important
concepts of hegemony. It starts with an analysis of the neorealist and
neoliberal frameworks, focusing upon hegemonic stability theory
before proceeding to a discussion of some alternative concepts of
hegemony, notably those of Immanuel Wallerstein, Susan Strange and
Joseph Nye.1 The chapter concludes with a discussion of Gramsci's
1 For neorealist approaches and hegemonic stability theory see works such as Charles
Kindleberger, The World in Depression: 1929-1939 (University of California Press,
Berkeley 1973); Robert Gilpin, US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The
Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (Basic Books, New York 1975); David
Calleo, The Imperious Economy (Harvard University Press, London 1982); Stephen
Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1978).
For a neoliberal institutionalist approach, see analyses such as Robert Keohane and
Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, (Scott and Foresman, New York 1989).
Alternatives to hegemonic stability theory also include works such as Isabel
Grunberg, "Exploring the Myth of Hegemonic Stability", International Organization,
vol. 44, no. 4, 1990, pp. 431-477; Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Three Instances of
Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist World Economy", in G. Crane and A.
Amawi, eds. The Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy (Oxford
University Press, New York 1991); Mark Rupert, Producing Hegemony: The Politics of
Mass Production and American Global Power (Cambridge University Press,
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conception of hegemony and the application of a Gramscian framework
to the contemporary world with a special focus on the work of Robert
Cox.2 These are the most important approaches to the issue of
hegemony and some of them include important elements which are
useful for the development of a conceptual theoretical framework in
Chapter Two. In this chapter, a critique of each group of approaches is
developed to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of these
approaches in understanding the changing basis of hegemony during
the 1990s and the final part of this chapter points toward the need for a
fresh perspective on hegemony.
The term hegemony derives from the ancient Greek and refers to
the dominance of one state over others.3 It has been used in diverse and
confused ways. The problem is that an unequal distribution of power is
a matter of degree and there is no general agreement on how much
inequality and what types of power constitute hegemony. Some
analysts such as Modeiski prefer the term "world leadership" to the
Cambridge 1995); Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony",
International Organization, vol. 41, no. 4,1987, pp. 212-235.
2 For neo-Gramscian approaches, see works such as Robert Cox, "Gramsci Hegemony
and International Relations: An Essay in Method", in Millennium, vol. 12, no. 2, 1983,
pp. 162-175; Robert Cox with Timothy Sinclair, Approaches to World Order
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996); Giovanni Arrighi, "The Three
Hegemonies of Historical Capitalism", in Stephen Gifi, ed. Gramsci Historical
Materialism and International Relations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
1993); Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge
University Press, New York 1990).
Greek hegemonia, from hegemon, leader, from hegeisthai to lead. See The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1996).
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term "hegemony". 4
 The latter quite often refers to a less desirable
system based on domination, coercion, exploitation and inequality. In
contrast the term "leadership" has more positive qualities because it is
thought of as the provision of the public good of responsibility, rather
than exploitation of followers.5
The issue of hegemony began to draw extensive scholarly
attention after events in the early 1970s, such as the abandonment of the
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and the first OPEC
(Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil shock in 1973.
These events were widely interpreted as signs either of the decline of
the leadership held by the United States or of deliberate American
retreat from the role. The various approaches to this topic resulted from
a lack of agreement on its definition and rules of application. The
standards against which to measure American decline were seldom
made clear. Part of the difficulty stemmed from a lack of agreement
about how much power is necessary to produce hegemony and also
from a lack of agreement on the relevant dimensions and indications of
power.6
' George Modeiski, "World Leadership: End Game Scenarios" in David Rapkin, ed.,
World Lea dershiv and Hegem ony" (Lyrine Rieimer Publishers, Boulder 1990) p. 241.
David Rapkin, "The Contested Concept of Hegemonic Leadership", in D. Rapkin,
ed., World Leadershp and Hegemony" (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 1990) p. 3.
6 Bruce Russell, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or Is Mark Twain
Really Dead?", International Organization vol. 39, no. 2, 1985, p. 209.
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Neoreahst and Neoliberal Approaches
The school that most influenced International Political Economy
(IPE) was that of the neorealists, notably Charles Kindleberger and
Robert Gilpin. 7 The conception of hegemony in the neorealist orthodoxy
of IPE focused upon state power and the creation of international
regimes for coordination and cooperation among otherwise rival states.
Neorealism embodied relatively static theories of politics which
emphasised distributional struggles within a given field of social
relations. Neorealist IPE was primarily concerned to explain the
emergence of a political order in which competing states were
understood as pre-constituted individuals, struggling for security in a
lawless and amoral world. As a consequence of this position,
neorealism suggested that a single, politically and economically
preponderant state - a "hegemon" - would be a necessary condition for
the construction of order in the international system. In several studies
this general framework - which is known as hegemonic stability theory
(HST) - overstated the extent to which leading states actually used their
extraordinary power to compel others to cooperate in the construction
of an encompassing, systemic order. Kindleberger with his explanation
See Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939; Robert Gilpin, US
Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Forein Direct
Investment; Robet Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War", Journal of
Interdisciplinary History, vol. 18, no. 4, 1988, pp. 591-613.
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of the Great Depression as a consequence of a lack of international
leadership and Gilpin's comparison of American hegemony with its
nineteenth-century British antecedent sparked a debate over hegemonic
leadership and America's alleged decline.
The distinction between neorealism and neoliberalism seems
blurred because neoliberalism does not represent a cohesive intellectual
movement or school of thought like neorealism. Neoliberalism operates
from different assumptions, examining different aspects of the
processes through which international change and cooperation might
be promoted. In contrast to neorealists, neoliberal analysts assume that
the relative decline of a hegemon's economic and military capabilities
does not necessarily imply a subsequent period of instability. In
neoliberal approaches such as that of Robert Keohane primary attention
is given to the influences of international institutions and non-state
actors like multinational corporations and the interest in examining the
conditions under which the converging and overlapping interests
among sovereign political entities result in cooperation.
First, the hegemonic stability theory was initially developed by
the economist and historian Charles Kindleberger as a means of
explaining why the international monetary disorder of the 1930s had
occurred. For Kindleberger the 1929 depression was so severe because
the international economic system was rendered unstable by Britain's
inability and the United States' unwillingness to assume responsibility
11
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for international economic stability by maintaining a relatively open
market for goods and providing counter-cyclical long-term lending.
The world economic system would be unstable unless a major economy
stabiised it, as Britain had done in the nineteenth century and up until
1913. In 1929, although Britain was wffling to supply the public good of
international monetary stability, it simply did not have the economic
strength to do so. The United States, which had massive economic
strength, was able but unwilling to take on the economic leadership
from Britain and become the new hegemon.8
According to Kindleberger, for the world economy to be stable, it
needed a stabiiser, that is a country that would undertake to provide a
market for goods, a steady flow of capital and a mechanism for
providing liquidity when the monetary system was frozen.
Kindleberger later added that world leadership should also manage, in
some degree, the structure of foreign exchange rates and provide a
degree of coordination of domestic monetary policies. 9 In this area, and
for the maintenance of free trade and a liberal flow of capital and aid,
leadership was necessary. When the United States economic leadership
in the world economy was faltering in the 1970s, three outcomes were
8 Charles Kindleberger: The World in Depression: 1929-1939, p. 292.
Charles Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy.
Exploitations, Public Goods and Free Rides", International Studies Quarterly, vol. 25,
no. 2, 1981, p.247. See also, Charles Kindleberger, The International Economic Order:
Essays on Financial Crises and International Public Goods (Harvester-Wheatsheaf,
London 1984).
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considered politically stable by Kindleberger. First, continued or
revived United States leadership. Second, an assertion of leadership
and assumption of responsibifity by Europe for the stability of the
world system and third, an effective secession of economic sovereignty
to international institutions: a world central bank, a world capital
market and a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The last was
considered by Kindleberger to be the most attractive but the least likely.
Politically unstable outcomes would have been: a) competition between
the United States and Europe for leadership in the world economy, b)
one unable to lead and the other unwilling or c) each retaining a veto
over programmes of stability or strengthening of the system without
seeking to secure positive programmes of its own.10 For Kindleberger
only an outstanding economic and political power, with the capacity
and willingness to lead, could supply and support the infrastructure
that permits international exchange. Kindleberger's theory was not
concerned with cooperation but rather with unilateral actions taken by
the stabiising or hegemonic power.
Like Kindleberger, Gilpin emphasised the similarities between
the rise and decline of Britain and the United States. Gilpin argued that
the alleged relative economic and industrial decline of the United States
during the 1970s was due to a more permanent crisis in the American
10 Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression: 1929-1939, pp. 308 & 311.
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economy and that powerful forces beyond the control of the United
States had accounted for this decline. In a combination of neorealist and
neoliberal approaches, Gilpin focused upon the role of the American-
based multinational corporation, which had performed an important
role in the maintenance and expansion of the power of the United
States. For Gilpin, American hegemony in the contemporary world
rested, in part, on the vast international operations of American
corporations. The underlying assumption of American officials had
been that the national interest of the United States was well served by
the overseas expansion of American corporations. Corporate control by
American executives and corporate dependence on the American
market had encouraged public officials to believe that the corporations
would on the whole behave consistently with the interests of the United
States.11 In addition, Gilpin pointed out that through the transformation
of American technology and the free enterprise tradition, multinational
corporations had helped to create the democratic and pluralistic world
of the American liberal vision. This view reached several conclusions,
namely that:
'a) The multinational corporation is the most dynamic and vital sector
of the American economy; these corporations represent America's
greatest strength and should be encouraged; b) the United States
would suffer economic and political decline if it failed to exploit to the
fullest the potential of the MNC and c) the MNC through the export of
capital and technology, raises the standard of living elsewhere, thus
11 Robert Gilpin, The US Power and the Multinational Corporation, pp. 142-146 & 197.
14
Chapter One The Changing Basis of Hegemony
creating economic partners for the United States and nation committed
to the American values of free enterprise and political democracy.' 12
However, Gilpin expressed some doubts as to whether or not
this assumption of complementarity of corporate and national interests
would continue to hold in the future. Gilpin suggested that the decline
of American power was leading to an era of grave uncertainty. In a
world economy composed of several major centres of economic power,
economic bargaining and coalitions would predominate. In fact, the
direction of the evolution of the international economy had been from a
liberal to a negotiated system. 13 Although the relative balance of
political and market determinants of economic activities would differ
from one economic sector to another and from time to time, market
shares and the global location of economic activities had become
strongly influenced by bargaining among nation-states and
multinational corporation.14
For Gilpin, although American economic and military power had
grown immensely in absolute terms throughout the postwar period, the
relative position of the United States had dramatically declined. In
relationship to other states and to America's former primacy in all
aspects of power (military and economic), the United States had
12	 Gilpin, The USPowerand the Multinational Corporation, p. 167.
13 Robert Gilpin, The US Power and the Multinational Corporation, p. 262.
14 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton
University Press, Princeton 1987) p. 408.
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suffered a major dedine in power. Gilpin maintained that although the
United States continued to be the dominant power and most prestigious
state in the system, it no longer had the power to govern the system as
it has done in the past It was increasingly unable to maintain the
existing distribution of territory, its spheres of influence and the rules of
the world economy. One of Gilpin's main arguments was that
decreased US capacity and willingness to provide leadership had
caused the postwar liberal international economy to deteriorate
seriously. Thus, Gilpin linked American decline with two potentially
disastrous results:
'The relative decline of American hegemony has a) seriously
undermined the stable political framework that sustained the
expansion of a liberal world economy in the postwar era and b)
increased protectionism and economic instability.' 15
The United States should accept a greater regionalisation of the world
economy, which implied greater representation and voice for other
nations and regional blocs in international economic organisations. The
attempt to hold on to rather than adjust to the shifting balance of world
power could be even more costly for the United States in the long run.16
15 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge) p. 232; Robert Gilpin: The Political Economy of International Relations,
p.351.
16 Like many observers at the end of the 1980s, Gilpin concentrated on the fact that
Japan had become the world's largest creditor. See Robert Gilpin, "Where Does Japan
Fit In?", Millenium, vol. 18, 1989, pp. 329-342; Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of
International Relations, pp. 364-369 & 371.
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However, Gilpm, has not explained the ways in which this adjustment
could take place. Gilpin has not elaborated on factors such as
international financial institutions and has ignored the mechanisms by
which the United States could take advantage of a possible instability of
the system in the form of a financial crisis. For example there was no
connection between financial crises and how these crises offer the
opportunity to the United States to promote, through international
financial institutions, a specific set of ideas and principles about the
workings of the global economy.
One of the most common definitions of hegemony has been
provided by Robert Keohane, who described it as a preponderance of
material resources. Keohane also defined hegemonic leadership as a
situation in which one state is powerful enough to maintain the
essential rules governing interstate relations and is willing to do so. 17
Keohane argued that the dominance of a single great power could
contribute to order in world politics but it was not a sufficient condition
and there was little reason to believe that it was necessary. Regimes
produce strong vested interests in cooperation by facilitating
recognition of mutual interests and by providing normative incentives
to cooperate in the absence of a hegemon.
17 Robert Keohane, and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (Harper Collins
Publishers, New York 1989) p. 49.
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Departing from hegemomc stability theory, Robert Keohane and
Joseph Nye have argued that international leadership could take three
forms: hegemony, unilateralism and multilateralism. Hegemonic
leadership was one way in which a public good -- responsibility --
could be supplied. But the hegemonic leader would constantly be
tempted to use its leadership position for the sake of specific, self-
oriented gains. A problem that had occurred was that wffling
submission to hegemonic leadership was difficult to prolong because
the legitimacy of such leadership tended to erode. Thus, the need for
compulsion in hegemonic leadership increased. The second type of
hegemonic leadership that Keohane and Nye defined was unilateral
initiative that set an international example. A large state might not be
able or willing to police the behaviour of other states, but because of its
size and importance, its actions could determine the regimes that
governed situations of interdependence, both because of its direct
effects and through imitation. More specifically, because the American
economy was dominant and less vulnerable than those of Japan,
Germany or France the United States had more leeway in foreign
economic policy than its principal competitors. The third type of
leadership was based on action to induce other states to help stabilise
an international regime. Keohane and Nye asserted that leading states
would forego short-run gains in bargaining in order to secure the long-
run gains associated with stable international regimes. Large states
18
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were most likely to make such short-run sacrifices, because they were
likely to be major beneficiaries of the regime and they could expect their
initiatives to have significant effects on world politics. However, for
such leadership to be sustainable other states must cooperate. This
cooperation depended on the legitimacy of the regime - the widespread
perception that it was indeed in the interests of all major parties. 18
Based on the above analysis, Keohane and Nye, writing in 1989,
have pointed out that although the United States still had the most
powerful economy in the world, the prospects for American hegemony
- to the point of being able to determine and maintain the rules - were
slim. Unless drastic changes took place in world politics, hegemonic
leadership would be out of the question. For Keohane and Nye, the
choice was essentially between non-hegemonic leadership and no
effective leadership at all. Effective non-hegemonic leadership
depended to some extent on unilateral initiatives and setting good
examples, but it was also related in complex ways to cooperation and to
international institutions.19 Keohane's basic argument was that
'Successful hegemonic leadership itself depended on a certain form of
asymmetrical cooperation. Material predominance alone does not
guarantee either stability or effective leadership. The hegemon may
'8 Keohane and Nye: Po wer and Interdependence, pp. 229-231.
19 Keohane and Nye: Power and interdependence, p. 231.
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have to invest resources in institutions in order to ensure that its
preferred rules will guide the behaviour of other countries.'20
This argument suggested the importance of the legitimacy of
hegemonic regimes and the coexistence of cooperation. This conception,
however, defined cooperation in terms of the presence or absence of
conflict. Keohane stressed the significance of the apparently high level
of international economic cooperation that had survived the alleged
decline of American hegemony but defined cooperation in terms of the
existence of formal agreements. International Monetary Fund (IMF)
programmes, for example, had elicited an astonishing degree of
coordination and compliance, despite their harsh impact. Yet the
existence of such agreements strained the meaning of the term
cooperation. The IME might formally agree on a set of policies, but
agreement at this level could obscure deeper conflicts and uneven
power relations both within and among nations.
According to another advocate of the declinist school, David
Calleo, the post-war Western liberal system had been based on
American power, imagination and energy, which shaped the great part
of the world into a pattern of American design. This system, also
known as the Fax Americana, not only was faltering but the United
20 See Robert Keohane: After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discard in the World
Political Economy (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1984) pp. 38, 39 & 46. For
more on international regimes see Robert Keohane, "The Demand for International
Regimes", International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2, 1982, pp. 325-355.
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States itself seemed more troubled and uncertain than at any lime since
the Great Depression of the 1930s. Furthermore, Calleo argued that the
postwar system was evolving into a more plural structure in which
other powers were becoming more active and powerful. Thus, the test
for American statesmanship should be not how long it managed to
cling to a deteriorating and overextended hegemony, but how well the
liberal international arrangements it had fostered could adapt
themselves to the stresses of the more plural order. The question that
was raised by Calleo was whether the postwar world system could
survive the relative decline of American power.21
Stephen Krasner argued that only states whose resources were
very large, both absolutely and relatively, could attempt to impose their
vision on other countries and the global system. At that point ideology
would become a critical determinant of the objectives of foreign policy.
According to Krasner, great power removed the usual restraints on
central decision-makers. Very powerful states escaped some of the
consequences of the inherently anarchic nature of the international
system. The association of an ideological foreign policy with a
hegemonic state was based implicitly upon an assumption of a
hierarchy of goals. States could only move on to higher things if more
fundamental aims had been satisfied. Just as man in the biosphere
21 David Calleo, The Imperious Economy, pp. 1-3.
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could engage in many activities not directly related to the survival of
the species, so hegemonic states could pursue ideological goals because
more basic needs had not been threatened. For Krasner, by measure of
aggregate capabilities and levels of development, the United States was
clearly a hegemon in the first decades after the end of World War II and
during these years the United States behaved as a stabiising and
liberalising hegemon. At some point between 1960 and the mid-1970s,
the United States had lost the margin of power required to successfully
perform the hegemonic functions. Other countries, such as Germany
and Japan had narrowed the relative lead upon which American
hegemony depended. However, Krasner distanced himself from the
main framework of hegemonic stability theory by emphasising the fact
that there could be stability in the system even if there was no longer a
hegemon to act as a stabiiser. 23 However, Krasner has not developed a
framework in order to explain how this stability could be achieved. For
example there is a lack of explanation about a) the role of capital flows
in the appearance of financial crises and b) the role of international
financial institutions in stabilising economies in crisis and c) how the
policies of these institutions are influenced by the United States.
Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest, p. 341.
Michael Webb and Stephen Krasner, "Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical
Assessment", Review of International Studies, no. 15, 1989, pp. 185 & 195.
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A contribution to the literature that further stimulated the debate
around America's relative decline emanated from Paul Kennedy. He
argued that if a hegemonic power overextended itself strategically it
would run the risk that the potential benefits from external expansion
could be outweighed by the great expense of it all - a dilemma that
would become acute if the nation concerned entered a period of relative
economic decline. Furthermore, Kennedy argued that the history of the
rise and the fall of the leading countries in the Great Power system
since the advance of Europe in the sixteenth century had shown a very
significant correlation over the longer term between productive and
revenue-raising capacities on the one hand and military strength on the
other.24 In the case of the United States, Kennedy pointed out that
America's hegemonic power was in decline and that American
statesmen had to recognise this broad trend and to manage affairs so
that the relative erosion of the United States' position took place slowly
and smoothly and was not accelerated by policies which brought
merely short-term advantage but longer-term disadvantage. 25 However,
this thesis will demonstrate that, in contrast to Kennedy's view, there is
rather an adjustment than a decline in the position of the United States.
There are certain mechanisms that facilitate the influence of the United
States in the global economy which are theoretically analysed in
24 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fail of the Great Powers: Economic Change and
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (EJnwin Hyman, London 1988) p. xvi.
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fail of Great Powers, pp. 534-535.
23
Chapter One The Changing Basis of Hegemony
Chapter Two arid applied and tested through the financial crises of the
1990s (the peso crisis 1994-95 and the South Korean crisis 1997-98).
A very common observation in the decline debate was that the
contemporary American economy operated in a very different
international environment from that of the past. Tom Kemp argued that
the United States had to share industrial and technological leadership
with other countries. After a century of exceptional growth, which had
made it the most powerful nation on earth, America was being
overtaken by other countries and had to face the consequences of the
loss of industrial and technological leadership. According to this point
of view, the relative, if not absolute, decline of the United States as a
world power was likely to continue with the irresistible rise of Japan
and the growth of Europe. For Kemp, the problem of the 1990s and the
prospect for the twenty-first century was much more one of adaptation
to world trends which were outside the control of Washington. 26
 From
a similar point of view, Stephen Burman argued that the mechanism of
decline was the burden of expenditure, which fell on the hegemon
through maintaining collective security:
'Globalisation has entailed the growth of other economic powers
capable of challenging American dominance and there is a sense
therefore in which the United States, as the sponsor of global
26 Tom Kemp, The Climax of Capitalism: The US Economy in the Twentieth Century
(Longman, London 1990) pp. 228, 229,232 & 233.
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capitalism, may prove to have been its own gravedigger by setting in
motion the very forces that will undermine its position.' 27
In a more general critique we could argue that neorealist
accounts of hegemony have focused upon state power and the creation
of international regimes for the coordination of policy and the
facilitation of cooperation among otherwise rival states. Neorealist IPE
has been primarily concerned to explain the emergence of political
order among competing states by suggesting that a single, politically
and economically preponderant state - a systemic leader or hegemon -
might be a necessary condition of order in the international system.
Thus a hegemonic state would also have a preponderant interest in
constructing a global system of order and would be more willing to
assume an asymmetrical share of the costs of that order. The general
framework of hegemonic stability theory had overstated the extent to
which leading states actually used their extraordinary power to compel
others to cooperate in the construction of an encompassing, systemic
order.28
The theory's oversimplification had shown up in its lack of
attention to non-governmental actors' roles in setting or influencing
economic policy. In the realist model, the state is the only important
Stephen Burman, America in the Modern World: The Transcendence of United
States Hegemony (Harvester-Wheatsheaf, New York 1991) pp. 28, 29.
Mark Rupert, Producing Hegemony: The Politics ofMass Production and American
GlobalPower, p.5
,
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actor. There is no acknowledgement of the complexity of formulating
foreign policy in today's world where non-governmental actors,
particularly transnationall corporations, with their global reach, have
tremendous power. As Anthony Tuo-Cofi Gadzey argued, hegemonic
stability theory as a typical rational model could not provide a realistic
analytical model of contemporary interstate interaction. 29 In his critique,
Robert Cox argued that neorealism reduced the states to the dimension
of material force and similarly reduced the structure of world order to
the balance of power as a configuration of material forces. Neorealism,
which dismissed social forces as irrelevant, tended to place low value
on the normative and institutional aspects of world order.3°
There are many reasons to believe that hegemonic stability
theory is far from accurate. Both Gilpin's self-exhausting hegemon and
Kindleberger's provider of public goods were seen as benevolent actors.
For Isabelle Grunberg, in order to believe in the theory's interpretation
of postwar history, we would have to agree on two assumptions,
namely: a) the United States had definitely declined and b) the decline
was due to farsighted, self-sacrificing policies. These two assumptions
are closely related to the theory's ethnocentrism and the theory's
potentially universal appeal especially to American policy-makers and
29 Anthony Tuo-Cofi Gadzey, The Political Economy of Power (Macmifian, London
1994) PP. 4-5.
3° Robert Cox, Social Forces, States and World Order (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 1996) pp. 146-149.
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scholars.31
 Indeed, the theory of hegemonic stabffity had a built-in,
ethnocentric bias simply in the sense that it links the fate of the world
with that of the United States, whereas most developments had sprung
from a much wider range of variables. In the theory of hegemonic
stability, the discussion about America's dedine, if it had really taken
place, had broadened and taken on a universal dimension. For
Americans who perceived their country as the focal point of the whole
world, the country's decline should be everyone's concern. As
Grunberg explained, the ethnocentricism was certainly less than naïve,
at least in its ultimate effects on agenda setting:
'The theory of hegemonic stability offered no escape from chaos,
except through a rejuvenation of US power, a rejuvenation to which all
allies should contribute for their own good.' 32
Hegemonic stability theory cannot explain regime persistence in
the face of relative American decline. In contrast to the neorealist
perspective the neoliberal view holds that the relative dedine of a
hegemonic state does not necessarily imply a subsequent period of
instability in the system. Instead there could be a cooperative
international environment. The neorealist perspective lacks a
recognition that world order involves more than just the relationships
of state-based actors. The neoliberal approach recognises the
31 Isabel Grunberg, "Exploring the myth of Hegemonic Stability", pp. 443-444.
32	 Grunberg, "Exploring the myth of Hegemonic Stability", pp. 448-449.
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importance of non-state actors but fails to address the role of
institutions, ideas and domestic elites in shaping state and private
actors activities.
Alternatives to Hegemonic Stability Theory
A neo-Marxist or structuralist definition of hegemony was
offered by Immanuel Wallerstein who defined hegemony as a
temporary characteristic of the world-system as a whole. For
Wallerstein's world-systems interpretation, hegemony referred to a
situation in which the ongoing rivalry between the so-called great
powers was so unbalanced that one power was truly primus inter
pares, that is, one power could largely impose its rules and its wishes in
the economic, political, military, diplomatic and even cultural arenas.
Using this definition, Wallerstein identified three instances of
hegemony: the Dutch United Provinces in the mid-seventeenth century
(1620-72), the United Kingdom in the mid-nineteenth (1815-73) and the
United States in the mid-twentieth (1945-67).33
For more details on these three instances of hegemony see Immanuel Wallerstein,
"The Three thstances of Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist World Economy",
p. 237.
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Wallerstein also considered the politics of hegemony. He argued
that global economic pre-eminence clearly shaped the definition of the
hegemon's national interest. Hegemons tended to identify their
interests with a liberal economic order. They came forward as
defenders of the principle of the free flow of the factors of production
throughout the world economy. However, hegemonic powers regularly
made exceptions to their anti-mercantilism when it was in their interest
to do so and they regularly were willing to interfere with political
processes in other states in order to ensure their own advantag&4.
Wallerstein pointed out that the United States was much weaker in the
1980s - economically, politically, culturally - than in the 1960s. Power
had shifted for structural reasons and not because of policy errors. A
structural factor was the advantage of the latecomer. After 1945,
Western Europe and Japan had to "catch up" with US industrial
strength, which had emerged from the war unscathed. Entering late
into an expanding world-economy permitted productivity leaps
because of newer machinery and relatively cheaper skilled labour.
Although Wallerstein's theory of the capitalist world-economy had
offered one possible alternative to the neorealist and neoliberal
assumptions, it too ended up with a highly abstract and one-sided
Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the
Capitalist World Economy", p. 239.
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understanding of states, their historical grounding in state-society
relations, and the politics of these relations in the modern world.35
From a structuralist point of view, George Modeiski criticised
hegemomc stability theory by pointing out that its focus on the
interaction of wealth and power was basically materialistic. He also
argued that this focus should be recognised as frustratingly narrow.
Factors such as the search for identity or knowledge and the process of
learning or legitimation were systematically ignored. 36 This problem
was evident in works such as those of Kindleberger and Gilpin. The
importance of legitimate leadership was often ignored in those pure
neorealist, materialistic perspectives of hegemonic power. Modeiski
argued that legitimate leadership "has the capacity of riding out the
most threatening storms". Thus, American global leadership was likely
to continue because the United States continued to hold the essential
qualffications for it favourable geographical location, economic
potential and military forces capable of global reach. Modeiski also
stressed the importance of the United States, serving as the capital zone
of a global community of democracy. No country had a better claim on
all these grounds.37 Structural approaches such as those of Wallerstein
and Modelski share the notion that hegemony or leadership is rooted in
5 Mark Rupert, Producing Hegemony: The Politics ofMass Production and American
GlobalPower, p. 8.
George Modeiski, "Global Leadership: End Game Scenarios", in World Leadershiv
and Hegemony, p. 243.
37 George Modeiski, "Global Leadership: End Game Scenarios", pp. 243 & 253.
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the distribution of power, which is defined just as in hegemonic
stability theory, in terms of material capabilities. These approaches still
do not depart from the neorealist conviction that a decline in hegemonic
power brings instability in the system.
Joe Nelson offered a different way to interpret the problem. He
argued that there was something new under the sun, a new world
order, and that this order was a key cause of American economic
difficulties and all of this was better explained by recent developments
in post-industrial capitalism than by the experiences of the Netherlands
in the fifteenth and sixteenth century or Great Britain in the nineteenth
century. Hegemonic arguments had ignored the role of managerial
strategies in bringing new levels of economic interdependence. Nelson
pointed out that recent international developments were qualitatively
different than all that had occurred in the past and the alleged decline
of American hegemonic power could not by any stretch of the
imagination be thought to replicate cycles of the rise and fall of
nations.38 Nelson's analysis showed that technological advances had
altered the world past from present. These advances had facilitated
growth in international trade and growth in a new level of economic
interdependence. It was this interdependence - not the hegemony, nor
Joe Nelson, Post-Industrial Capitalism: Exploring Economic Inequality in America,
(SAGE Publications, London 1995) pp. 93,94.
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the rise and fall of nations - that had prompted convergence in world
wealth, convergence that had mistakenly been interpreted in terms of
America's decline. However, Nelson has ignored factors such as
international institutions and the role of financial crises in providing the
United States the opportunity to advance free market ideas directly or
indirectly through international institutions.
From another perspective, Arthur Stein had argued that without
agreements there could be no regime. Hegemons might lead but they
needed followers and should make concessions to gain the assent of
others. In other words, the liberal trade regimes that had emerged in
both centuries in Britain and the United States had been founded on
asymmetric bargains that permitted discrimination, especially against
the hegemon. Just as the existence of a hegemonic power did not
necessarily imply the emergence of a liberal trading order, so its decline
did not necessarily mark the end of such a regime. 39 Stein's principal
argument was that hegemons did not create openness. They could open
their economies and they could assure others of non-retaliation as long
as others imposed trade barriers only within specified constraints and
under specified conditions. Hegemons needed followers in order to
liberalise international exchanges:
Arthur Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States arid the
International Economic Order", International Organization voL 38, no. 2, 1984, pp. 35-
38.
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'The hegemon's decline does not signify that it has become irrelevant
Rather it remains a major, perhaps still the major, trading power, and
its participation and agreement are necessary if relative openness is to
be maintained. Thus, the continued agreement of the United States
remains essential for the maintenance of the postwar trading order it
made possible by its willingness to bear the costs of openness.' 40
For her part, Susan Strange was instrumental in identifying the
reasons why the myth of America's lost hegemony had taken root so
strongly in the United States' academic community about twenty years
ago and why it had been so generally accepted since. Strange first
criticised the notion that derived from the theory of public goods and
the theory of hegemonic stability namely, that the lack of international
economic cooperation could be explained by applying the theory to the
behaviour of states in conditions of dispersed political power. This
critique led to five important propositions, namely: a) the game of states
had become much more economic than political, b) the United States'
structural power had, on balance, increased, c) "realism" and
"unilateralism" were much more evident in the US foreign policy than
liberal internationalism, d) the use of hegemonic structural power in
ways that were destructive of international order and cooperation had
been an important cause of world economic instability, and e) thus, a
necessary condition for greater stability and cooperation resided within
° Arthur Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States and the
International Economic Order", p. 35
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the United States rather than in the institutions and mechanisms of
international cooperation.41
Strange's analysis maintained that in the new competitive game
between states it was not relational power - that is the power of A to get
B to do something it would not otherwise do - but structural power that
mattered. Structural power was the power to choose and to shape the
structures of the global political economy within which other states,
their political institutions and their economic enterprises, had to
operate.42 According to Strange, structural power was to be found, not
in a single structure, but rather in four separate but interrelated
structures: a) a security structure b) a production structure c) a financial
structure and d) a knowledge structure. In the international political
economy, all four were important, and the state, which was dominant
in most aspects of structural power, was the most powerful. 43 More
importantly, Strange asserted that some American analysts' choice of
indicators had misled them into thinking that their country was
suffering economic decline:
'It is not the share of industrial manufactured products made in the
United States nor the share of US exports of manufactures to world
markets that counts. We should look instead at the proportion of total
world production of goods and services produced: a) in the United
41 Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony"1 pp. 553, 554.
Susan Strange, States and Markets (Pinter Publishers, London 1987) p. 26.
43 Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony" pp. 564,565.
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States and b) by enterprises ultimately headquartered in the United
States and responsible to the government in Washington.' 44
Joseph Nye and Wffliam Owens went further by pointing out
that knowledge, more than ever before, was power. The one country
that could best lead the information revolution would be more
powerful than any other. Nye argued that for the foreseeable future,
that country would be the United States:
'America has apparent strength in military power and economic
production. Yet its more subtle comparative advantage is its ability to
collect, process, act upon and disseminate information, an edge that
will almost certainly grow over the next decade.'45
This information edge would be equally important as a force multiplier
of American diplomacy, including "soft power" - the ability to achieve
desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than
coercion. It would work by convincing others to follow, or getting them
to agree to, norms and institutions that produced the desired
behaviour. For Nye and Owens, soft power could rest on the appeal of
one's ideas or the ability to set the agenda in ways that shaped the
preferences of others. However, Nye and Owens argued that two
conceptual problems had prevented the United States from realising its
potential. The first was that outmoded thinking had clouded the
44 Susan Strange: "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony", pp. 227,228.
45 Joseph Nye and William Owens, "America's Information Edge", Foreign Affairs,
vol. 75, no. 2, 1996, p. 2.
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appreciation of information as power. Traditional measures of military
force, gross national product, population, energy, land and minerals
had continued to dominate discussions of the balance of power. These
power resources still mattered and American leadership continued to
depend on them as well as on the information edge. But as Nye pointed
out, these measures failed to anticipate the demise of the Soviet Union
and they were equally poor means of forecasting for the exercise of
American leadership into the next century.46 Theorists of hegemonic
stability had generally failed to spell out the casual connections
between military and economic power and hegemony.
The second conceptual problem according to Nye and Owens
had been that information power was hard to categorise because it cut
across all other military, economic, social and political power resources,
in some cases diminishing their strength, but in others multiplying it. In
their concluding remarks, Nye and Owens claimed that the twenty-first
century, not the twentieth, would turn out to be the period of America's
greatest pre-eminence. Nye suggested that a look at the five-century-
old modern state system showed that different power resources had
never been static and that they continued to change in the
contemporary world. In an age of information-based economies and
transnational interdependence, power was becoming less transferable,
'Joseph Nye and Wffliam Owens, "America's Information Edge", p. 2.
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less tangible and less coercive. For Nye, information was becoming the
new coin of the international realm and better than any other countly,
the United States was now positioned to multiply the potency of its
hard and soft power resources through information.47
In sum neorealists, neoliberals and world system analysts
viewed hegemony very closely linked to state power and state power
was conceived in terms of the nation-state. From another perspective
the analyses of Susan Strange and Joseph Nye provided the concepts of
structural power and soft power which are important in understanding
the changing nature of hegemony. However, while these analyses
recognised the role of non-state actors and ideas they did not elaborate
on the role of transnational mobile capital and domestic elites. The next
part of this chapter introduces some basic concepts of the Gramscian
framework in order to move to the ideas of Robert Cox, which broaden
our understanding of American hegemony especially regarding the role
of domestic elites.
Joseph Nye, "The Changing Nature of World Power", Political Science Quarterly,
Vol. 105, No.2, 1990, p. 183; Joseph Nye and Wffliam Owens, "America's Information
Edge", pp. 5 & 9.
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The Graniscian Framework
In Antonio Gramsci's approach to hegemony, his concern about
legitimacy had led him to define hegemony as more than a simple
resource preponderance or success in controlling joint outcomes in the
interstate system. However, it must be understood that Gramsci's
concepts in general resist ready definition. His concepts, designed to
grasp some of the complexities present in social processes are multi-
faceted. Gramsci's concepts of civil society, historical bloc and
hegemony formed the basis upon which the new Global Political
Economy has been developed by scholars such as Robert Cox, Stephen
Gill, and Giovanni Arrighi 48. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci
examined the way in which political society or the realm of state power
and authority, created and maintained as well as manipulated systems
of beliefs and altitudes in civil society and how the predominant class
not only created hegemony but could also depend in its quest for power
on the consent arising from the masses of people.49 This consent was
See Robert Cox: "Social Forces, States and World Order"; Robert Cox: Approaches to
World Ordei Robert Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An
Essay in Method."; Stephen Gifi, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission;
Stephen Gill: Gramsci Historical Materialism and International Relations (Cambridge
Univ. Press, Cambridge 1993); Giovanni Arrighi, "The Three Hegemonies of
Historical Capitalism".
49 See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, translated by Q. Hoare
and G. Nowell Smith (International Publishers, New York 1971).
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carried by systems and structures of beliefs, values, norms and practices
of everyday life which unconsciously legitimated the order of things.
An emphasis upon the non-material basis of power is the
hallmark of Antonio Gramsci's approach to hegemony. According to
Gramsci state and society together constituted a solid structure which
was called an historic bloc. An historic bloc encompassed political,
cultural and economic aspects of a particular social formation and it
could not exist without a hegemonic social class. 50 Gramsci stated that
the supremacy of a social group or class manifested itself in two
different ways: domination (dominlo) or coercion, and intellectual and
moral leadership (direzione intelletuale e morale). This latter type of
supremacy constituted hegemony. It followed that hegemony was the
predominance obtained by consent rather than force of one class or
group over other classes. 51 However, this ideological superiority must
have solid economic roots. In other words, if hegemony was ethico-
political, it should also be economic. It should also have its foundation
in the decisive function that the leading group exercised in the decisive
nucleus of economic activity. Thus, hegemonic leadership emerged
50 Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in
Method.", p. 56.
51 Joseph Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought. Hegemony Consdousness and the
Revolutionary Process, (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1981) P. 24.
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only when the economic material base of a dominant state was set
squarely in a uniquely, inspiring philosophical and moral world view.52
The Gramscian idea of hegemony owed its origins to the political
thought of Nicolo Machiavelli but helped to broaden even further the
potential scope and application of the concept. In the fifteenth centuly
Machiavelli had been concerned with finding the leadership and the
supporting social basis for a united Italy. In the twentieth century
Gramsci was concerned with the leadership and a supportive basis for
an alternative to fascism. Gramsci had taken over from Machiavelli the
image of power as a centaur: half man, half beast, a necessary
combination of consent and coercion:53
'They are the levels of force and consent, authority and hegemony,
violence and civilisation, of the individual moment and of the
propaganda, of tactics and of strategy. In actual fact, it often happens
that the more the first perspective is immediate and elementary, the
more the second has to be distant (not in time but as a dialectical
relation) complex and ambitious.'
To the extent that the consensual aspect of power was in the forefront,
hegemony would prevail. According to Cox,
'The Machiavellian connection frees the concept of power (and of
hegemony as one form of power) from a tie to historically specific
social classes and gives it a wider applicability to relations of
dominance and subordination, including relations of world 	 55
52 Anthony Tuo-Kofi Gadzey, The Political Economy of Power: Hegemony and
Economic Liberalism, p. 29.
Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Robert Adams, ed. (Norton Critical Edition, New
York 1977) pp. 169-170.
Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, pp. 169-170.
55 Robert Cox with Timothy Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, p. 127.
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By identifying hegemony purely and simply with the dominant
ideology or a "mechanism of legitimacy", the Machiavellian distinction
between forms of consent was glossed over and a simple identity was
postulated between ideology, culture and language. 56 For Gramsci,
however, the effects of hegemony were highly contradictory. The more
authentically hegemomc a class was, the more it would leave opposing
classes the possibifity of organising and forming themselves into an
autonomous political force. At this point two crucial and closely related
problems had arisen. As Joseph Femia has stated the Gramscian
concept of hegemony embodied a hypothesis that within a stable social
order, there should be a basis of agreement so powerful that it could
counteract the division and disruptive forces arising from conflicting
interests. But consent though voluntary agreement could vary in
intensity. On the one hand, it could flow from a profound sense of
obligation, from wholesale internalisation of dominant values and
definitions; on the other hand, from their very partial assimilation, from
an uneasy feeling that the status quo was nevertheless the only viable
form of society.57
For Gramsci, hegemony was not a static concept but a process of
continuous creation which, given its massive scale, was bound to be
Christine Buci-Glucksman, Gramsci and the State (Lawrence and Wishart, London
1975) P. 57.
57	 Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought, pp. 38-40.
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uneven in the degree of legitimacy it commanded and to leave some
room for antagonistic cultural expressions to develop. 58
 For example, he
characterised hegemony as
'The spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population
to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant
fundamental group, consent historically caused by the prestige
accruing to the dominant group because of its position and function in
the production.' 59
Elsewhere Gramsci suggested that those who were consenting must
somehow be truly convinced that the interests of the dominant group
were those of society at large, and that the hegemonic group stood for a
proper social order in which all men were justly locked.
'The fact of hegemony undoubtedly presupposes that account be taken
of the interests of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised
and that the leading group make sacrifices of an economic-corporate
kind.' 60
As Robert Cox has explained, Gramsci rejected a narrow or
superficial view of the state which reduced it, for instance, to the
foreign policy bureaucracy or the state's military capabilities. Indeed,
historically, hegemonies were founded by powerful states which had
undergone a thorough social and economic revolution which modified
not only the internal economic and political structures of the state in
Walter Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's
Political and Cultural Theory, (University of California Press, Berkeley 1980) P. 174
59	 V. Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought, p. 42.
60	 V. Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought, p. 42.
42
Chapter One The Changing Basis of Hegemony
question but also unleashed energies which expanded beyond the
state's boundaries. World hegemony was thus in its beginning an
outward expansion of the internal hegemony established by a dominant
social class.61
To illustrate that point it is essential to focus on a part of The
Prison Notebooks headed "Americanism and Fordism", where Gramsci
explored the technocratic and corporatist tendencies at work in
advanced capitalism. In particular, he was concerned with the
significance of "Taylorism" as a method used by American capitalists to
subordinate workers to machine specialisation and the cult of
efficiency.62 According to Gramsci, Taylor's ideas formed the basis of
"Americanism" or "Fordism", which was defined as the ideology of the
advanced sectors of American industry. The chief goals of this ideology
were to "rationalise production and create a new type of man suited to
the new type of work". America, Gramsci believed, enjoyed a
preliminary condition, which facilitated the implementation of
Fordism. America had no feudal past, and it was "relatively free of
these parasitic residues whose presence has hindered the development
61 Robert Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations", pp. 58, 61.
62 Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856-1915) was the preeminent ideologue of "scientific
management", which promoted and justified technical rationality and efficiency.
Taylor represented this as involving a reconciliation of employers and workers in a
new shop-floor consensus, making possible the realisation of a common interest
shared by employer and individual workers. Ultimately, the goal of Taylorism was to
create a more efficient worker, greater production, and greater profits. Fordism was
the application of Taylorism; it was the way in which greater productivity was to be
achieved. For more on Taylorism and Fordism, see Mark Rupert, Producing
Hegemony, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995) pp. 60-62 & 67-73.
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of European industry and commerce".63
 What is more important
however, was that American capitalism appeared inseparably linked to
a different form of organisation of hegemony from the dominant class'
standpoint. As Christine Bucki-Glucksmann argued, through a
combination of force (destruction of unions) and consent (a policy of
high wages, social psychology and methods of adaptation) capitalist
rationalisation of production aimed at creating a new type of worker
compatible with "Fordised" industry. In this type of industry the
factory was not separated from society: Hegemony in the factory was
accompanied by an intensified system of ideological and moral
constraints outside work.
The political apparatus of mass production had been woven into
the fabric of sociopolitical relations in the United States. This neoliberal
constellation of public and private powers in the United States was
integral to postwar American global power in both an instrumental and
a substantive sense. As Rupert has explained:
'Instrumentally, America's mass-production industries produced vast
quantities of goods, which helped to defeat fascism, arrest postwar
economic crisis in Europe and contribute to a renewal of growth.
Substantively, the quality of social organisations reconstructed in the
core of the world economy was shaped by the American productivist
ethos, its putatively apolitical consensus on economic growth and the
limited generalisation of affluence associated with it. The framework of
ideological, political and economic stability necessary for the
emergence of a vibrant core of liberal capitalist states-societies was
63 Joseph Femia, Gramscl's Political Thought, pp. 29-30.
'4 Christine Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the State pp. 82-84.
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made possible by the politics of productivity and the reconstruction of
state-society relations in the USA.' 65
This concept of world hegemony referred to the power of a state
to exercise governmental functions over a system of sovereign states. In
principle, this power might just involve the ordinary management of
such a system as instituted at a given time. However, as Giovanni
Arrighi has argued, the government of a system of sovereign states in
practice always involved some kind of transformative action that
changed the mode of operation of the system in a fundamental way.66
This power was something more and different than dominance. It was
the power associated with dominance expanded by the exercise of
intellectual and moral leadership. As Gramsci, with reference to
hegemony at the national level, emphasised:
'The supremacy of a social group manifests itseff in two ways, as
domination and as intellectual and moral leadership. A social group
can and indeed must, already exercise leadership before winning
governmental power; it subsequently becomes dominant when it
exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must
continue to lead as well.'67
The work of Antonio Gramsci extended the definition of
hegemony to include the relationship between social classes. Thus, his
conception of hegemony captured the inter-structuring of cultural,
Mark Rupert, ProducIng Hegem ony, p. 103.
66 Giovanni Arrighi, "The Three Hegemonies of Historical Capitalism", pp. 1148-149.
67 Antopio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Grainscj pp. 57.
58.
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economic, political and social forces that coalesce to ensure the
domination of the ruling elite. Hegemony functioned as a complex of
experiences, relationships and activities that maintained the status quo.
Although Gramsci's theory had provided a vehicle for criticising the
neorealist assumption that power resides primarily in objective
structures, it must be understood that he did not conceive of power
exclusively in terms of ideological consensus among the ruling class
and the subordinate groups. Gramsci's concept of hegemony also
included an important policy dimension that was especially applicable
to the analysis of American hegemonic power. Not only must the
hegemonic group dominate the ideological terrain, controlling morally
and doctrinally the terms of debate. It also must be able to implement
policies that simultaneously produce consent even as they serve the
long-range interests of the ruling group.68
The extension of Gramscian ideas to the study of International
Relations and Global Political Economy has involved ambitious studies
concerned to define the origins, development and dynamics of the
emerging global political economy. Nonetheless, Cox, Ikenberry, Gifi
and Cafruny, have already elaborated on the internationalisation of the
state and civil society, the international aspects of social hegemony and
supremacy and the transnational class and bloc formations and other
issues which help to define the nature of global politics in the twentieth
Alan Cafruny, "A Gramscian Concept of Declining Hegemony", pp. 103-105.
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century. Gramsci's thinking has suggested the need to pay closer
attention to the reciprocal relationship between changes in American
political economy and changes in the international economy.
The neo-Gramscian Framework of Robert Cox
Robert Cox was the first to explore the implications of Gramsci's
concepts of hegemony for international relations. In contrast to both
neorealist and Wallerstein's understandings of international hegemony
as a preponderance of material resources which one state might deploy
in its attempts to secure the compliance of others, Cox pointed to the
social organisation of production as it had operated on a global scale
and to the qualitative relations of power and hegemony which existed
in such a historical structure.69
Cox proposed that historical materialism70 was a foremost source
of critical theory and it corrected neorealism in four important respects.
69 See Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International
Relations Theory" in Millenium: Journal of hiternational Studies, vol. 10 no. 2, 1981,
pp. 126-155.
7° Marxism's historical materialism prescribed that history inevitably followed certain
laws and that individuals had little or no influence on its development. Central to
historical materialism was the belief that change take place through the meeting of
two opposing forces (thesis and antithesis). Their opposition was resolved by
combination produced by a higher force (synthesis). See Stanley Aronowitz, The
Crisis in Historical Materialism: Class, Politcs and Culture in Marxist Theory
(University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota 1990). Gramsci's historical materialism did
not deny the objectivity of material conditions. However, for Gramsci, effective
human action was the consequence neither of pure wifi nor of inexorable forces, but of
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First, both realism and historical materialism had directed attention to
conflict. However, neorealism saw conflict as a recurrent consequence
of a continuing structure, whereas historical materialism saw conflict as
a possible cause of structural change. Second, historical materialism
added a new dimension of power to that of rivalry among the most
powerful states. This dimension was the dominance and subordination
of centre over periphery in a world political economy. Third, historical
materialism enlarged the realist perspective through its concern with
the relationship between the state and civil society, as defined by
Gramsci. Indeed Gramsci had contrasted historical materialism, which
recognised the efficacy of ethical and cultural sources of political action
(though always relating them to the economic sphere) with what he
called historical economism or the reduction of everything to
technological and material interests. Fourth, historical materialism
focused upon the production process as a critical element in the
explanation of the particular historical form taken by a state/society
complex. While neorealism implicitly had taken the production process
and the power relations inherent in it as a given element of the national
interest, historical materialism was sensitive to the dialectical
a particular kind of interaction between o1jective circumstances and the creative spirit
of man. Granisci's historical materialism also prescribed that the economic base set, in
a strict maimer, the range of possible outcome, but free political and ideological
activity was ultimately decisive in determining which alternative prevailed. See
Joseph Femia, Gramsci's Political Though, pp. 120-121.
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possibilities of change in the sphere of production which could affect
the state and world order.71
Cox distinguished three categories of forces that interact in a
structure, namely material capabilities, ideas and institutions:
FIGURE 1.1 - COX'S THREE CATEGORIES OF FORCES
Ideas
/\
Material Capabilities	 Institutions
Material capabilities are productive and destructive potentials. In their
dynamic form, these exist as technological and organisational
capabilities and in their accumulated forms as natural resources which
technology can transform. Ideas are broadly of two kinds. One kind
consists of those shared notions of the nature of social relations, which
tend to preserve habits and expectations of behaviour. For instance, one
of these notions is that people are organised and commanded by states,
which have authority over defined territories. Such notions, though
durable over long periods of time, are historically confined. The other
kind of ideas relevant to a historical structure, are collective images of
For this discussion see Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond
International Relations Theory", pp. 134-137.
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social order held by different groups of people. According to Cox, the
clash of rival collective images provided evidence of the potential for
alternative paths of development and raised questions as to the possible
material and institutional basis for the emergence of an alternative
structure. Institutionalisation was a means of stabilising and preserving
a particular order. Indeed, institutions reflected the power relations
prevailing at their point of origin and tended to encourage collective
images consistent with these power relations. However, eventually
institutions took on their own life. They could become a battleground of
opposing tendencies, or rival institutions could reflect different
tendencies. As Cox pointed out, institutions were particular amalgams
of ideas and material power which in turn influenced the development
of ideas and material capabilities.72
Cox particularly emphasised the role of international
organisation as a mechanism through which the universal norms of
world hegemony were expressed. Cox also explained that international
organisation functioned as the process through which the institutions of
hegemony and its ideology are developed. International organisation
was the product of the hegemonic world order and it ideologically
legitimated the norms of the world order. In other words, international
institutions and rules were generally initiated by the state which
Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations
Theory", pp. 139-143.
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established the hegemony. The dominant state secured the acquiescence
of other states, according to a hierarchy of powers within the interstate
structure of hegemony. There was an informal structure of influence
reflecting the different levels of real political and economic power,
which underlay the formal procedures for decisions. International
institutions reflected orientations favourable to the dominant social and
economic forces. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), for example, in recommending monetarism,
endorsed a dominant consensus of policy thinking in the core countries
and strengthened those who were determined to combat inflation this
way against others that were less concerned about inflation.
International institutions were actually connected with the national
hegemonic classes in the core countries and through the intermediary of
these classes, had a broader base in these countries.73
G. John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan subsequently broadened
this point to argue that the United States articulated and sought to
proliferate throughout Europe a set of normative principles based on
the notion of liberal multilateralism. The attempt by the United States to
construct a postwar hegemonic system was based as much on
international acceptance of a particular set of norms and principles as
Robert Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in
Method", pp. 162-175.
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on the then preponderant US material capabilities. Moreover, in its
attempt to legitimate its power:
'The United States was largely successful in inducing other nations to
buy into this normative order. In building postwar order, the United
States did exercise power through coercion and inducements. But it
also articulated norms of international order that, in combination with
the provision of material resources, came to be embraced by domestic
elites in various countries.'
In applying the concept of hegemony to world order, it became
important to determine when a period of hegemony begins and when it
ends. To illustrate, Cox considered the past century and a half as falling
into four distinguishable periods, namely, 1845-1875, 1875-1945, 1945-
1965, and 1965 to the present. The first period (1845-75) was hegemonic
because there was a world economy with Britain at its centre. Economic
doctrines consistent with British supremacy but universal in form -
comparative advantage, free trade and the gold standard - spread
gradually outward from Britain. At the same time, Britain held the
balance of power in Europe, thereby, preventing any challenge to
hegemony from a land-based power. Britain ruled supreme at sea and
had the capacity to enforce obedience by peripheral countries to the
rules of the market. In the second period (1875-1945) all these feature
were reversed. Other countries challenged British supremacy. The
C. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "The Legitimation of Hegemonic
Power" in D. Rapkin, ed. World Leadershiv and Hegemony (Lynne Rienner
Publishers, London 1991) pp. 59-61.
52
Chapter One The Changing Basis of Hegemony
balance of power in Europe became destabiised, leading to two world
wars. Free trade was superseded by protectionism, the Gold standard
was abandoned and the world economy fragmented into economic
blocs. Cox labelled this period as non-hegemonic. In the third period,
following World War 11(1945-65), the United States founded a new
hegemonic world order with institutions and doctrines adjusted to a
more complex world economy and according to Cox, to national
societies more sensitive to the political effects of economic crises.
Purposive American intervention solidified the basis of centrist, liberal
capitalist regimes in the occupied and liberated countries of the West,
excluding both communist and fascist alternatives to the neo-liberal
state and clearing the way for a moderate consensual politics of
growth.75 It was in these terms that the American global hegemony of
the postwar era was expressed. However, from the later 1960s through
to the early 1970s it became evident that this US-based world order was
no longer working well. During the uncertain times which followed,
'Three possibilities of structural transformation of world order opened
up: a reconstruction of hegemony with a broadening of political
management on the lines envisaged by the Trilateral Commission;
increased fragmentation of the world economy around big-power-
centred economic spheres; and the possible assertion of a Third-World-
based counter-hegemony with the concerted demand for a New
International Economic Order as a forerunner.' 76
7 Mark Rupert, Producing Hegemony, p. 43.
76 Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations", pp. 168-170.
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On the basis of this conditional situation, it would appear that,
historically, to become hegemonic, a state would have to found and
protect a world order that was universal in conception, which most
other states could find compatible with their interests. Historically,
hegemonies of this kind had been founded by powerful states which
had undergone a thorough social and economic revolution which not
only modified the internal economic and political structures of the state
in question but unleashed energies which expanded beyond the state's
boundaries. Thus, Cox argued that world hegemony was in its
beginning an outward expansion of the internal hegemony established
by a dominant social class. For Cox, hegemony at the international level
was not merely an order among states. It was an order within a world
economy with a dominant mode of production, which penetrated into
all countries and linked into other subordinate modes of production. It
was also a complex of international social relationships, which
connected the social classes of the different countries. World hegemony
was describable as a social structure, an economic structure and a
political structure. Furthermore, hegemony was expressed in universal
norms, institutions and mechanisms which laid down general rules of
behaviour for states and for those forces of civil society that acted across
national boundaries - rules that supported the dominant mode of
production.
77 Robert Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations", pp. 171-172.
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Cox was using the term hegemony as meaning more than the
dominance of a single world power. It meant dominance of a particular
kind where:
'The dominant state creates an order based ideologically on a broad
measure of consent, functioning according to general principles that in
fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or states and
leading social classes but at the same time offer some measure of
prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful.' 78
From a similar point of view, the transnational dimension of American
hegemony was underlined by Giovanni Arrighi:
'The contemporaneous development of international organisations and
transnational corporations has created an extensive and dense network
of pecuniary and non-pecuniary exchanges which no single state can
control unilaterally and more importantly, from which no state can de-
link except at exorbitant cost.' 7
This network included the United Nations, with its General Assembly,
the Security Council and specialised agencies, the IMF and the World
Bank, the GATT and the US-centred multinational corporations.
This organisational scope and its complexity has been a major
factor in enhancing the autonomy of the institutions of US hegemony
from each and every member of the inter-state, including the
hegemonic state itself. In addition, and more decisively, transnational
corporations have developed into an integrated system of production,
78 Robert Cox, Production, Power and World Order, p. 7.
Giovanni Arrighi, "The Three Hegemonies of Historical Capitalism" p. 182.
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exchange and accumulation which is subject to no state authority and
has the power to subject to its "laws" each and every member of the
interstate system. For Arrighi, the emergence of this "Free Enterprise
System" has been the most distinctive result of US hegemony as well as
its ultimate limit. It marks the withering away of the interstate system
as the primary locus of world power. 8° For Strange, the American
Empire was spilling out beyond frontiers whose insubstantial nature,
where production was concerned, just showed the consolidation of an
entirely new kind of non-territorial empire. That non-territorial empire
was really the "flourishing economic base" of American power.81
The approaches of Strange and Arrighi were supplementary to
Cox's conclusion that world orders were grounded in social relations
and that a significant change in world order was likely to be traceable to
some fundamental change in social relations and in the national
political order. In Gramsci's thinking this would arise with the
emergence of a new historic bloc within national boundaries. The
greater richness of such a perspective could be demonstrated by
comparing the Coxian or neo-Grarnscian account of hegemony with
that offered by neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches. The novelty of
the neo-Gramscian perspective existed in the attention it gave to the
80 Giovanni Arrighi, "The Three Hegemonies of Capitalism", p. 183.
81 Susan Strange, "The Future of the American Power", Journal of International
Affairs, vol. 42, no. 2, 1988, pp. 6, & 7.
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role of ideology and domestic elites in establishing and maintaining a
hegemonic world order.
Other Neo-Gramscian Approaches
From a neo-Gramscian perspective, Stephen Gill and David Law
have argued that rise and fall of hegemons has been seen by realists and
world systems theorists in terms of a cyclical view of history, in which
the dynamism and power resources of a country propel it to hegemony.
Hegemony has been seen as a temporary and increasingly short-term
condition in the world system.82 Stephen Gill and David Law have
argued that the interpretation of the implications of changes in the
distribution of material power resources is far more complex. In an era
of transnational capitalism it was inaccurate to limit the conception of
hegemony by defining it simply in terms of the power of one state
relative to other states. Furthermore the neorealist approach tended to
underestimate the mobiising role of certain aspects of the United
States' political culture. According to Gill and Law, this was perhaps
linked to the assumptions held by realists that states acted coherently as
units, and that states were the only important units in international
82	 Gifi and David Law, The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems
and Policies (Harvester Wheatsheal, New York 1988) p. 336.
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relations. Indeed, the state-centric assumptions of realists (like Gilpin
and Krasner) and some Marxists (like Wallerstein) could lead to a
neglect of the prospect of changes in identification and interest in ways
that might effectively augment the power resources of the hegemon,
sustain cooperation and mitigate conflicts. Gill has asserted that:
'Such assumptions lead to an underestimation of the importance not
only of American civilisational models and the pro-capitalist and
liberal democratic values associated with Americanism, but also to a
systematic misunderstanding of the role of liberal economic ideas and
associated international institutions in the development of American
83
Using a Gramscian approach, Gill and Law argued that a
"transnational" hegemony had emerged in which a transnational
capital class predominated, leading a hegemonic bloc of mainly
transnational capital and incorporated labour. Gill and Law suggested
that at the geographical centre of such a potential "transnational"
hegemony would be a group of capitalist countries, lead by the United
States. The centrality of the United States and the regimes it had created
could be seen as facilitating a transnational historic bloc, in which the
leadership of the more dynamic transnational corporations was
associated with the growing mobility of capital, the revival and spread
of market forces and the ideological hegemony of associated liberal
frameworks of thought. Thus, it was argued that America's decline in
Stephen Gffl, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission, p. 75.
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the global political economy and its effects had been exaggerated. The
more crucial issue was the change in the relationship between the
American and the world political economy. What had been developing
in the 1970s and 1980s was a shift away from an international economic
order of economically sovereign states and national political economies,
linked together primarily by trade flows, towards a transnational liberal
economic order. As American hegemony became more transnational in
character it would become less h'allAmerican".M
However, according to Atilio Boron, ideological predominance,
institutional ingenuity and ceaseless political manoeuvring would not
be enough. Hegemony would not be viable without an overwhelming
superiority in the military arena because the ability to obtain obedience
in the international system largely exceeded the coercive capacities of
the superpower. A state whose hegemonic daims were far superior to
its real economic and military capacities would suffer a defeat,
prompting the reorganisation of the international system. Furthermore,
no nation could hope to be the hegemon of the international system
without simultaneously being an economic power able to control the
critical aspects of the world economy. 85 In the case of the United States,
Boron argued that no country in the foreseeable future could enjoy the
Stephen Gifi, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission, p. 88; Stephen
Gifi & David Law, The Global Political Econ amy, pp. 345, 347 & 355-358.
85 Atilio Boron, "Towards a Post-Hegemortic Age? The End of Pax Americana",
Security Dialogue VoL 25, no. 2,1994, pp.213-216.
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simultaneous overwhelming superiority in the economic, financial,
technological, political and military domains that the United States had
enjoyed in the past.
The institutional foundations of American leadership were still
in place and the widespread worry about the end of American
leadership was partly a result of a misunderstanding of what
leadership was and the changing conditions in which it must operate.
According to Ikenberry:
'If leadership means the ability to foster cooperation and commonality
of social purpose among states, American leadership and its
institutional creations will long outlast the decline of its postwar
position of economic dominance; and it wifi outlast the foreign policy
stumbling of particular administrations.' 86
In Ikenberry's argument, leadership was not simply the exercise of
power. It had two essential elements - power and purpose. It involved
the ability to project a set of common goals or principles that allowed a
group of states to define and pursue their interests in concerted or
congenial ways. Military power and coercion were overrated forms of
leadership assets. It was not in a hegemonic leader's interest to preside
over a global order that required constant use of material capabilities to
get other states to acquiesce. Legitimacy existed when political order
was based on reciprocal consent, and when secondary states bought
86 G. John Ikenberry, "The Future of International Leadership", Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 111 No. 3, 1996, p. 386.
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into rules and norms of the political order as a matter of principle and
not simply because they were forced into it. Ikenberry also emphasised
another aspect of hegemonic leadership - leadership by example. States
were particularly willing to follow a state if that state was successful,
that is, if it had developed a particularly appealing and prosperous
domestic political order. The appeal of America's booming postwar
economy and consumer society was world-wide and this appeal
certainly reinforced the hegemonic position of the United States. In
recent years major failings within the American society and economy
undermined the leadership claims of the United States. However,
despite these problems and although much of the material power of
American hegemony had eroded, the institutions of reciprocal and
legitimate joint governance remained. Ikenberry argued that this
system might well remain relatively stable for a very long lime87
As Bruce Russett argued, there had been a major gain to the
United States from the Fax Americana, which proved of great
significance in the short as well as in the long term: the pervasive
cultural influence of the United States. Altogether, the near-global
acceptance of so many aspects of American culture - consumption,
democracy, language - very quickly laid the basis for what neo-
87 G. John Ikenberry, "The Future of International Leadership", pp. 396-399 & 402..
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Gramscians called cultural hegemony. 88 In the longer term it had
shaped people's desires and perceptions of alternatives, so that their
preferences in international politics and economics were concordant
with those of Americans. Pervasive American cultural influence was
part of a structural transformation of the international system.
Furthermore, the spread of American culture (democratic, capitalist,
mass-consumption, anti-Communist) had laid the basis for innumerable
American economic and political gains. Thus, cultural hegemony,
according to Russett, had provided a long-term influence that persisted.
It was among the primary reasons why a decline in dominance over
material power had not been reflected in an equivalent loss of control
over outcomes.89
In his contribution to the debate, Alan Cafruny attempted to
apply Gramsci's three levels of hegemony to the case of the United
States after the War. These three periodisations could describe trends
and forces that overlapped, and could provide a theoretically and
empirically useful way of understanding the era of American
hegemony. According to Cafruny, a phase of integral hegemony existed
from the end of World War II to the London gold crisis of 1960 which
revealed the fragility of the dollar and signified the loss of American
88 Bruce Russet, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony or, Is Mark Twain
Really Dead?", International Organization, 39, no. 2, 1985, pp. 228, 229.
89 Bruce Russet, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony or, Is Mark Twain
Really Dead?", p. 230.
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power. Declining hegemony lasted until 1971, when the American
decision to abandon the dollar-gold standard indicated that
nationalistic and disintegrative tendencies had become irresistible for
the United States as well as other countries. From 1971 the international
political economy could be characterised as minimally hegemonic. At
this point, Cafruny argued that the widespread acceptance of neoliberal
ideas throughout the world represented a successful Gramscian
strategy on the part of the United States. Rule by consensus rather than
coercion might be said to demonstrate the continuity of American
hegemony. The concept of minimal hegemony suggested that despite
its relative decline, the United States continued to set the agenda for
global change.9°
In conclusion neorealist, neoliberalist and neo-Gramscian
conceptions of hegemony differ substantially as to the relative
importance of material and non-material basis of power. Neorealists
focus on material capabilities, neoliberals on market forces and neo-
Gramscians on ideas. Seen from a contemporary context however, there
is the need for a fresh perspective on hegemony during the 1990s. There
are elements in existing approaches that are useful for our
understanding of hegemony but these elements have not been applied
and tested through the conditions of the 1990s and especially the two
9° Alan Cafruny, "A Gramscian Concept of Decliiiing Hegemony: Stages of US Power
and the Evolution of International Economic Relations", pp.114-118.
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major financial crises of the last decade, the peso crisis (1994-95) and the
South Korean crisis (1997-98). This thesis considers hegemonic stability
theory as a starting point for understanding basic concepts of
hegemony and power but insufficient for a more complex and deeper
explanation of hegemonic power. Gilpin with his recognition of the role
of TNCs and Krasner with his explanation of an ideological foreign
policy broadened the concept of hegemony. Keohane from a neoliberal
perspective placed emphasis upon the role of international institutions
and cooperation in the system. This thesis considers the approach of
Susan Strange instrumental in explaining the continuity of American
hegemony through her concept of structural power and, together with
Joseph Nye's emphasis on soft power, has laid the foundations for a
different approach to the changing basis of hegemony. However these
analyses still ignored the role of domestic elites in establishing and
maintaining a hegemonic world order. Robert Cox from a neo-
Gramscian perspective filled this gap with his analysis, of the role of
domestic elites and the interaction between ideas, material capabilities
and institutions. What was missing from Cox's analysis however, was
the role of transnational mobile capital. Gill and Law also from a neo-
Gramscian point of view addressed this issue by linking the mobility of
capital to the ideological hegemony of market forces.
The perspectives mentioned above offer significant insights to
the concept of hegemony and more specffically to the issue of American
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hegemony. Seen from a contemporary context however, while these
approaches analyse important aspects of hegemony none of these is
sufficient in order to explain the changing nature of American
hegemony in the deregulatory financial environment of the 1990s. What
is missing is a new perspective in order to explain American hegemony
in the 1990s by analysing the American responses to the two major
financial crises of the 1990s: the peso crisis (1994-95) and the South
Korean crisis (1997-98). This thesis attempts to fill this gap by
introducing in Chapter Two an explanatory framework for the
changing basis of American hegemony, which will be tested through
the case studies of the peso and South Korean crises.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORISING THE CHANGING BASIS OF AMERICAN
HEGEMONY
This chapter introduces a theoretical framework in order to
explain the changing basis of American hegemony during the 1990s.
This thesis does not totally reject neorealist, neoliberal and neo-
Gramscian approaches. To do so it would not be constructive. On the
contrary there are elements in previous approaches that provide us
with significant notions about the issue of hegemony and world order.
However, in the deregulatory financial environment and the globalised
economy of the 1990s none of these explanations is adequate to grasp
the changes that have occurred in the nature and exercise of American
hegemony. The global economy today is more complex and diversified
than in the 1960s, the 1970s and the 1980s. No framework that attempts
to explain American hegemony in the 1990s can be accurate without
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taking into account financial crises which are directly associated with
the increased mobility of capital and the globalisation of finance. This
thesis attempts to fill this gap in our understanding of the changing
basis of American hegemony by constructing an appropriate
framework, first, by identifying a set of variables that redefine
American hegemony and, second, and most importantly, by applying
and testing this framework through an analysis of the response of the
United States to the two major financial crises of the 1990s: the peso
crisis and the South Korean crisis.
The resulting conceptualisation of American hegemony is based
on a set of five variables that are not independent but closely connected
to each other. Each variable should be viewed in relation to the others,
thus this framework can only be applied as whole. The five variables
are:
a) financial globalisation
b) the transnational mobifity of capital;
c) the role of international institutions;
d) ideas that are mediated through domestic elites and
e) the limited instability of the system.
These five interdependent variables facilitated and continue to facilitate
the entrenchment of what is known as the "Washington Consensus"
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which was constructed during the 1980s and represents the free market
orthodoxy of deregulation, privatisation and financial liberalisation.1
The Washington Consensus has its origins in neoliberalism, which has
achieved a certain degree of hegemony in global society. The
Washington Consensus is reflected in governments' economic and
trade policies, and the respective roles played by the private sector and
international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank
in the governance of the global economy.
The five variables of the framework have not appeared suddenly
in the 1990s. Their origins are traced back over a period of twenty years
from the collapse of Bretton Woods (1971) to the Reagan years (1981-
1989). However, while elements of this framework have been analysed
in the literature before, such a framework with this specific set of
variables has never been applied and tested through both the peso and
South Korean crises of the 1990s. While this short chapter only
introduces the main elements of this framework, Chapter Three
provides an analysis of the Washington Consensus along with events
during the 1970s and the 1980s when the five variables were slowly
taking shape.
1 A detailed analysis of the Washington Consensus is provided in Chapter Three, from
p. 103.
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First Variable: Globalisation of Finance
The first variable is the globalisation of finance which is rooted in
a series of decisions taken by the United States over the last 30 years
which dismantled the post-war international monetary system,
liberalised world markets and granted the financial sector a great
degree of autonomy and power. It is the financial sector which sets the
pace and imposes normative behaviour. The United States began by
abandoning the system of fixed exchange rates established by the
Bretton Woods Agreements in 1944 and introducing a system of
generalised floating exchange rates. There was a strong economic
motive for the decision which American authorities took unilaterally in
1973. They were seeking to compensate for declining competitiveness
and a growing national debt by exporting the country's macroeconomic
imbalances. The floating exchange rate system provided a flexible and
efficient monetary tool that enabled American Administrations to avoid
paying for its indebtedness with a relative loss of sovereignty and
highly unpopular domestic austerity measures. Furthermore, America's
allies could not question American policies without destabiising the
cold-war security system from which they derived undoubted benefits.
The deregulation of American financial industry has paved the
way for its globalisation via the Wall Street stock exchange and banks.
In the United States financial sector deregulation was the most rapid
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and far reaching. It was also a world leader in implementing new
finance techniques and instruments. During the same period of time
international financial markets were thoroughly restructured. This
restructuring was closely connected with reforms implemented on
national financial markets. Worldwide liberalisation in the 1980s and
1990s gave American financial industry access to the savings of the
newly industrialised and emerging countries where rates of return were
high.	 The consequence this globalisation process was that
governments, must increasingly measure their performance according
to criteria acceptable to the financial markets, such as they must be
either sound in order to retain the confidence of the transnational
financial community.
This thesis argues that financial globalisation has aided the
United States in preserving its influence in the world economy. While
during the 1980s analysts such as Chalmers Johnson 2, were suggesting
the superiority of the Asian model of capitalism and raised questions
about the validity of the Anglo-American model of capitalism,
developments during the 1990s reversed these assumptions. This thesis
will demonstrate that the performance of American economy during
the 1990s and the major financial crisis in Asia enhanced the hegemony
of the market model along the lines of the Washington Consensus and
2 See Chalmers Johnson, Miff and the Japanese Mfracle: The Growth of Industrial
Policy 1925-1975(Stariford University Press, Stanford 1982).
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as a result reduced the policy autonomy of the state. States and state
actors, for reasons of domestic economic and political objectives, have
sought to convince or pressure other states and transnational actors
such as transnational corporations and international institutions to
adopt measures, which have shifted the balance of competitive
advantage in their favour. 3 This thesis however, argues that the role of
the state is not irrelevant in the current globalised economy. This is very
well demonstrated by the US Treasury's intervention in 1995 after the
collapse of the Mexican peso and also by the crucial role that the United
States played during the Asian crisis (1997-98) by preventing the
collapse of the international banking system and ensuring that
liberalisation would continue. American-led IMF assistance has
represented an essentially state-driven response to recent financial
crises and also the high degree of influence that the United States has
over the conditionalities imposed on countries that accept financial
assistance from the IMF. Furthermore, as Ewan Anderson, Ivars
Gutmanis and Liam Anderson have argued, during the 1990s American
Administrations have become significantly more interventionist in
support of American business interests both in terms of providing a
competitive home base for American firms to operate from and in terms
of directly promoting the interests of American firms in global
Philip Cerny, "Structuring the Political Arena: Public Goods, States and Governance
in a Globalising World", in Ronen Palan, ed Global Political EconomT Contemporary
Theories, (Routledge, New York 2000) p. 33.
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markets.4
 This will also be demonstrated in Chapters Five and Seven by
the response of the United States to the peso and South Korean crises.
Second Variable: Capital Mobility
The second variable is the transnational mobility of capital
which has been the key to the process of financial globalisation. Within
the globalised economy individual nations are increasingly dependent
not only on trade but also on flows of capital from outside. These are
seen as necessary to achieve economic growth, gain access to new
technologies and maximise employment. The increased demand for
foreign investment has also been associated with processes of
deregulation of capital transfers and with opportunities created by the
privatisation of former public monopolies in sectors such as power
supply and telecommunications. 5 The mobility of capital means that
firms which were previously limited to national markets and resources
can now raise money anywhere in the world and site production
wherever is more profitable. This generates incentives for countries to
lighten tax and other regulations faced by transnational firms within
Ewan Anderson, Ivars Gutmartis and Liam Anderson, Economic Power in a
Changing International System (Casell, New York 2000) p. 169.
5	 Holton, Globalisation and the Nation-State, Macmilan Press, London 1998, p.
53.
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their borders. Investment decisions are becoming increasingly sensitive
to such factors as wage rates, and regulatory and tax policies but also
the economic potential of the region involved. The globalisation of
finance connotes a number of changes in the world's capital markets.
These changes include the liberalisation of long-standing regulatory
restrictions on financial intermediaries, the introduction of new
technologies that speed up capital flows and stimulate the development
of innovative financial products. These developments render capital
potentially more mobile, both within and across national frontiers. The
globalisation of finance places countries and regions in competition
with each other for capital. The result of this phenomenon, as Robert
Palan and Jason Abbott, pointed out was that a certain discipline has
been imposed upon states by the market. 6
 Any significant change in
economic policy has to be conducted with consideration of the
international money market. States which do not subject their monetary
and financial policies to such orthodoxy are likely to experience a
sudden shortage of capital. The huge increase in short-term private
capital flows leaves developing nations extremely vulnerable to rapid
capital flight (i.e. Mexico in 1994-95 and East Asia in 1997-98). In the
emerging markets of Asia, for example, capital was flowing at the rate
6 Ronen Palan and Jason Abbott, State Strategies in the Global Political Economy
(Pinter, London 1999) p. 138.
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of about $100 billion a year in 1996. By the second half of 1997 it was
flowing out at about the same rate.7
It should be noted here that open financial markets are not new
in global economy. Conditions similar to today's globalisation of
finance existed before 1914 among the most advanced economies and
their dependencies. The system, which dated back to the 1870s, rested
on a rough consensus among the principal trading nations. At the
centre of that consensus was a version of the gold standard, backed by
the wealth and power of Great Britain. Following World War I (1914-
1918) and the Great Depression of the 1930s 
*ew intergovernmental
consensus on monetary issues was built at Bretton Woods in 1944. At
the centre of that arrangement was exchange rate stability and limited
capital mobility. However, the policies of the United States during the
1970s (especially the abolition in 1974 of remaining domestic controls
on capital) and the 1980s under the Reagan Administration reflected a
long-term transformation in American strategy toward an informal
market-based system of control, which has also been expressed in the
financial orthodoxy of the Washington Consensus. Although the
liberalisation of financial movements can be traced back to the 1960s
with the creation of the Eurodollar market, it was during the 1970s and
1980s that American policy-makers assumed that an open, liberal order
7 See Sarah Anderson, "International Financial Flows", Foreign Policy in Focus, voL 3,
no. 41, 1998 (Foreign Policy in Focus Website, http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org ).
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would preserve America's hegemonic position in global finance. Indeed
the United States has a powerful interest in maintaining and expanding
the free worldwide movement of capital. Capital liberalisation has
replaced trade liberalisation at the top of American foreign policy
agenda. As Robert Wade argued, the United States, in order to maintain
its high levels of consumption and investment, needed access to the
world's savings which is much easier to do if world financial markets
are highly integrated.8
 As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the economic
policies of the Reagan Administration had the effect of facilitating the
interpenetration of capital, the liberalisation of markets and deepening
the interdependence between American and other states'
macroeconomic policy conditions. As Stephen Gill argued, the
economic policies of the 1980s advocated a more liberal world market
where the largest and most mobile forms of capital would tend to
become stronger.9
Transnational mobility of capital as a key element of
globalisation has affected the broader economic and political conditions
which prevail in every country and as a consequence, has redefined
hegemony. The worldwide free market based on transnational mobility
of capital, is strengthening the American model of capitalism, which
8 Robert Wade, "The Coming Fight Over Capital Flows", Fore%n Affairs, vol.78, no. 2,
1999, p. 45.
Stephen Gifi, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge
University Press, New York 1990) p. 107.
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relies on its strong comparative advantages in the post-industrial
sectors of financial and cultural services, communications and leading-
edge technologies. It is the United States which is laying down the
dominant economic norms (profitabifity and shareholder value) and the
regulatory criteria (ratings of companies and states). For instance, the
behaviour of markets is shaped by the ratings awarded by two major
American private rating agencies, Moody's and Standard & Poor.1°
Thus, on the basis of the leadership role played by the United States in
the emergence of the present transnational configuration American
hegemony has not declined but has been redefined during the 1990s.
This thesis wifi demonstrate through the case studies of peso and South
Korean crises that in this deregulatory financial environment the
Washington Consensus has both shaped the governance of the global
economy, and by fostering conditions of domestic financial instability,
created a scenario to enable American hegemony to become further
entrenched in the post-crisis international economy.
10 Noelle Burgi and Philips Golub, "The States We Are Stifi In", Le Monde
Di1omatique, April 2000.
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Third Variable: International Institutions
While the mobility of capital is a key element for globalisation,
international institutions - the third variable of the framework - are
instrumental for global governance. This conceptual framework accepts
the neoliberal argument that international institutions are mechanisms
created by states in order to assure continuity in their relations and
reduce uncertainty about the reliability of other states. 11 In that sense,
international institutions reflect the relations of forces that exist in the
global economy. Although institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, have been in existence
throughout most of the Cold War period, their functions have been
revised and their missions broadened in order to institutionalise free
market orthodoxy in public policy. From the 1980s, the IMF and the
World Bank have actively promoted free market orthodoxy, the Anglo-
American model of capitalism as represented by the Washington
Consensus. This has been evident in the conditionalities attached to
IMF and World Bank loans to troubled economies during the 1980s and
the 1990s. More specifically, the IMF was founded in 1945 to help
operate a system of fixed exchange rates, in which all currencies were
pegged to the dollar, in turn fixed with respect to gold. When the fixed
11 See Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World
Political Econ omy (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1984).
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rate system collapsed completely in 1970, the IMF found a new and
important role. During the 1980s, changes in economic conditions led
Mexico and other Latin American countries to announce they could not
meet the interest and principal payments on their large borrowings
from overseas commercial banks. As analysed in Chapter Four, default
on those obligations would have wiped out the capital of many leading
banks in the United States. To meet their interest obligations and reduce
their outstanding debt, Latin American countries had to earn more
foreign exchange. Latin American governments raised taxes, and cut
government spending. The IMF monitored these adjustments and
provided moderate amounts of credit to indicate that it was satisfied
with the policy progress that these economies were making. The next
major chapter in the IMF's history, according to Martin Feldstein, began
with the collapse of the Soviet Union and other communist regimes in
Eastern Europe (1989-1991). These countries were shifting from
communism to a market economy. The IMF provided advice on a wider
range of economic issues than it had done in Latin America. Much of
IMF's advice was controversial, but the IMF was able to promote its
structural adjustment programmes because it brought substantial
financial rewards to countries that accepted its advice. 12
12 Martin Feldstein, "Refocusing the IMF", Foreign Affairs, vol.77, no.2, 1998, pp. 21-
22.
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During the peso crisis of 1994-95, the necessity for quick action
prompted the IMF to short-circuit the usual procedures for board
review of new stand-by arrangements. This was necessary after the
failure of the Clinton Administration to gain approval for a $40 billion
package of loan guarantees to Mexico. The administration withdrew its
request and together with the US Treasury and the IMF composed a
package that did not need congressional authorisation. In this package
$18 billion came from the IMF. The rescue package, as analysed in
Chapter Five, implied significant exceptions from normal IMF practice.
The Fund's contribution turned out to be seven times larger than
Mexico's normal limit, an amount that represented almost 20 per cent of
the Fund's total liquid resources. In the case of South Korea, which is
discussed in Chapter Seven, after the crisis of 1997-98, the IlviF
organised a $57 billion package of loans with the participation of the
World Bank and the American and Japanese governments. In exchange
for those funds the IMF demanded structural changes in South Korean
economy along with reduced spending and higher interest rates. This
thesis argues that the influence of the United States over
macroeconomic and social policy in countries that have accepted IMP
and World Bank loans has been substantially increased. The entire
direction of the American-led IMF assistance packages to Mexico and
South Korea has principally aimed at promoting neoliberal reform and
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greater openness to foreign direct investment along the lines of the
Washington Consensus.
Fourth Variable: Ideas and Domestic Elites
The fourth variable of this framework refers to the ideas that are
accepted and mediated through the domestic elites. As Robert Cox has
argued there is a transnational process of consensus formation among
policy-makers in both developed and developing countries. This
process has generated consensual guidelines, underpinned by
globalisation and the ideology of free-market orthodoxy, which have
been transmitted into the policy-making of national governments and
big corporations. Transnational class formation is a key aspect of the
globalisation process. Globalisation redefines the relationship between
production and territoriality, between nation-states, economic
institutions and social structures. Class formation is less tied to territory
and the political jurisdiction of nation-states. As national productive
and financial structures become transnationally integrated, world
classes whose organic development took place through the nation-state
are supranational integration with national classes of other countries.
According to Wffliam Robinson and Jerry Harris, transnational
fractions of local elites swept to power in countries around the world in
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the 1980s and 1990s. They have captured key ministries and
bureaucracies in the policymaking apparatus, especially Central Banks,
finance and foreign ministries, as key government branches which link
countries to global economy. They have utilised national state
apparatuses to advance globalisation and to pursue economic
restructuring and the dismantling of the old nation-state based
Keynesian welfare.13 These transnational elites have sought worldwide
market liberalisation, projects of economic integration such as the
NAFTA, the APEC and the European Union and they promoted a
supranational infrastructure of the global economy such as the WTO.
The increasingly organised global elite articulated a coherent
programme of global economic and political restructuring centred
around market liberalisation or what is called the Washington
Consensus. It pushed for greater uniformity and standardisation in the
codes and rules of the global market. At the Cancun Summit in Mexico
in 1982, the developed nation-states, led by the United States, launched
global neoliberalism and began imposing structural adjustment
programmes on the Third World and other developing countries.
Developing countries have been offered the Washington Consensus by
the IMF and the United States as a fait accompli, the only option in
13 See William Robinson and Jerry Harris, "Transnational Capitalist Class" Journal of
Science and Society, voL 64, no. 1, Spring 2000, PP. 11-54. See also James Rosenau,
Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997).
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economic theory and political practice. These elites that have followed
the IMF's direction have been offered some tangible rewards. For
example, budget cuts have had less impact on the upper and middle
class than the poorest in society. Furthermore, domestic elites by
accepting the free market orthodoxy and applying it in their own
countries have profited from the resulting cuts in state spending, since
these have provided them with business opportunities to expand the
role of the domestic private sector. Indeed, as William Robinson has
argued, political and economic power has tended to gravitate towards
new groups linked to the global economy, either directly or through
reorgamsed local state apparatuses which have functioned as
"transmission belts" for transnational interests.'4
This thesis argues that, during their respective financial crises,
the role of domestic elites in Mexico and in South Korea (though in
different degree) was important in the acceptance and application of
IMF conditionalities and the consequent entrenchment of the
Washington Consensus in these countries. The role of domestic policy-
makers and business was also important not only after the financial
crises but also before these crises occurred in opening their economies
to foreign investment and trade during the 1980s and early 1990s and
thereby fermenting the causes of the crises. However, the two major
14 Wffliam Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalisation, US Intervention and
Hegemony, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996) p. 33.
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financial crises of the 1990s, have actually strengthened the consensus
around the neoliberal project, which represented a congruence of
interests among the dominant groups on the global system. This thesis
will demonstrate that despite the debate on the IMF conditionalities
and market liberalisation trend that was sparked by the financial crises
of the 1990s, the Washington Consensus has achieved ideological
hegemony by setting the parameters for and the limits to the debate on
options and alternative projects.
Fifth Variable: Instability of the System
The fifth and last variable is the limited instability of the
international financial system which has become evident during the
1990s with financial crises such as those of Mexico (1994-95) and East
Asia (1997-98) but also Russia (1998). This is a very important factor in
this framework since it is directly linked to the globalisation of finance
and the mobility of capital. According to Jason Furman and Joseph
Stiglitz, financial liberalisation increases the vulnerability of national
economies to crises. Financial liberalisation leaves economies with
fewer tools to cope with the strains imposed by the surge of capital
83
Chapter Two: Theorising American Hegemony
inflows in the 1990s.15
 It is very difficult for individual states to remain
immune from the effects of global economic forces, in that a shock to
any part of the system has the potential to affect the system as a whole.
Greater capital mobility causes investment decisions to be dependent
on markets rather than public institutions. In contrast to the stable
economic order of Bretton Woods, financial liberalism was favoured in
early 1970s, on the grounds that it would promote a more efficient
global allocation of capital and would prevent the state to interfere with
the freedom of individuals to move their money across border. As Eric
Helleiner has argued, the neo-liberal bloc involved private financial
interests and conservative financial officials and multinational
industrial interests whose frustration with capital controls grew as their
operations became increasingly global in the 1960s and the 1970s.16
Greater capital mobility has also increased the vulnerability of
national economies to sudden capital movements. Financial crises such
as those of Mexico 1994-95 and the Asian crisis of 1997-98 are
testaments to the inherent instability of liberalised international capital
markets where sudden reversals of market confidence cause periodic
panics of different magnitude and duration. Also, it is interesting that
Jason Furman and Joseph Stiglitz, "Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights from
East Asia", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 2, Washington DC 1998, pp.
17-18.
16 Eric Helleiner, "From Bretton Woods to Global Finance", in R. Stubbs and G
Uñderhil, (eds.) Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (Macmifian Press,
London 1994) pp. 166-167.
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both the Mexican and South Korean crises occurred immediately after
these countries joined the OECD and began to conform to the code of
capital liberalisation of the organisation. Indeed after the substantial
capital liberalisation of five Asian countries - South Korea, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines - after 1993, approximately $220
billion dollars in private capital flowed into the region during the three-
year period from 1994-1996. The reversal of flows in 1997due to the
sudden shift in confidence amounted to roughly $100 bfflion. 17 It is very
difficult for a country or a region to tolerate this kind of sudden shift in
market confidence from euphoria to panic that causes a huge reversal of
private capital flows. This thesis argues that the limited instability of
the system that is caused by the increased mobility of capital has
offered an opportunity to the United States to promote through the IMF
and the World Bank a specific set of policies and ideas about the
workings of the world economy. This set of principles is embodied in
the Washington Consensus and Chapters Five and Seven will discuss
the degree of entrenchment of the Washington Consensus alter the peso
and South Korean crises, through the conditionalities attached to
American-led IMF loans to these countries.
These five variables define the changing basis of American
hegemony. This set of variables is applied and tested for the first time
17	 details on the code of capital liberalisation of OECD see Chapter Six, pp. 224-
225.
85
Chapter Two: Theorising American Hegemony
through the American responses to the peso and South Korean crises.
The changing basis of American hegemony is not about shaping the
developments in the world economy. It is rather about reacting to
developments ensuring that the trend of financial liberalisation would
continue in the world economy by strengthening the Washington
Consensus. During the two major financial crises of the 1990s, the
United States acted to stabiise Mexico and South Korea and to advance
economic reforms in order to make these economies more open and
market-driven. The specific set of interdependent variables
(globalisation of finance, mobility of capital, international institutions,
ideas mediated through domestic elites and limited instability of the
system) is behind the influential role that the United States has played
during the 1990s and especially in the aftermath of the financial crises
of Mexico and South Korea. However, as Chapters Five and Seven will
demonstrate, the United States has exercised a different degree of
influence on Mexico (and the rest of Latin America) and South Korea
(and the rest of East Asia), not least because of the different role and
significance that each of these five variables has played in the two case
studies. This thesis will demonstrate through the application of this
framework of five variables that as a result of the peso and South
Korean crises the Washington Consensus of free market orthodoxy and
financial liberalisation has been entrenched and is more widely applied
today than a decade ago. More specifically, based on primary
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documents from the US Congress, the US State Department and the
IMF, this thesis will demonstrate that during the 1990s, the Washington
Consensus has both shaped the governance of the world economy and
by fostering conditions of domestic financial instability, created a
scenario to enable American hegemony to become further entrenched in
the post-crisis international economy.
Before the conceptual framework is tested for the first time
Chapter Three elaborates on this framework by identifying the origins
of the five variables and discussing the Washington Consensus of free
market orthodoxy.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE COLLAPSE OF BRETTON WOODS, THE RISE OF
REAGANOMICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS
This chapter analyses the origins of the five variables of the
conceptual framework that is introduced in Chapter Two in relation to
the Washington Consensus. It does so by focusing upon the challenge
to the Bretton Woods orthodoxy of controls on capital and the policy
response which that challenge helped to facilitate and inspire in the
United States, (i.e. Reaganomics) and the construction of the
Washington Consensus. The chapter commences with a definition of
foreign economic policy before focusing upon the collapse of Bretton
Woods and the consequent changes in American economic and trade
policies, while the second part analyses the links between the Reagan
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Administration's economic policies and the construction of the
Washington Consensus during the 1980s.
Foreign policy is the set of policies by which a state attempts to
preserve and enhance its position in the international political system.
For Howard Letner, foreign policy rests upon three components:
economic strength, political cohesion and international structural
arrangements affecting both security and economics. 1 Consequently,
the economic dimension of foreign policy constitutes a state's foreign
economic policy. Foreign policy has always reflected economic
objectives, but their relative significance and impact on other issues has
dramatically increased. After the end of the Cold War, and with
increasing economic globalisation, the relative importance of economic
over security issues has increased. 2 For American foreign policy in
particular, it has become a fundamental task to supply the strategic
blueprint and maintain the day-today organisational framework and
operation of the international financial system. However, the growing
1 Howard Letner, "Implications of the Economic Crisis for East Asian Foreign
Policies", The Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. XIII, no. 1, 1999, PP. 9-11.
2 Brian Hocking and Michael Smith, Beyond Foreign Economic Policy: The United
States, the Single European Market and the Changing World Economy (Pinter
Publishers, London 1997) pp. 7-8. Economic globalisation can be defined as growth in
economic activities across international borders at a more rapid rate than growth in
national economies, resulting in deeper linkages between national economies and
international markets. See Ernest Preeg, From Here to Free Trade, (The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago 1998) p. 2.
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complexity of the international financial system has made this task
increasingly difficult.
The main institutional actors in American foreign economic
poiicy are the President, the State Department, the Treasury, and the
Congress. For Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, the foreign policy-
making process should be conceptualised as a series of concentric
circles as first suggested by Roger Hilsman. 4
 The innermost circle in the
foreign policy-making process consists of the President and his
immediate personal advisors. The second circle contains departments
and agencies of the Executive Branch5 (mainly, the State Department
and the Treasury) and the outermost circle consists of the Congress,
domestic interests groups, public opinion and the mass media (see table
2.1).6
Philip Cerny, "American Decline and the Emergence of Embedded Financial
Orthodoxy", in Philip Cerny, ed. Finance and World Politics: Markets, Regimes and
States in the Post-Hegemonic Era (Edward Elgar, Vermont 1993) p. 159.
See Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, American Fore%n Policy: Pattern and
Process (St Martin's Press, London 1987); For the original conception of concentric
circles see Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Doubleday, New York 1967).
In Kegley's and Witkopf's adaptation, the Executive Branch also included the
Defence Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Commerce,
the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Labour. See Hegeley and
Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process, pp. 371-414.
6	 Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, American Fore4-n Policy, pp. 334-335.
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FIGURE 3.1: THE CONCENTRIC CIRCLES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
ECONOMIC POLICY
Congress. Interest Groups. Public Opinion. Mass Media
Executive Branch (State Department.
The President
and Personal Advisors
Source: C.Kegley and E. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, p. 335.
American foreign economic policy is produced and exercised
through the interaction between these main institutional actors,
although the important executive decisions reside with the President.
However, it would be simplistic to perceive American foreign economic
policy as a consensual product of these actors. Private power can seek
to influence foreign policy making by establishing several relationships
with the policy making process. For example, a transnational
corporation that possesses the capacity to act independently of the
United States government might lobby Congress or the Executive
Branch concerning a piece of trade legislation or regulation that applies
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to international economic transactions. 7 The globalisation of the world
economy has also complicated the links between Washington and
American business. As Jeffrey Garten has argued, American business
depends on Washington's help to liberalise trade, protect intellectual
property, remove regulatory barriers and encourage continuing
regulatory reform. On the other hand, Washington needs business to
reinforce its goals. The Executive Branch depends on business for
technical information regarding trade negotiations and in all emerging
markets America's political and economic goals depend largely by the
direct investments in factories that only business can deliver.8
Furthermore, within the Executive Branch there may appear different
views and different patterns of action. However, institutional
fragmentation does not necessarily produce incoherent foreign policy,
which is demonstrated in Chapters Four and Six on the American
policy responses to the peso crisis and the South Korean crisis
respectively.
7 with most political processes the form of the relationship between private power
and foreign policy making process is seldom static, since the circumstances
surrounding the political interplay shift and change. See James Nathan and James
Oliver, Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System (Little, Brown and
Company, Boston 1987) p. 258.
8	 Garten, "Business and Foreign Policy", Fore%n Affafrs, vol. 76, no. 3, 1997, pp.
70-71.
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The Collapse of Bretton Woods and Changes in American Foreign
Economic Policy during the 1970s
The 1944 Bretton Woods agreement placed major constraints
upon international financial movements. The Bretton Woods system
was an attempt to encourage nations to maintain liberal trade policies
while allowing some measure of national autonomy. The negotiations
were dominated by two figures, John Maynard Keynes from Britain and
Harry Dexter White from the United States who had been central
figures in the intellectual movement challenging liberalism in the 1930s.
There was a consensus among the negotiators at the conference that a
liberal financial order was not compatible with the stable system of
exchange rates and world trading system they hoped to create.
However, it was the American plan that prevailed over Keynes's more
ambitious scheme for an international currency (the "bancor"). White's
plan proposed that states would contribute according to their means to
an international stabilisation fun. Contributions would be made up of
gold (25 per cent) and national currencies (75 per cent). In case of need
states could draw according to the size of their contribution, the
conditions for drawing becoming harder as they reahed the limit of
their quota. With respect to exchange rates White argued that
speculative financial flows had constituted one of the chief causes of
foreign exchange disturbances during the inter-war period. Thus, such
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movements would need to be controlled to prevent them from
disturbing the Bretton Woods financial order. The endorsement of
capital controls at Bretton Woods partly reflected a decision to sacrffice
financial liberalism in the interests of creating a stable exchange rate
system and liberal trading order. 9 For many years it worked. Global
trade increased at an unprecedented rate and the global economy
expanded rapidly. From its foundation, however, the Bretton Woods
system underwent major changes, especially with respect to finance.
Confidence in the dollar eroded as persistent American balance-of-
payments' deficits dumped more dollars onto international currency
markets than could be redeemed by American gold stocks, eventually
forcing the United States to abandon this commitment.1° With the link
Eric Hellether, "From Bretton Woods to Global Finance", in R. Stubbs & G.
Underhifi, eds. Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (Macmifian Press,
London 1994) pp. 164-165. See also Susan Starnge, "From Bretton Woods to the Casino
Economy", in Stuart Corbridge,Nigel Thrift and Ron Martin, eds. Money, Power and
Space (Blackwell, London 1988) pp. 53-55.
10 At this point lies the most obvious design flaw in the Bretton Woods system, the
Triffin paradox, named after the Belgian economist Robert Triffin in 1960. The essence
of the Triffin paradox is as follows. The main ideas behind Bretton Woods were that:
a) the United States guard against inflation by maintaining the value of the dollar
constant against gold while b) the United States provided liquidity to the rest of the
world economy by means of an increased supply of dollars. Clearly a) and b) could
not be pursued simultaneously over the medium term. When the United States began
to run a balance of payments deficit - precisely because it helped rebuild the
economies of its allies after Word War II - non-US citizens and other states became
wary about holding dollars. See S. Corbridge, "Bretton Woods Revisited: Hegemony,
Stability and Territory, Environment and PlanningA, vol.26,1994, p. 1841.
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between gold and the dollar broken in the early 1970s most major
currencies were allowed to float.11
Eric Helleiner has contended that there were five developments
that explain the weakening of the Bretton Woods financial order. The
first was the restoration of market confidence in the safety of
international financial transactions in the late 1950s. The second was the
rapid expansion in market demand for international financial services
that accompanied the growth of trade and multinational corporate
activity in the 1960s. The third was the depositing of enormous surplus
funds in international banking markets by OPEC states after the 1973
oil price increase. The fourth was the move to floating exchange rates in
the 1970s, which encouraged market actors to diversify their assets
internationally in the new volatile currency markets, although the latter
could also be considered as a consequence. Finally, the appearance of
financial cartels across the advanced industrial world in the late 1970s
and 1980s, which pushed financial operators into the international
financial markets as a means of coping with increased competitive
pressures.12
Although American Administrations supported the Bretton
Woods financial order in the early post-war years - even introducing
11 Bruce Moon, Dilemmas of International Trade, (Westview Press, Boulder 1996) pp.
85-86.
12	 Helleiner, "From Bretton Woods to Global Finance", p. 165.
95
Chapter Three: Reaganomics and the Washington Consensus
their own capital controls programme in the mid-1960s - they turned
against it in the early 1970s. Not only did they oppose proposals for co-
operative controls, but they also abolished their own capital controls in
early 1974 and pushed other countries to do the same. This more liberal
American attitude toward financial movements had two sources. The
first was the realisation by American policy-makers that an open, liberal
order would preserve America's hegemonic position in global finance.
Because of the relative attractiveness of American financial markets vis-
à-vis their over-regulated counterparts in Europe and Japan, American
officials understood that private market actors, if given the freedom to
invest internationally, would choose to hold dollars over other
currencies and to invest in the United States. These developments were
crucial for the United States in this period, given its growing
dependence on the dollar's global role and on foreign funds to finance
current account and fiscal deficits. This pattern of American policy-
making - in which the United States relied on its hegemonic position in
the emerging open global financial order to finance external and
internal deficits - remained in place throughout the 1970s and was also
important in explaining the strong support of the Reagan
Administration for financial openness in the 1980s. The second source
of American financial liberalism in the early 1970s, according to
Helleiner, was a shift away from the Keynesian framework of thought
that had influenced American policy-makers in the early post-war years
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toward a neo-liberal position advocated by figures such as Milton
Friedman and Friedich Hayek. 13 Neo-liberals rejected the post-war
concern that speculative financial flows would disrupt stable exchange
rate arrangements by arguing strongly in favour of a floating exchange
rate system. They also did not sympathise with the Bretton Woods
commitment to Keynesianism and the autonomy of the welfare state.
Instead they desired that international financial markets would
discipline government policy and force states to adopt more
conservative fiscal and monetary programmes. This neo-liberal
ascendancy involved private financial interests as well as multinational
industrial interests whose frustration with capital controls increased as
their operations became increasingly global in the 1960s and 1970s.14
The origins of the first two variables of the framework
introduced in Chapter Two (financial globalisation and mobility of
capital) could be traced back to the creation of the Eurodollar market in
London in the 1960s.15
 This market provided a regulation-free
13 See, Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press,
Chicago 1962); Milton Friedman, From Gaibraith to Economic Freedom (Institute of
Economic Affairs, London 1977); Friedich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Routledge,
New York 1962).
14 Eric Helleiner, "From Bretton Woods to Global Finance", pp. 166-167. For more
analysis on Bretton Woods see also, Armand Van Dormael, Bretton Woods: Birth of A
Monetary System (Macmillan, London 1978) and A.L. Keith Achenson, Bretton Woods
Revisited (Macmillan, London 1972).
15 The British government's support for the Eurodollar market was crucial because it
provided a physical base for the market, permitting it to operate in London free from
regulation. British financial officials and institutions remained strongly committed to
promoting London as an international financial centre long after Britain's financial
predominance was over. See Paul Eiazig and Brian Scott Quinn, The Euro-Dollar
System: Practice and Theory of International interest Rates (Macmillan Press, London
1977) pp. 5-7.
97
Chapter Three: Reaganomics and the Washington Consensus
environment in which to trade financial assets denominated in foreign
currencies, mainly dollars. The American government did not prevent
banks and firms from operating in the Eurodollar market American
banks and transnational corporations demanded the freedom to operate
for the limitations on their freedom after the introduction of American
capital controls in the mid-1960s. Furthermore, American policy-makers
recognised that the unregulated nature of the Eurodollar market would
help increase the attractiveness of dollar holdings to investors and
banks at a time of growing American balance-of-payments problems.
The Eurocurrency market grew from $3 bfflion in 1960 to $75 billion in
1970.
By 1971 official dollar holdings abroad exceeded American gold
stocks by over 300 per cent. President Nixon, on August 15, 1971,
unilaterally reversed the American commitment to convert every $35
held by foreign countries into an ounce of American gold. This meant a
de facto 10 per cent devaluation of the dollar relative to the German
mark, the Japanese yen, the British pound and gold. The move shifted
much of the burden of global financial adjustment to those countries
which depended heavily on exports to the United States to generate
their foreign exchange and to those countries which had huge dollar
holdings. In that way, the United States forced its economic partners
enjoying large balance-of-payments surpluses to assume the cost of
restoring the American economy to equilibrium. The United States was
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able to do that because American power in the early 1970s was still
sufficiently substantial to force the other Western industrial countries to
absorb the cost of adjusting the value of the dollar. 16 Thus, the
introduction of the Eurodollar not only developed into a major engine
of credit creation for the real world economy but also put tremendous
pressures on the exchange rate system that by 1973 the fixed exchange
rate system had to be abandoned and give way to the forces of foreign
exchange markets.17
However, the catalyst for the move towards liberalisation was
the American decision to remove its capital controls in 1974, to assist
the revival of New York as an international financial centre. This was
consistent with the American aim of fostering an international
monetary system organised on the basis of market principles. The
status of the dollar as the world's leading currency gave the United
States considerable freedom to borrow from abroad in its own currency,
thus permitting the United States to sustain expansionary policies more
easily than foreign governments and allowing Washington to co-
ordinate policies with these governments. For example, in 1978, the
United States persuaded Japan and Germany to reflate in return for an
American commitment to restrain monetary growth and to relax
control over oil prices. Therefore, by the mid-1970s, contrary to the
16 Anthony Tuo-Kofi Gadzey, The Political Economy of Power. Hegemony and
Economic Liberalism, (Macmillan Press, London 1994) pp.156-157.
17 Susan Strange, States and Markets (Pinter Publishing, London 1994) pp.106-107.
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decline of hegemony thesis, the United States had largely succeeded in
reshaping the international monetary system in a way that was,
according to Andrew Walter, advantageous for American interests.18
The strategy of the United States had two dimensions, a fact that
was clearly demonstrated on the one hand, by the abolition of
remaining exchange controls in 1974 and on the other hand, by the
passage of the section 301 legislation of 1974 to liberalise markets on
terms favourable to American companies so as to institutionalise their
competitive advantage. The section 301 legislation of 1974 was broadly
directed at foreign restrictions on American trade and used to enforce
trade rights as conferred by the GATT and bilateral treaties, if necessary
through retaliation against those judged to have violated these rights.
Section 301 was characterised by the fact that it enabled the United
States to unilaterally make demands for trade concessions by others
without offering any matching reciprocal concessions of its own that
others might demand in turn. The aggressive unilateralism of Section
301 referred to policies that would allow the United States to impose
new trade barriers against countries whose existing barriers to trade
were judged to be higher then the corresponding American barriers.
For example, in September 1985, the Reagan administration initiated a
18 Andrew Walter, World Power and World Money (Harvester, New York 1993) p.
189.
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series of Section 301 actions against Japan and other countries. Later in
1987, a radical proposal came from Democratic Representative Richard
Gephardt who advocated automatic retaliation against countries that
maintained persistent trade surpluses with the United States. In 1988,
this proposal was dropped in favour of the Senate's "Super 301", an
amendment of the old Section 301 of 1974.19 The Super 301 and Special
301 provisions of 1988 added strength to 301 actions against
unreasonable practices. Super 301 essentially required the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) to establish a priority list of countries and
their unreasonable practices and then set deadlines for their removal by
the foreign countries and should they fail to comply, for decisions of
retaliation by the United States. Special 301 was similar in its approach
but it addressed intellectual property rights. For example, in May 1989,
the USTR took actions against Japan, India and Brazil according to the
Super 301 schedule.2°
During the 1970s however, the diversion of capital from trade
and production to financial markets failed to revive profitability and to
help manage economic problems. It was only at the end of the 1970s
19 Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 included more than a thousand pages of
legislation but its centrepiece was Super 301, which included amendments to Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974 aimed at curtailing unfair foreign trade practices. See
Pierre Martin, "The Politics of International Structural Change: Aggressive
Unilateralism in American Trade Policy", in Political Economy and the Changing
Global Order, p. 440.
°Jagdish Bhagwati, "Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview", in J
. 
Bhagwati and H.
Patrick, eds. Aggressive Unilateralism. America's 301 Trade Policy and the World
Trading System (University of Michigan Press, Michigan 1993) pp. 2-5.
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and the early 1980s that the situation changed radically. At the roots of
this change was a major reversal of American policies following the
decision by President Nixon in 1971 to abandon the gold-dollar
standard. Since there was no viable alternative to the dollar as the
principal international reserve currency and medium of exchange, the
abandonment of the gold-dollar standard resulted in the establishment
of a pure dollar standard. The result was not the "collapse" of the
Bretton Woods system, but as Susan Strange put it, its deliberate
destruction. Its rules were consciously rejected by President Nixon,
leaving the exchange rate to be determined by market forces. 21 After
1973 this dollar standard gave American policy-makers an increased
degree of freedom in expanding the global supply of money, because it
eliminated any need to control American balance-of-payments deficits.
The United States was in a position to "tap the resources of the rest of
the world virtually without restriction, simply by issuing its own
currency" .
However, American privileges were not as unlimited as they
appeared in the mid-1970s. Only a fraction of the liquidity created by
the American monetary authorities found its way in new trade and
production facilities. Most of it was converted into Eurodollars, which
21 Susan Strange, "The "Fall' of the United States: Peace, Stability and Legitimacy", in
Geir Lundestad, ed. The Fall of Great Powers: Peace, Stability and Legitimacy (Oxford
University Press, London 1995) p. 203.
Susan Strange, "The Peristent Myth of Lost Hegemony", International Organisation,
vol. 41, no.4, Autumn 1987, P. 569.
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reproduced themselves many times over through the mechanisms of
private inter-bank money creation and re-emerged in the global market
as competitors to the dollars issued by the American government. 23 On
the domestic front, Washington policy-makers found it difficult to
tackle successfully a rise in stagflation (high inflation combined with
high unemployment) that was largely induced by the two oil shocks of
1973-1974 and 1979. The combination of unemployment and inflation
weakened the capacity and the political will of the federal government
to deal with the policy problems that were caused by stagflation. The
rise in unemployment caused political problems, which led the
government regularly to switch its policy objective to stimulating the
domestic economy at the expense of inflation.24
As a response to a crisis of confidence in the dollar and the
American economy, on October 6, 1979, the Chairman of the US Federal
Reserve, Paul Volker, took measures to restrict the supply of dollars in
world financial markets. Gilpin has argued that the unwillingness of
Germany in particular, to continue to support the dollar in 1979, was a
major reason for the shift in American monetary policy and that this
policy reversal marked the end of American hegemony. 25 However, the
23 Giovanni Arrighi, "The Global Market", Journal of World Systems Research, voL 5,
no.2, Spring 1999, P. 215
24 Joseph Hogan, "Reaganomics and Economic Policy, in IJilys Hill, Raymond Moore
and Phil Williams, eds. The Reagan Presidency. An Incomplete Revolution?"
(Macmillan Press, London 1990) p. 136.
Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relation,(Princeton UP,
Princeton 1987) p. 332.
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change in American policy was more a response to the fundamental
changes, which had taken place in the international monetary and
financial system than a sign of weakness on the part of the United
States.26
 This switch to restrictive monetary policies undertaken in the
last year of the Carter administration marked a shift of the American
government from being a competitor to private finance - as it was
during the 1970s - to being its most faithful and powerful supporter.
Volker's deflationary move in support of the dollar was only the first
step in this direction. This change indicated an important
transformation in economic polices by the time of the presidential
elections of 1980. During the course of the campaign season and for a
period after the elections in November 1980, Ronald Reagan and his
advisors developed an economic plan that built upon these changes but
moved in more radical directions. Soon came a major deregulation
drive aimed at creating in the United States conditions as favourable as
anywhere else in the world for financial speculation. With that came a
significant expansion of state indebtedness and a consequent escalation
in interstate competition for mobile capital.27
26 Andrew Walter, World Power and World Money, p. 224.
27 Gjovappj Arrighi, "The Global Market", p. 216.
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Reaganomics and the Construction of the "Washington Consensus"
What differentiated Reagan's economic policy from its
predecessors was the domestic mix of monetarism and supply-side
economics. The Reagan administration aimed to fight inflation by
reducing the money supply and taxes. Just as monetarism implied a
substantially reduced economic role for the state, so too did the
doctrine of supply-side economics upon which Reagan based his
economic policy. Supply-side economics gained wide publicity during
1980. Supply-side economics concentrated on the level of taxes levied
by the government and the consequences of those levies for economic
activity. There was a new perspective to fiscal policy which focused on
the relative price effects. Lower tax rates would encourage saving,
investment, productivity and risk-taking. According to supply-siders,
as people switched into these activities out of tax shelters and working
for non-taxable income, the incentive effects would cause an increase in
the market supply of goods and services - hence the term "supply-side
economics". As people responded to their higher after-tax income and
wealth or greater profitability, incomes would rise and the tax base
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would grow, thus feeding back some of the lost revenues to the
Treasury.28
For supply-side economists, such as Milton Friedman and
Arthur Laffer, taxes were not the only negative activity of government.
Government intervention and regulation were also blamed for the poor
economic performance of the 1970s.29 As President Reagan put it in his
inaugural address, "government is not the solution to our problem;
government is the problem". 3° Thus, the neoliberal ascendancy of the
1980s was grounded in part in the intractability of the domestic
economic problems of the 1970s. The apparent inability of the various
governments in power in North America and Western Europe and
beyond to deal with rising inflation was a central component of the
legitimation of neoliberalism. New Right liberal ideas influenced the
Reagan administration just as monetarist arguments influenced the
2 Paul Craig Roberts, "Supply-side Economics: An Assesment of the Theory and
Results of American Experience in the 1980s", in James Buchanan et.al., eds.
Reaganomics andAfter (Institute of Economic Affairs, London 1989) p. 26.
29 The Laffer Curve was named after Professor Arthur Laffer. He was an advisor to
President Reagan in the early 1980s. He suggested that, as taxes increased from fairly
low levels, tax revenue received by the government would also increase. However, as
tax rates rose, there would come a point where people would not regard it as worth
working so hard. This lack of incentives would lead to a fall in income and therefore a
fall in tax revenue. The logical end-point would be tax rates at 100 per cent where no
one would bother to work and so tax revenue would become zero. See Arthur Laffer
et.al., Foundations of supply-side economics: Theory and Evidence, (Academic Press,
New York 1983). For the background to the supply-side economic doctrine in the
Reagan Administration, see David Stockman, The Triumph of Politics, (Harper, New
York 1986); and David Green, The New Right: The Counter Revolution in Political,
Economic and Social Thought, (Wheatsheaf Books, London 1987).
3° President Reagan's First Inaugural Address, U.S. Capitol, January 20, 1981 (The
Ronald Reagan Official Website, http://www.ronaldreagan.com ).
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Thatcher government in the United Kingdom.31 For Desmond King, the
Reagan administration's economic strategy, based in part upon supply-
side economics, had five key elements:
'a) a large cut in tax rates to stimulate economic activity by increasing
monetary incentives
b) government control of the rate of growth of the money supply to
tackle inflation
c) a large reduction in non-defence (mainly welfare) public spending
by the state
d) an expansion of state defence expenditure; and
e) an extensive deregulation of the economy by the government' 32
For the Reagan Administration, most government regulation
was seen as an excessive burden upon entrepreneurs and producers,
which required taxes to be levied for its financing. These constituted a
powerful rationale for the deregulation of the economy. The Reagan
Administration's deregulation polices revealed the influence of New
Right arguments about the free market and minimal government.
Economic deregulation along with privatisation was clearly intended to
open previously regulated markets to more competition and to give
businesses in those markets greater autonomy to set wages and prices
according to supply and demand. Like other aspects of Reagan's
31 The Thatcher government came into office in May 1979. The instruments of
Thatcher's economic policy were a strict monetarist policy, a medium-term financial
strategy to lower the budget deficit, restrain on wages, legislation to alter the way
trade unions operated and a pound that was appreciating under the influence of high
interests rates and strong export earning from oil. See Alan Walters, Britain's
Economic Renaissance (Oxford University Press, London 1986).
32 Desmond King, The New Right: Politcs, Market and Citizenshit, (Macmillan,
London 1987) p. 144.
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economic policy, deregulation had begun before 1980. Between 1968
and 1978, for example, steps were taken toward greater deregulation of
communications, banking, stock-market transactions and airline
transportation. Beginning in 1980, the pace quickened, as trucking and
railroads, oil, cable television, were added to the list. A major project
was that of the final break-up of the American Telephone and
Telegraph Co. into nine regional firms. Deregulation of banking, in
particular had radically changed the face of the financial sector. The
major changes in banking law, codified in the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, ultimately eliminated
all regulation of interest rates and loosened restrictions on the
geographic areas served and the services offered by individual banks.33
The deregulation and privatisation drive of the 1980s aimed to shift
traditional responsibilities of the state to the commercial sector.
Economic deregulation actually made it extremely difficult for a future
Administration to reverse the deregulation policies of the Reagan
Administration.
Although during 1979-82, there were record numbers of
bankruptcies and an acceleration of the decline of older, less-
competitive industries, in 1982 the recession ended due to a
combination of fiscal, stimulus and supply-side tax-cutting measures.
3 Bennet Harrison aid Barry Bluestone, The Great U-Turn: Corporate Restructuring
and the Polarising of America, (Basic Books, New York 1988) pp. 94-96.
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The tax cut was indeed massive. 34
 The 1981 cuts in business and
personal taxes were so generous that the value of allowable deductions
and actual credits actually exceeded the tax liability on the income that
investment in a typical piece of equipment would generate. This meant
that investments in equipment had become fully subsidised by the
government. In 1983, monetary policy was loosened and budgetary
allocations were shifted in favour of military spending which by 1982-
83 was growing by 10 per cent a year.35 The hostility towards statist
paternalism along with Reagan's stress on the need for a strong
America, served to vindicate tax cuts and the deregulation of industry
and banking. In this context foreign transnationals became more
dependent upon the American market at the same time as American
manufacturing capital shifted many of its assets towards high profit
sectors, like financial services, real estate, new technology and defence.
Reagan's policies facilitated a growth in concentration in these sectors
of the American economy, so that its bigger corporations were better
able to compete internationally.36
President Reagan first proposed a 30 per cent, across the board (i.e., for all
taxpayers), tax rate cut during the 1980 primary campaign. President Reagan was able
to sign into law the tax cuts in late 1981 after an attempt by congressional Democrats
to block the cuts failed but at the reduced rate of 25 per cent, and an effective rate of 23
per cent since the cuts were over three years (5 per cent in 1981, retroactive; 10 per
cent for 1982; 10 per cent for 1983. (The Ronald Reagan Official Website,
http://www.ronaldreagan.com).
Bennet Harrison and Barry l3luestone, The Great U-Turn: Corporate Restructuring
and the Polarising ofAmerica, p. 92.
36 Stephen Gffl, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission, (Cambridge
University Press, London 1990) pp. 102-104 & 107.
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A particular feature of American deregulation was the fact that it
took place on an impressive scale. Its influence was also due to two
other factors. First, attention focused on its alleged benefits. For
example, in the case of airline deregulation attention was drawn to the
lower fares in the United States when compared to Europe where tight
controls existed until the early 1980s. Second, technological
development during the 1980s linked all the main financial centres, to
globalise financial markets. As Swann has stressed, once one centre had
deregulated and dealing costs had fallen, other centres were forced to
follow suit otherwise their trade would be deflected to the lower cost
centre. Thus competition from the New York Stock Exchange after 1974-
1975 helped to bring deregulation to London in 1979, and this kind of
knock-on effect was felt throughout the world.37
 Furthermore, the
success of the United States in outperforming all other states in global
financial markets arid forcing its great rival of the Cold War the Soviet
Union into bankruptcy, gave credibility to the claim that all states and
their citizens would benefit from following the prescriptions of the
neoliberal policies followed by the United States.38
The results of the combination of monetarism and supply-side
economics pursued by the United States from the late 1970s and
Dennis Swami, The Retreat of the State: Deregulation and Privatisation in the UK
and the US, Harvester, London 1988, pp. 43-44.
Giovanni Arrighi, The Global Market, p. 221.
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especially during the 1980s had the consequence (probably unforeseen
at that time) of redefining and cementing American global hegemony.
Beyond the economic liberalisation and deregulation on the domestic
front there were also external consequences, both financial and
commercial. The American trade deficit, which doubled from 1982 to
1983 and again in 1984, induced an export-led recovery within the
Western industrialised world. While expanding at a very rapid pace
during the 1980s, the United States was willing to tolerate a massive
increase in imports, in order to stimulate economic activity in the
Western industrialised economies. In that way American economic
policy served to reinforce American hegemony in the Western world
and to spread American influence and dominance to the rest of the
world. The explanation of that resides, according to Augelli and
Murphy, with the fact that given the size of the American economy and
its links to the rest of the world, American domestic economic policy
was actually global economic policy.39 A very good example of that was
the Plaza Accord in September 1985 by which American policy-makers
sought to reverse the increasing trade deficit with Japan by persuading
the G5 central banks to raise the value of the Japanese yen and lower
Enrico Augeffi and Craig Murphy, America's Quest for Supremacy and the Third
World, (Pinter Publishers, Londonl988) pp. 160-161 & 172-174.
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the value of the dollar.4° Indeed, the efforts of the central banks were
successful in increasing the value of the yen (from 238 yen/dollar in
1985, to 128 yen/dollar by 1988).41
The New Right's strategy during the 1980s aimed to identify
American institutions with the free market In New Right thinking the
American claim to exemplary modernity and the institutions of the free
market had been assimilated into one another. As a result the spread of
the free market was represented as the cutting edge of modernity and
identified with the extension of American values. For John Gray, if the
authority of American institutions was universal and the free market
was at the heart of them, then the reach of the American free market
could be global. In that sense, freeing up markets was not a
conservative project but rather a programme for an economic counter-
revolution. But Gray goes further by pointing out that the political
economy of Reaganomics was not entirely free market oriented. It was a
species of military-led Keynesianism with large budget deficits that
were incurred in order to finance the tax cuts and military
expenditures.42 This spending also boosted investment in new
information technologies. The increased government spending on
40 However, the appreciation in the value of the yen against the dollar failed to
eliminate Japan's bilateral trade surplus with the United States.
41 Richard Stubbs, "The Political Economy of the Asia-Pacific Region", in Stubbs &
Underhill, eds. Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (Macmifian,
London 1994) p. 371.
42 John Gray, False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism, (Granta Books, London
1998) pp. 104-108.
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military research, development and production, eventually led to
making government spending larger rather than smaller and created
unprecedented budget deficits. But Reagan's fear of the "evil empire",
the Soviet Union, made military preparedness as important as economic
recovery.43
Regarding the third variable of the framework, international
institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, their re-orientation of
their functions and missions has taken place during the 1980s. Indeed,
an important dimension of the Reagan Administration's foreign
economic policy was the targeting of international organisations as a
way of making them an instrument of American policy. An important
result of the major review of American involvement in international
lending agencies mitiated by the Reagan Administration in the early
1980s was a re-affirmation by the IMF, the World Bank and regional
development banks that the purpose of development aid was to foster
open economies. Although the Administration threatened to withdraw,
it did not pull out of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) for instance, or other intergovernmental
agencies. But Reagan made his threats credible in 1984 by withdrawing
from one prominent agency that was a source of ideological opposition
° American military expenditures rose from 5.5 per cent of GNP in 1976 to almost 8
per cent in 1986. Military expenditures in the T1980s were greater than in Japan or
Germany by a ratio of more than 3/1. (See Stephen Gifi, American Hegemony and the
Trilateral Commission, p. 83). See also Bennet Harrison and Barry Bluestone, The
Great U-Turn: Corporate Restructuring and the Polarising ofAmerica, p. 90.
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to his views, namely the United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). As Augelli and Murphy point out,
this was not a very costly act. UNESCO's major operations involved co-
operation in fields such as science, education and culture, but no large
constituency in the United States actually relied upon that agency. In
withdrawing from UNESCO, the Administration's threat to undo the
international organisation system was given more credibility. After that
point, whenever the question of increasing the resources for the
multilateral agencies arose, the Reagan Administration responded by
demanding that any new finances only be given in exchange for the
institutions' more strict adherence to American economic policy
objectives.44 In the case of the IMF, although the share of American
votes had declined, reflecting its falling share of world GDP, it
remained sufficiently large to block any significant change in policy.45
The United States remained the only country with veto power, thus
having a degree of control over outcomes in an institution constructed
on the basis of principles favoured by the United States.46
44 Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, America's Quest for Supremacy and the Third
World, pp. 186-188.
As of January 2000, the United States had a 17.35 per cent of the total votes of the
IMF members. Second was Japan with 6.23 per cent.
(The IMF Website,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm#total).
'1 Stephen Gifi and David Law, The Global Political Economy. Perspectives, Problems
And Policies, (Cambridge University Press, New York 1990) pp. 345-346.
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Indeed, by the mid-1980s most debtor economies had negotiated
new stand-by arrangements with the IMF, under which Fund resources
and policy advice were made available subject to limits and to
performance conditions that were in line with what came to be known
as the Washington Consensus. The term "Washington Consensus" was
first used by John Williamson in 1990 to describe a list of economic
reforms that were being urged on Latin American countries by the
United States. According to Williamson, the "Washington" of this term
was both the political Washington of Congress and the Administration
and the technocratic Washington of the international financial
institutions, the economic agencies of the US government, the Federal
Reserve and the think tanks.47 The Washington Consensus had its roots
directly in the economic policies of the Reagan Administration. These
could be traced back to July 1981, when William Brock, the United
States Trade Representative, had maintained that free trade was
essential to the pursuit of a strong US hegemony. At the same time it
was also emphasised that the Reagan Administration would strictly
enforce US laws and international agreements relating to practices such
as government subsidisation.48
John Wffliamson, Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?
(Institute for International Economics, Washington DC 1990) p.7.
Robert Baldwin, Trade Policy in a Changing World Economy, (Harvester-
Wheatsheaf, New York 1986) P. 74.
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For Williamson there were ten elements comprising the
Washington Consensus:
a) Fiscal discipline, such that budget deficits should be small enough
to be financed without recourse to the inflation tax;
b) Public expenditure priorities, such that policy reform should re-
direct expenditure from politically sensitive areas which typically
receive more resources then their economic returns can justify,
such as defence and subsidies, toward fields with high economic
returns like primary health and education and infrastructure;
c) Tax reform, with the aim to broaden the tax base and cut marginal
taxes;
d) Financial liberalisation, where the objective was market-
determined interest rates;
e) Exchange rates, where countries needed a unified exchange rate at
a level sufficiently competitive to induce a rapid growth in non-
traditional exports;
f) Trade liberalisation, for quantitative trade restrictions should be
replaced by tariffs and these should be progressively reduced until
a uniform low tariff of at most 20 per cent is achieved;
g) Foreign direct investment, for barriers impeding the entry of
foreign firms should be abolished;
h) Privatisation, such that state enterprises should be privatised;
i) Deregulation, in that governments should abolish regulations that
impede the entry of new firms or restrict competition; and
j) Property rights, because the legal system should provide secure
property rights without excessive costs.49
For Williamson, the Washington Consensus did not imply a specific model of
market to be sought See John Williamson, "Democracy and the Washington
Consensus", World Development, voL 21, no. 8, 1993, PP. 1332-1334.
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The general advice for all countries was to adopt outward-oriented
trade and investment policies aimed at price stability, fiscal policies
aimed at balance in the medium term and most importantly, liberal
financial policies designed to build open and solid capital markets. The
incentive to move in such a direction was the promise of restructured
and reduced bank debt and new financing, mainly in the form of
private portfolio and direct investment.50
The term Washington Consensus as it was articulated by
Williamson was in principle geographically and historically specific - a
lowest common denominator of the reforms that he judged Washington
could agree were needed in Latin America as of 1989. But in practice
there would not have been a lot of difference if Williamson had
undertaken a similar exercise for Africa or Asia rather than Latin
America. Williamson's Washington Consensus focused principally on
policy reforms that reduced the role of government, such as
privatisation and the liberalisation of trade, finance and foreign direct
investment. It did this because the orthodoxy of the generation whose
ideas were embodied in the practices being challenged in 1989 had been
much more statist than was by then regarded as advisable, and hence
the policy reforms that were needed at that time were all in the
5° Louis Pauly, Who Elected the Bankers? Surveillance and Control in the World
Economy (Cornell University Press, London 1997) pp. 121-122.
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direction of liberalisation. 51 These circumstances expanded the meaning
of the term to cover a wider set of economic ideas associated with the
free market economy.
The fourth variable of the framework, ideas that are accepted by
domestic elites, played a significant role during the 1980s in
legitimising and applying the Washington Consensus in many regions
of the world. Indeed, by the 1990s, most developing countries'
governments had become converts to free market policies in varying
degrees. Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, the governments of
developing countries substantially reduced trade barriers and many
removed longstanding restrictions on capital movements. By the early
1990s the Washington Consensus was changing development policies
and practices across the globe. Washington pressed successfully for an
acceleration of corporate-friendly globalisation rules, reflected in the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 and the
creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994. The IMF and
the World Bank in tandem with the US Treasury also pressed for
51 John Williamson, "What Should the Bank Think About the Washington
Consensus?", paper prepared as a background to the World Bank's World
Development Report 2000, in July 1999 (The World Bank Website,
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/forjourn.htm).
52 The OECD has also proposed a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) which
would, if it had been implemented, given foreign investors the capacity to seek
compensation from domestic governments if they could demonstrate discrimination
against them - when compared to the treatment of domestic investors. The OECD
began the MAI negotiations in May of 1995 which ended in 1998 with no agreement.
(See West Governors' Association Website:
http://www.westgov.org/wga/publicat/maiweb.htm)
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investment liberalisation in South Korea and other East Asian
economies.53
 As a result the Washington Consensus achieved
ideological hegemony and was clustered in governments, the private
sector and international financial and political agencies.
Williamson has acknowledged that not all of the assertions he
included in his original "ten-best 1
 policy recommendations enjoyed the
same degree of consensus. According to his assessment in five of the ten
policy prescriptions "consensus has been established". Three of the
prescriptions (financial and trade liberalisation and deregulation) were
still controversial " in a non-ideological way" meaning that, in his
judgement, the emergence of a consensus was just a matter of time and
depended only on finding the technical solution that would reconcile
the differences that still existed among the experts. The remaining two,
changing public budget priorities and according the same treatment to
foreign and domestic firms were, in Wfflianison's view, always bound
to be controversial due to their inherent political nature.54
 This
controversy is evident in the cases of the peso crisis (1994-1995) and the
Asian crisis (1997-1998), which are examined in Chapters Four and Six.
Robin Broad and John Cavanagh, "The Death of the Washington Consensus?", in
World Policy Journal, voL XVI, no. 3, 1999, P. 80.
John Williamson 'Democracy and the Washington Consensus" pp. 1332-1333; See
also, John Williamson 'What should the Bank Think about The Washington
Consensus" Paper presented at the World Bank's PREM meetings. July 1999, p. 3.
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It should be noted here that foreign economic policy in the
United States had been characterised by an occasionally abrasive
relationship between the Presidential and Congressional branches of
government on who should take the leading role in defining and
protecting American interests. During the Bretton Woods era, Congress
delegated authority over trade policy to the President and State
Department. For example, the 1962 Trade Expansion Act passed by
Congress created the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations,
which was renamed the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in
1980. The USTR was authorised by President Carter to make and
administer American trade policy, lead all trade negotiations and
represent the American government in all major international trade
organisations. 55 However, Congress had tried to maintain influence
over trade policy by setting out the rules which determined the way in
which both it and the executive dealt with foreign economic policy. A
major example of this had been the evolution of "fast-track" authority
first given to the President in 1974 and intended to speed the conclusion
of trade agreements and insulate them from political pressures within
Congress. This delegation of authority to the President was limited in
the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act and it became the
55 Simon Lee, "Managed or Mismanaged Trade? US-Japan Trade Relations During the
Clinton Presidency", in R. Li and I. Cook, eds. Fragmented Asia, vol. 2 (Avebury,
London 1998) PP. 209-233.
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centre of the growing congressional debate over NAFTA during 1992
and 1993. Another example had been the section 301 of the 1974 Trade
Act, which required that members of Congress be included in
delegations to trade negotiations and that private sector advisory
comniittees be established to inform the trade policy process.56
Furthermore, as a result of the economic polices of the 1980s and
the subsequent globalisation of finance, the links between Washington
and American business had become more complicated. In the era of
globalisation of finance and economic activity, it is misleading to limit
the conception of hegemony and dominance by defining it simply in
terms of the power of one state relative to other states. Today, the US
government is extremely concerned about the access of US-based
transnational corporations (TNCs) to foreign markets. Government
advocacy of free trade is designed to open markets for some industries,
particularly the telecommunications and information-related industries.
Thus the TNCs have become more direct instruments of
macroeconomic policy through research and development (R&D)
subsidies, tax concessions and trade agreements. 57
 At the same time, the
fact that non-American TNCs appear increasingly strong relative to
Brian Hocking and Michael Smith, Beyond Foreign Economic Policy: The United
States, the Single European Market and the Changing World Economy (Pinter
Publications, Washington DC 1997) pp. 77-78.
Edward Comor, "The Global Political Economy of Communication and IPE", in
Edward Comor, ed. The Global Political Economy of Communication: Hegemony,
Telecommunication and the Information Economy (Macmillan Press, London 1996) p.
7.
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American companies does not significantly alter the ability of the
United States to achieve liberal economic policies. The general trends of
globalisation are actually linked to the importance of foreign direct
investment in the United States, as foreign TNCs see access to the
American market as crucial. 58
 Therefore, even in this context, the United
States appears as, if not the dominant, at least the preeminent power in
the world economy largely due to the reorientation and the
reconstruction of its economic polices during the 1980s. In retrospect,
the Reagan Administration's economic policies projected America's
structural power59
 and set the conditions for its economic relations with
other states. The effect is best described by Henry Nau:
'The Reagan Administration based its policy on a new appreciation of
American economic power in the international marketplace.. .By
renewing incentives to disinflate and enhance market forces at home,
the administration used American power not as an end in itself but as
a means of encouraging these reforms abroad. Simultaneously it urged
new international negotiations to maintain open markets, recognising
that American economic policies, could not shape international
behaviour if markets closed.' 60
Reagan's economic policies raised the dependence of other states on the
American market Based initially on domestic remobilisation,
Reaganomics promoted the liberalisation of markets and deepened the
Gifi and Law, The Global Political Economy, p. 357.
According to Susan Strange's terminology, structural power is the ability to exercise
control over people's security, and the manner or mode of production of goods and
services. Structural power also lies with those able to control the supply and
distribution of credit and those who possess knowledge. See Susan Strange, States and
Markets (Pinter Publishers, London 1993) pp. 26-28.
60 Henry Nau, "Or the Solution?", Foreign Policy, no. 59,1985, p.147
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interdependence between the macroeconomic policy-making conditions
of America and other states.61
It should not be overlooked that an important factor behind the
continuing dominance of the United States in the field of international
money and finance has been the extent to which this dominance is
linked to the dependence of Europe, Japan and other countries upon
American military protection. Although security issues are not the
concern of this thesis, the link between financial and security
relationships should not be underestimated.
The fifth variable of the framework, the limited instability of the
system became evident during the 1990s as a consequence of the
globalisation of finance and the increased mobility of capital. The crises
of Mexico in 1994-95 and of East Asia in 1997-98 have demonstrated the
vulnerability of national economies to sudden movements of capital
from one region to the other in the search of greater profitability. As
argued in Chapter Two, these financial episodes have provided
American policy-makers, directly through the US Treasury or indirectly
through the IMF and the World Bank, with the opportunity to advance
the Washington Consensus in the troubled economies as the only way
out of the crisis. Chapters Five and Seven demonstrate how the
Washington Consensus was reinforced during the 1990s through the
peso and the South Korean crises.
61 Stephen Gffl, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission, p. 107.
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This chapter has elaborated on the framework of five variables
that was introduced in Chapter Two. More specifically this chapter
analysed the origins of the five interdependent variables that define the
changing basis of American hegemony in relation to the emergence of
the open market orthodoxy of the Washington Consensus. The next
four chapters analyse the American influence in Mexico and South
Korea and the ways in which the United States responded in order to
assure the continuity of the liberalisation trend of the 1980s and the
1990s. The framework of five variables will be tested through the case
studies of peso and South Korean crises in order to identify the extent
to which the Washington Consensus has been entrenched.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE REDEFINITION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARDS MEXICO: FROM THE
CRISIS OF 1982 TO NAFTA AND THE PESO CRISIS OF 1994
This chapter analyses the origins of the liberalisation of the
Mexican economy that took place during the 1980s and the variables on
which the advancement of the Washington Consensus was based before
the peso crisis. The first part of this chapter provides an analysis of the
Mexican economy and US-Mexican relations before and after the
Mexican debt crisis of 1982. The second part of the chapter explains the
role of NAFTA in consolidating economic reforms in Mexico and
promoting the Washington Consensus in the region and the third part
examines the main reasons and the most significant developments that
led to the peso crisis (1994-95). This chapter demonstrates the close links
between the economies of the United States and Mexico and the
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significant influence that the United States has exercised over the path
that Mexican economy has followed especially since 1982.
The Mexican Economy and the US-Mexico Relations: The Crisis of 1982
Mexico and the United States are linked together by a two
thousand-mile border. The US-Mexico relationship has been
characterised by unfriendly or stand-offish relations. American
altitudes towards Mexico have ranged from benign neglect to arrogant
unilateralism, while the principal goal of Mexican diplomacy for much
of the 20th century has been to keep the US at arm's length and to
demonstrate its independence by opposing US objectives. For example,
Mexican governments spent most of the Cold War period making
speeches denouncing American intervention and defending Soviet-
sponsored guerrilla movements in the name of national sovereignty. As
M. Delal Baer put it, what cooperation took place was hidden as if it
was something shameful. Common problems were not tackled in an
open, joint spirit of friendly cooperation. Rather, meetings with
Mexican officials were laden with a thousand reasons why the two
countries could not cooperate, spiced with history lessons reminding
the U.S. of its craftiness. Mexico's anti-American dogma defined
126
Chapter Four: The United States and Mexico
virtually all cooperation as a form of capitulation. 1
 This relationship
was framed by the Mexican Revolution (1910-1940). The main
principles of that revolution were land reform, anti- clericalism,
nationalism, and anti-foreign capital attitudes. Some of the most
characteristic examples in those areas were Mexico's nationalisation of
the oil industry in 1938, Mexico's foreign policy stances in the 1960s
with regard to Cuba, that were quite at odds with American policy, and
its foreign policy stance towards Central America, namely Nicaragua
and El Salvador in the 1980s, which was characterised as a very
independent policy.2
An important feature of contemporary political history in Mexico
was the creation of the National Revolutionary Party in 1929, the
precursor of the present day Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PR!)
which was founded in 1946 and has held power uninterrupted until
December 2000. At the conclusion of World War II, under the PR! and
the Aleman Administration, Mexico devoted itself to the process of
1 M. Delal Baer, "Lessons of NAFI'A for US Relations with Mexico", Testimony before
the US Senate Subcommittee for the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, April 27, 2000 (The US Senate Website,
http:// www.senate.gov/ —foreign/hearings/hrg042700.html).
2 For more on the Mexican Revolution and United States-Mexico relationship, see
Charles Harris & Louis Sadler, The Border And The Revolution (High-Lonesome
Books, Silver City 1988). For an analysis of Mexican policies towards the Untied States
see Clark Reynolds, The Mexican Economy: Twentieth Century Structure and Growth
(Yale university Press, New London 1970); B. Griffiths, Mexican Monetary Policy and
Economic Development, Praeger Publishers, New York 1972).
In the elections of July 2, 2000, the PRI lost power to Partido Accion Nacional (PAN)
and its candidate Vicente Fox signalling the first transition of power in 71 years. PAN
was founded in 1939 and is a pro-business, pro-Catholic, centre-right party.
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import-substitution industrialisation (ISI). There are at least two
common interpretations as to what is meant by import-substitution.
Narrowly defined, import substitution is the development by the state
of policies designed to close a chronic deficit between the export of
primary products and the import of manufactured goods. Broadly
defined, import-substitution is a strategy for development, which
favours the expansion of the internal market, in contrast to orthodox
neoclassical doctrines which emphasise development through the
market economy. Within this context, the state is expected to play a
crucial role through indicative planning, the construction of state-
owned industries in key sectors and the application of temporary
protectionist policies in the foreign trade sector. 4 The goal of ISI was to
develop a strong industrial base by encouraging the domestic
production of previously imported goods. In Mexico, between 1940 and
1982, the foreign investment laws reflected the government's distrust of
foreign investment. For example, Article 27 of the Mexican constitution
prohibited foreigners from owning property or any type of real estate
within 50 kiometres of the coast and 100 kiometres of the border. 5 It
4 James Cypher, State and Capital Development in Mexico: Development Polky Since
1940 (Westview Press, Boulder 1990) PP. 5-6.
Only Mexicans by birth or naturalisation and Mexican companies have the right to
acquire ownership of lands, waters, and their appurtenances, or to obtain concessions
for the exploitation of mines or of waters. The State may grant the same right to
foreigners, provided they agree before the Ministry of Foreign Relations to consider
themselves as nationals in respect to such property, and bind themselves not to invoke
the protection of their governments in matters relating thereto; under penalty, in case
of non-compliance with this agreement, of forfeiture of the property acquired to the
Nation. Under no circumstances may foreigners acquire direct ownership of lands or
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was for reasons of history and internal political structures that not only
Mexico but also most Latin American countries resisted any
liberalisation of their economies until the 1980s. Import-substituting
industrialisation succeeded in its initial goals of reducing imports and
promoting domestic manufacturing. From 1939 to 1969 Mexican
imports fell rapidly as a proportion of total Mexican demand and the
economy grew at the very impressive annual rate of 6 per cent from
1940 to 1975. At the time Mexico was a model for other countries that
employed an ISI strategy.6
Until the 1970s, Mexico relied on international institutions to
provide capital in the form of loans to spur its economic development.
Often these loans carried requirements that made Mexico attentive to
scheduled repayments while ensuring economic development under
international supervision. However, Mexico's long reluctance to
participate in any form of free trade was demonstrated by its refusal to
join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAU) in 1980. As
long as Mexican oil exports could generate increased national wealth,
the pressure to join the GATT was never substantial. Mexico followed
waters within a zone of one hundred kiometres along the frontiers and of fifty
kiometres along the shores of the country. See Constitution of Mexico, Chapter 1,
Individual Guarantees, Article 2Z (The Mississippi State University Website,
http://www.msstate.edu/Archives/History/Latin_America/Mexico).
6 Harry Browne, Beth Sims and Tom Barry, For Richer, For Poorer. Shaping US-
Mexican Integration, (Resource Centre Press and Latin America Bureau, London 1994)
p. 12.
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the model of a planned economy, with centralised state-guided
principles to direct its growth. By avoiding the GAU, Mexico was able
to impose import quotas that limited the access of foreign goods to its
markets. Tariffs, quotas and import restrictions were supplemented by
national ownership of many sectors of the economy. In 1973, for
instance, under President Echeverria, a law was passed regulating
foreign investment and the transfer of technology from one country to
another. The law required that all new companies have at least 51 per
cent Mexican ownership. It also called for a National Commission on
Foreign Investment to approve or reject all new foreign investment. The
Commission was encouraged to direct new investment into areas of the
economy not developed by existing firms. In areas where national firms
were already in business new foreign investment was discouraged.7
As a result, economic development not only for Mexico but also
for Latin America took a lower priority during the Nixon, Ford, Carter
and Reagan administrations. The US government decided that when
Latin American countries needed American capital and technology,
these would be channelled through private enterprises and not made
available by loans and transfers between governmental organisations.
In essence, private loans by American banks, with little or no United
The Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment was
enacted on February 9, 1973. See Josefina Zoralda Vasquez and Lorenzo Meyer, The
United States and Mexico (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1985) pp. 185-186
and Frank Macchiarola, "Mexico as a Trading Partner", Proceedings of the Academy
of Political Science, vol. 37, no. 4,1990, pp. 101-104.
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States government participation, began to replace the loans that had
been provided by international organisations. 8 Loans from private
banks were negotiated on a bilateral basis, offered greater freedom to
the borrowing nation and were no longer directed toward an agreed-
upon policy of economic development for the borrower. Indeed, the
entry of private American bankers into the international lending market
worked to the short-term advantage of both Mexico and the United
States. For Mexico, it meant continued freedom to develop its industries
under domestic ownership, with foreign capital being used to finance
economic expansion. The United States was able to reduce its economic
burden in a time of domestic economic distress, resulting in reduced
interest among United States policymakers in the problems of Latin
America's political economy.
It was easier for Mexico to borrow from private lenders who
were supposedly less politically oriented than official governmental
institutions. At the same time the price of oil, which had been $2.50 a
barrel in 1973 began to climb, peaking at $33.00 a barrel in 1983. For an
oil-exporting country, substantial loans stimulated by increasing oil
prices created an astonishing - but temporary - boost for the country's
economy. Furthermore, the fact that Mexico had the sixth most
important world reserves of hydrocarbons enabled the Mexican
government to take a stronger and more independent stand vis-à-vis
8 Josefina Zoralda, Vazquez and Lorenzo Meyer, The United States and Mexico, p. 7.
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the United States. 9 Mexico found it easier to avoid domestic reforms
and take advantage of prosperity, but the failure to link the loans to
other developmental objectives meant that Mexican industries, many of
them state owned could conceal inefficiency, lack of productivity and
even corruption.l°
Through the 1970s and early 1980s, Mexico continued to balance
its fiscal deficits from loans rather than by increasing taxes on its
wealthiest economic sectors. While oil prices remained high, successive
Mexican Administrations did not see the need to come to terms with
the implications of its substantial borrowings. At the beginning of the
1980s, oil and gas appeared to offer Mexico the opportunity to make the
leap from an undeveloped to a developed economy. However, a
surplus world supply of fuel transformed a seller's market into a
buyer's market and in 1981 the price of oil began to drop. In 1982,
Mexico's total (external and domestic) debt reached 51.7 per cent of
GDP.11 Instead of devaluing the peso drastically and cutling
governmental spending, the Mexican government added $22 billion to
an already large foreign debt. Toward the end of the end of the short-
lived oil boom a ffight of capital occurred - mostly to the United States
9 In 1978, for example, Mexico explored the possibility of shipping crude oil to Cuba.
The plan was never carried out but in 1979, Lopez Portfflo felt confident enough to
receive Fidel Castro on the small Mexican island of Cozumel. See Josefina Zoralda,
The United States and Mexico, p. 191.
10 Frank Macchiarola, "Mexico as a Trading Partner", p. 96.
11 Banco de Mexico, Economic and Financial Indicators, (Banco de Mexico Website,
http://www.banxico.org.mx/siteBanxicoINGLES/eInfoFinanciera).
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in the form of $16 billion between 1981 and 1982. In August 1982,
Mexico announced to the world that it was bankrupt and could not
make the current payments on its foreign debt of $83 bfflion. A month
later, the Portillo Administration announced the nationalisation of
domestic banks and the imposition of exchange controls. 12 Mexico
owed money to 1,400 banks - mostly in the United States. For instance,
it owed the Bank of America and Citibank roughly $43 billion each.
Citibank's Mexican exposure equalled two-thirds of its net corporate
assets.13 The US government acted rapidly to support the Mexican
government and thereby avoid a total collapse of Mexico's economy,
which could have triggered a series of defaults in Latin America. The
Federal Reserve and other American agencies provided an emergency
loan of $1.9 billion and worked closely with Mexican officials and the
IMF to renegotiate the Mexican debt. In return, Mexico's new
administration under Miguel De La Madrid had to accept an austerity
programme negotiated with the IMF and indirectly supported by the
12 President Lopez Portfflo had developed the nationalisation plan in secret,
announcing it to his cabinet only twelve hours before his address to the nation. See
Sylvia Maxfield, "Capital Mobility and Mexican Financial Liberalisation", in Capital
Ungoverned: Liberalising Finance in M. Loriaux, Meredith Woo-Cumings et. al., eds.
Interventionist States (Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1995) pp. 102-103.
13 Kavaljit Singh, The Globalisation of Finance: A Citizen's Guide (Zed Books, London
1999) p. 47.
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Reagan administration in the United States. The arrangements included
devaluation, a cut in government expenditures and salary controls.'4
The response of the American administration to the Mexican
debt crisis of 1982 took place in a context of an increasing strategic
importance of Mexico to the United States due to Mexico's oil resources,
the dimensions of the country's foreign debt that endangered the
stability of the US banking system, an impressive increase in bilateral
trade, the inflow of Mexican migration to the United States and drug
trafficking. These issues created a network of relations that were shared
and consolidated during the Mexican economic crisis of 1982. It was
then, when many of their common interests reached a critical point, that
Mexico and the United States were forced to sit at the negotiating table
and establish direct contact.15
 A very good example of this close
relationship has been the US-Mexico Binational Commission (BNC)
which is a unique forum established by the two countries to allow for
regular exchanges at the Cabinet level on a wide range of issues critical
to US-Mexico relations. The BNC was established in 1981 by Presidents
Reagan and Lopez Portillo and it was envisaged as a simple flexible
mechanism that would meet once or twice annually during which US
14 Josefina Zoralda Vasquez and Lorenzo Meyer, The United States and Mexico, pp.
195-196.
l5 Soledad Loaeza, "The Changing Face of Mexican Nationalism", in M. DeJa Baer and
Sidney Weintraub, eds. The NAFTA Debate: Grappling with Unconventional Trade
Issues (Lynne Rienner, Boulder 1994) p. 155.
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and Mexican counterparts would address issues requiring high-level
attention.16
When Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado became president (1982-
1988) following the IMF's and US Treasury's recommendations, the
Mexican government made a U-turn in economic policy, dropping 1ST
and adopting a neoliberal strategy, characterised by the privatisation of
public enterprises, the liberalisation of the economy toward foreign
markets, salary controls and the reduction of social expenses.
Neoliberalism, characterised by a minimalist state, control of inflation
and privatisation, holds that reducing all barriers to free market
activities will produce economic growth that eventually will benefit
everyone. Intent on attracting foreign investment and promoting
exports, de la Madrid slashed government spending and rapidly
devalued the peso. Slowly some changes began to occur. From 1982 to
1986, Mexican manufacturing imports increased from $3.4 billion to
$7.8 billion while manufacturing production for domestic markets fell
by greater amounts than the increase in imports.
16 The BNC currently has 14 working groups and two subgroups which reflect the
political, economic, law enforcement, social and environmental issues at the centre of
US-Mexico relations. BNC working groups range from agriculture, border
cooperation, education and cultural affairs to health, labour, trade, investment and
migration. See US-Mexico Binational Commission, Fact Sheet Released by the Office of
Mexican Affairs, June 10, 1998, (The State Department Website,
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/  ara/).
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The Four Variables at Work
From 1986, globalisation of finance, capital flows, international
institutions and domestic elites as expressed by the Mexican
Administration (four out of five variables of our conceptual framework)
played an important role in strengthening the Washington Consensus
in Mexico. More specifically, in 1986, President de la Madrid brought
Mexico into full participation in the GATF while state-run industries,
ranging from sugar plantations to Aeromexico were sold off. These
policy shifts responded to the wishes of the IMF and the United States,
but they also reflected the economic orientation of the Mexican
administration. Once Carlos Salinas de Gortari became president in
1988, there was a further rush to liberalisation. Within three years,
import permits - the key instrument for keeping out competitive
imports - had been eliminated for practically all goods apart from
agriculture and the automotive sector. In May 1989, the government
announced the liberalisation of its foreign investment rules to permit
100 per cent ownership of many enterprises with assets as much as $100
million. As a result, revenues from privatisation and deregulation
exceeded 7 per cent of GNP in the 1991-1994 period while the
previously nationalised banks reverted to private ownership.17
17 A limited return of bank stock into private ownership beginning in 1987 and
regulatory changes in 1989 paved the way for full bank re-privatisation in 1991 and
1992. Banking legislation passed in July 1990 permitted 100 per cent private
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The government also removed many of the restrictions on
foreign investment in the tourism industry and on the system of
maquiladoras - the largely American-owned branch-plants located near
the United States border that produce goods for export under special
legal treatment from both Mexico and the United States. These
industries used Mexican labour to assemble American-made parts for
shipment back to the United States as finished products. Normal import
duties on the finished product had been replaced by much lower duties
based on the value added in Mexico by the production of the finished
product. Maquiladoras had been in place since 1965, when the Mexican
government opened its northern border to foreign - mainly American-
owned export processing plants through its Border Industrialisation
Program. It represented the first step toward the integration of Mexico
into the US manufacturing base. This initiative in effect created an
insulated sub-economy governed by different rules and subject to
different economic forces. On the one hand the Mexican government
encouraged US companies to move to the borderlands and set up
maquiladoras, while on the other (until the early 1980s) it discouraged
foreign investment in the country's interior. By 1985, these
maquiladoras had become the second largest foreign exchange source
ownership of all Mexico's commercial banks. See Sylvia Maxfield, "Capital Mobility
and Mexican Financial Liberalisation", pp. 106-108.
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in Mexico. Until the mid-1980s the country's economic planners viewed
it largely as an employment program (table 3.1).
TABLE 4.1 - MAQUILADORAS, BY PLANTS, EMPLOYEES AND LABOUR
COST
1982-1992
YEAR	 NUMBER OF	 EMPLOYEES AVG HOURLY
	
PLANTS	 LABOUR COST
1982	 585	 127048
	
1.78
1983	 600	 150867
	
1.28
1984	 672	 199684
	
1.43
1985	 760	 211968
	
1.39
1986	 890	 249833
	
1.02
1987	 1125	 305523
	
1.04
1988	 1396	 369489
	
1.17
1989	 1655	 429725
	
1.30
1990	 1930	 460293
	
1.34
1991	 1954	 489000
	
1.60
1992	 2129	 511000
	
1.64
Source: Harry Browne, For Richer, For Poorer, p.14.
However, by the early 1990s export-oriented industrialisation and the
production-sharing model of the maquilas were central to the Salinas
administration's development strategy for Mexico as a whole.18
It took seven years of economic reforms (1983-1989) for the new
approach to achieve its objective of regaining creditworthiness. In July
1989, after more than seven years, an interim agreement, the Brady
Plan, developed by (and named after) the United States Treasury
Secretary Nicholas Brady was unveiled by the Bush Administration.19
18 Harry Browne, For Richer, For Poorer, p. 29.
19 The Brady Plan was unveiled in a speech by Secretary Brady to the Conference on
Third World Debt of the Brookings Institution and the Bretton Woods Committee,
March 10,1989 in Washington DC.
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After President Salinas of Mexico signed the agreement (February
1990), Venezuela (March 1990), Costa Rica (March 1990), Uruguay
(January 1991), and most of the other major debtors followed over the
following two years. The bonus for American interests was that in the
process the overall political economy of Mexico and other Latin
American countries had been substantially reorganised in a way that
made it even more vulnerable to external American penetration than in
the past.2° The accord offered bank creditors who held Mexico's $54
billion of medium and long-term foreign debt three basic choices. First,
they could exchange their credit for new bonds carrying a fixed annual
interest rate of 6.25 per cent with floating interest rates of more than 10
per cent; second, they could accept a 35 per cent reduction in the face
value of these loans and retain the floating interest rate and third they
could provide additional loans equal to 25 per cent of their medium and
long-term loans. The new bonds issued under the first two options were
backed by as much as $7 bfflion of United States Treasury securities and
accounts financed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World
Bank and Japan. 21 Although Mexico, the United States and the
American banks reached an agreement in the matter of the debt crisis,
the deliberations were difficult. The United States had been pushing for
20 Anthony Payne, "The United States and its Enterprise for the Americas", in A.
Gamble, A. Payne, ed. Regionalism and World Order (Macmillan Press, London 1996)
p.101.
21 Frank Macchiarola, "Mexico as a Trading Partner", p. 98
139
Chapter Four: The United States and Mexico
a harsh repayment strategy that would have required devaluation of
the peso and further reductions in worker salaries. Mexico, on the other
hand, was able to point to some substantial measures it had already
enacted, notably, a budget with a surplus of 6 per cent, taxes and
reduced subsidies. Inflation, which had been 300 per cent annually was
brought down to 20 per cent. More than 400 state enterprises were also
shut down in the move toward privatisation. The discussions were
further complicated by the fact that a bilateral agreement between the
United States and Mexico would have been insufficient, since American
banks held only 30 per cent of Latin America's debt. International
orgamsations and Japan had to be made part of the solution. The result
of delay in reaching and implementing an agreement was to leave
Mexico with unmet needs for capital investment. However, Mexico
struck the first deal in February 1990 and was followed by other Latin
American countries - Venezuela, Costa Rica (1990) and Uruguay (1991)
- and most of the other major debtors over the following two years.
The Brady Plan was the first step in focusing upon debt
reduction as a way out of the debt crisis. Since the early 1980s the debt
crisis had presented US policymakers with two crises: a crisis of US
banks which had lent too much to the developing countries and a crisis
of the developing countries which had borrowed too much. Thus, US
Treasury policies were aimed at keeping the pressure on the debtor
countries to continue servicing the debt. The developing countries had
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to squeeze their economies to meet the interest payments. The Brady
Plan called for the debt problem to be handled on a case-by-case basis,
in which each debtor country would negotiate separately with its
creditors. Most importantly, it envisaged that any easing of the terms of
the debt had to be linked to domestic economic reforms under the
supervision of the IMF and the World Barik. The bonus for the United
States was that in the process, the overall political economy of Latin
America had been substantially reshaped in a way that made it even
more vulnerable to external penetration than in the past.
The debt crisis produced an unparalleled opportunity to achieve
in the debtor countries, the structural reforms favoured by the Reagan
administration.23 In accordance with the Reagan's administration goals
of more privatisation and less government regulation, debts were
rescheduled in return for lower tariffs and reductions in controls of
foreign investment. In addition the Mexican government was forced to
privatise state industries. Many of these changes were made under the
Brady Plan, which utilised the World Bank, the IMF and world financial
markets to pay off their loans. Loans from both the IMF and the World
Bank forced Mexico to meet specffic conditions for economic
readjustment while increasingly guaranteeing foreign access to
Jeffrey Sachs, "Making the Brady Plan Work", Foreign Affafrs, vol. 69, no. , 1989, pp.
90-92.
Jacquelin Roddick, The Dance of the Millions: Latin America and the Debt Crisis,
(Latin America Bureau, London 1995) p. 43.
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Mexico's economy. Included in the reforms were measures to increase
the liberalisation of trade, production and finance.24
Mexico's commitment to financial liberalisation was due to the
PRI's leaders' aim to reshape the economic and political environment
facing potential investors and creditors. As Sylvia Maxfield argued that
Mexican policy-makers moved forward with financial liberalisation
with the hope that it would lead to a strategic exchange: policy
commitments would be made to those who could mobiise finance and
investment and they in turn would provide new resources for the
national economy.25
 Restoring a working relationship with domestic
business was more difficult given the climate of distrust and
confrontation generated by nationalisations of banks in 1982. In order to
win back the economic support and political allegiance of domestic
business the De La Madrid Administration also granted economic elites
ad hoc concessions through a government-sponsored financial scheme
that assisted large firms in restructuring their foreign obligations.
During the De La Madrid Administration two segments of
business acquired increasing centrality and weight exporters and new
private financial groups. The growing importance of the former was
related to the shift toward outwardness. The growth of a new private
24 Duncan Green, Silent Revolution, (Latin America Bureau, London 1995) pp. 32-88.
Sylvia Maxfield, "Capital Mobility and Mexican Financial Liberalisation" in Michael
Loriaux et al, eds. Capital Ungoverned: Liberalising Finance in Interventionist States
(Cornell University Press, London 199?) p. 93.
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financial elite was the result of the expansion of the non-banking
financial sector after 1983. As Blanca Heredia argued the intra-business
power shifts triggered by stabilisation and structural adjustment were
accompanied by major shifts in the correlation of forces within the state
apparatus. The push in favour of markets eroded developmentalist
policy elites and boosted the leverage of a new generation of pro-
market technocratic elites. These shifts allowed a rising group of
technocrats to use market-reform as a vehicle for building a new type of
alliance with economic elites.26 The new coalition was based upon a
broad heterodox bargain among economic elites, the presidency and
remnants of both corporatist and populist groups from the original
coalition of the PRI. Power had shifted toward those elites who shared a
commitment to a market economy which is embedded in the
Washington Consensus. Vital to this move were three pacts (pactos de
concertacion) which were used to extract concessions from major
groups in exchange for political access and the promise of future
benefits. The Programme for Immediate Economic Restructuring (1983),
the Pact of Economic Stability (1987) and the Pact of Economic Stability
and Growth (1988) sought to curb inflation, and began to put a
26 Blanca Heredia, "State-Business Relations in Contemporary Mexico", in Monica
Serrano and Victor Bulmer-Thomas eds. Rebuilding the State: Mexico After Salinas
(New York 1996) PP. 135-138. See also Sidney Weintraub and M. Delar Baer, "The
Interplay Between Economic and Political Opening: The Sequence in Mexico" in The
Washington Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 2,1992, p. 192.
143
Chapter Four: The United States and Mexico
neoliberal economic agenda into place. The Pacts were instrumental in
persuading the private sector, which constituted the main beneficiary,
that the Mexican government was serious about its commitment toward
economic liberalisation, private investment and free trade. 27
The immediate impact of De La Madrid's policies was the near
defeat of his successor, Carlos Salinas de Gortari. In the 1988
presidential elections, many former FRI supporters voted for the left-of-
centre candidate Cuahtemoc Cardenas Solorzano, who promised to end
the unpopular austerily measures. Among Cardenas' supporters were
government bureaucrats and FRI-affiliated labour unions. 28
 Although
the structural reforms were initiated during the De La Madrid
administration the most important changes were undertaken by the
Salinas government (1988-1994). The salinista reforms included the
privatisation of banks, telecommunications monopoly and the two
main airline companies. In total, the privatisation process brought
revenues of about 10 per cent of the GDP. After a major trade
liberalisation Mexico became one of the most open countries in the
region. By 1994 each of the ten policy instruments listed by Williamson
as forming the basis of the Washington Consensus has been applied in a
way that promoted the structural adjustment of the Mexican economy.
27	 Poitras and Raymond Robinson, "The Politics of NAFTA in Mexico", Journal of
Interamerican Studies and WoridAffairs, vol 36, no.1,1994, pp. 7-10.
Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Mexico's New Economic Vitality", Current History,
February 1992 p. 55.
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However, the privatisation of several key enterprises turned out to be a
failure. As Carlos Urzua has argued, due in larger part to the biased
selection of buyers and a lack of proper supervision after privatisation,
the sale of some public enterprises ended up doing more harm than
good from a social welfare point of view. Furthermore, the privatised
banking sector performed poorly not only according to international
standards, but also compared with the performance of publicly owned
banks. In addition if one considers several typical general indicators of
how the Mexican economy has evolved over the years, the worst
performances between 1946 and 1994 occurred during the De La
Madrid and Salinas administrations 29 (table 3.2).
TABLE 4.2 - THE MEXICAN ECONOMY 1946-1994
Administration	 GDP	 Inflation Current	 % of
	
Growth	 Rate Account	 Poor
____________________	 %	 % ________ People
Aleman (1946-52)	 5.8	 9.6	 -1.6	 N/a
Ruiz Cortines (1952-58)
	 6.4	 6.7	 -2.9	 N/a
Lopez Mateos (1958-64)
	 6.4	 2.2	 -2.3	 77.5
Diaz Ordaz (1964-70)
	 6.2	 3.6	 -2.6	 72.6
Echeverria (1970-76)
	 6.0	 15.2	 -3.7	 58.0
Lopez Portillo (1976-82)
	 6.6	 35.7	 -5.1	 48.5
De La Madrid (1982-88) 	 0.2	 86.7	 1.7	 58.5
Salinas (1988-94)	 3.0	 15.9	 -5.6	 66.0
Source: Carlos Urzua, How to Provoke an Economic Crisis: Ihe Mexican Way, p. 9S.
29 Carlos Urzua, "How to Provoke an Economic Crisis: The Mexican Way", in Monica
Serrano, ed. Mexico: Assessing Neo-Liberal Reform (Institute for Latin American
Studies, London 1997) pp. 97-99.
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Mexico also adopted an exchange rate system intended to help
stabiise its domestic economy. In 1988, the nominal exchange rate of
the peso was fixed temporarily in relation to the US dollar. In 1989 this
fixed exchange rate system was replaced by a "crawling peg" system,
under which the peso/dollar exchange rate was adjusted daily to allow
a slow rate of nominal depreciation of the peso to occur over time. In
1991 the crawling peg was replaced with a band within which the peso
was allowed to fluctuate. The ceiling of the band was adjusted daily to
permit some appreciation of the dollar to occur (table 3.3).
TABLE 4.3 -EXCHANGE RATE OF PESO AGAINST THE DOLLAR, 1984-
1996
YEAR	 EXCHANGE
RATE
1984	 185.19
1985	 310.28
1986	 637.87
1987	 1405.8
1988	 2289.58
1989	 2483.37
1990	 2838.35
1991	 3016.15
1992	 3004.08
1993	 3.162*
1994	 5.325
1995	 5.695
1996	 7.877
Source: Bank of Mexico. Economic Indicators, 1997
* In 1993 the Mexican government divided the face value of the peso by 1000.
Prior to NAFTA, Mexico's economic strategy of adopting sound
monetary and fiscal policies appeared to be having its intended effects.
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Inflation had been steadily reduced, government spending was down
and foreign capital investment was significant and growing.3°
For Mexico, NAFTA was the climax of an extraordinary decade-
long economic reform which shifted Mexico away from an inward-
oriented development policy that emphasised import substitution and
close regulation of commercial ties with other nations. The Mexican
rationale for NAFTA is best understood in terms of the country's need
for external finance. Heavy debt-servicing obligations and a depressed
world market for oil were among the main factors responsible for
investment levels that were too low to create robust recovery. Thus, the
resumption of satisfactory rates of economic growth in Mexico
depended upon increased external capital inflow. NAFTA could bolster
investor confidence, not only by offering a positive signal for future
intentions, but also by improving market access for export-oriented
activities and by making concessions to American capital. 31 If economic
liberalisation was to work within Mexico, the economy needed external
support A free trade agreement could provide strong incentives for
3° See United States General Accounting Office, "Mexico's Financial Crisis. Origins,
Awareness, Assistance and Initial Efforts to Recover", Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, House of Representatives Washington
DC, February 1996, p.5.
31 Gerald Helleiner, "Considering US-Mexico Free Trade", in Ricardo Grinspun and
Maxwell Cameron, eds. The Political Economy of North American Free Trade
(Macmifian Press, London 1993) p. 48.
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both domestic and foreign investors to develop Mexico's markets and
bring in new technology and management skills.32
Regarding the role of ideas mediated through domestic elites as
the fourth variable of the framework of this thesis, it is important to
stress that NAFTA was not imposed on Mexico by the United States but
it reflects the role adopted by the Mexican state representing the
interests of its bureaucracy and domestic elites as these were already
influenced by foreign capital and the Washington Consensus.
Furthermore, membership in the NAFTA was critical to stimulate
economic recovery and thus, the regime's own political survival.
NAFTA had the effect of reinforcing the reorganised ruling coalition
that was formed during the 1980s. The core of private sector support for
NAFTA was composed of large Mexican manufacturing firms
(especially those with the potential to find a large American market for
their exports) medium-sized manufacturers who could find niches in
the export market, capital-intensive foreign businesses, the
international financial community and domestic suppliers of foreign
businesses in Mexico. Pro-NAFTA sentiment also gained momentum
within the business community via creation of an association
specifically organised for that purpose. In 1990, the Coordinadora de
32 Jeffrey Schott, "The Free Trade Area of the Americas: US Interests aid Objectives",
Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade, House Committee on Ways and Means,
Washington DC July 22, 1997 (The Institute for International Economic Website,
http://www.iie.com/ftaa.htm).
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Organismos Empresariales de Comercio Exterior (COECE) emerged to
serve as a critical coordinating body linking the government with the
private sector. COECE became the most important group of its kind in
the private sector and a close ally of the government on the free trade
agreement. Indeed as Poitras and Robinson argued COECE shared
ideology, personnel and positions of key issues with the Salinas
Administration. 33 However, in an open political system, the
liberalisation programme and the decision for NAFTA would not have
gone so far and so quickly as it had in Mexico. Voters would have
attenuated or even rejected it; the media would have discussed and
conditioned it; Congress would have screened, slowed and regulated it;
and unions would have cut slices off it. Because none of these checks
and balances existed in Mexico, Salinas had appeared as a reformer and
a free trade hero to many people in the United States.34
The most open challenge to the impact of globalisation on social
and political structures has come from a revolutionary movement, the
Zapatista rebeffion of the Mayan Indians in the southern Mexican state
of Chiapas that broke out on New Year's day 1994. This was the day on
which the NAFTA came into effect. The Zapatistas have attempted to
cultivate international support and to change the Mexican political
33	 Poitras and Raymond Robinson, "The Politics of NAFTA in Mexico", pp. 16-17.
Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, "Authoritarianism and North American Free Trade: The
Debate in Mexico", in Ricardo Grinspun and Maxwell Cameron, eds. The Political
Economy of North American Free Trade, p.215
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system. They have aimed to become a rallying force for democratic
change and to create the beginnings of a counterhegemonic bloc.35
For the United States, free trade with Mexico was consistent with
its international trade agenda. During the 1980s, a national debate over
"national competitiveness" had made the American public sensitive to
the fact that, through formal or informal integration schemes, Asian and
European nations (particularly Japan and Germany) were overtaking
the United States in terms of productivity and market share. 36
 From this
perspective, the prospect of a trade agreement with Mexico was
perceived as an efficient strategy to follow. Indeed this initiative helped
to catalyse the Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT and improve
the competitiveness of the American economy by augmenting the size
and scope of its regional economy and thus the ability to compete
successfully with Japan. Finally, the agreement with Mexico
significantly improved the access and protection of US investment in
Mexico and provided a useful blueprint for other countries in the
hemisphere.37
However their attempts to offer an alternative have failed and by the end of 2000, the
Zapatistas agreed to stop the rebellion and open dialogue with the new President Vicente Fox.
See Robert Cox, "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative
World Order", Review of International Studies, vol. 25, 1999, pp. 23-24.
36 J. Enrique Espinoza and Pedro Noyola, "Emerging Patterns in Mexico-US Trade", in
Barry Bosworth et. aL, eds. Coming Together? (Brookings Institution Press,
Washington DC 1997) p.29.
For further analysis on NAFfA and hemispheric free trade see Panayotis
Karayannis, Regional Integration in North America: NAFTA and the American
Agenda, MA Thesis submitted to the University of Hull, UK, September 1996.
150
Chapter Four: The United States and Mexico
There were two central strategic objectives for the United States
in NAFTA. First, a key American goal was to promote pluralism in
Mexico because it was thought that this would enhance both political
and economic stability over the long run. The economic opening that
the agreement has reinforced was expected to push developments in
that direction. Second, a key objective was to secure the de Ia Madrid-
Salinas reforms against the risk that future Mexican governments might
cancel them. NAFTA obligations raised the cost of such a policy
alteration and thus protected American interests.38
NAFTA has lowered barriers to an important and growing
market of 90 million people, creating new trade opportunities for
American exporting firms. As a result, NAFTA has encouraged
American companies that have moved their operations to Asia to
relocate in Mexico, which has helped the United States. According to a
US Senate analysis, first, by moving to Mexico, a company would
increase employment in Mexico. This higher employment level would
increase United States' exports to Mexico because 70 cents out of every
dollar Mexicans spend on imports they spend on American products.
Asians on the other hand, only spend about 10 cents to 15 cents out of
38 Statement by Fred Bergsten of the Institute for International Economics before the
Ways and Means Committee, US House of Representatives, September 11, 1997 (The
Institute for International Economics Website, http://www.iie.com/septll.htm).
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every dollar on US goods.39 Second, as trade barriers are coming down,
US transnational corporations have a substantial interest in co-
production arrangements in the Western Hemisphere. The very basis
for the export-processing zones that have proliferated, especially in
Mexico is to exploit factor advantages - low labour costs for labour-
intensive operations whose proximity minimises transportation costs.
By eliminating tariffs on Mexican imports, for example, US automobile
firms have been expected to gain a competitive advantage over
Japanese automakers through access to low cost Mexican labour and
the burgeoning Mexican consumer market.
The more powerful position of the United States, along with
Mexico's more pressing need to maintain good relations with its
northern neighbour, has placed Mexico in a weak and vulnerable
position in trade negotiations. Washington has taken advantage of the
asymmetric relationship to gain Mexican cooperation with American
priorities. For example, prior to NAFTA, in 1990 the US Trade
Representative Carla Hills placed Mexico on the "Priority Watch List"
of trading partners whose policies the US Trade Representative
considered unfairly biased against American companies. Washington's
threat of withdrawal of preferential tariff treatment affecting $220
million of Mexican chemical industry exports persuaded Mexico to
Senate Record Vote Analysis, "North American Free Trade Agreement/Passage"
(Bifi Passed, 61-38), 103d Congress, 1 Session, November 20, 1993, Vote No. 395, (The
US Senate Website, http://www.senate.gov/-rpc/rva/1031/1O31395.htm).
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drastically rewrite its laws on intellectual property rights, even before
NAFTA was negotiated. 4° Indeed, the regional dominance of the United
States - not only economically, but also culturally, militarily and
politically - has been a key aspect of NAFTA. Asymmetries of power,
wealth, technology and cultural influence between Mexico and the
United States have guaranteed that the benefits and adjustment costs
have been distributed unequally within and between the two countries.
When a small country is bargaining for an agreement in which it gains
more market access than its more powerful partner, that stronger
partner will inevitably extract some compensating concessions.
Enhanced American and Canadian access to the Mexican energy
sector is one concession that Mexico had to make to get an agreement.
Petroleum has enormous political and symbolic value in Mexico for it is
a major power resource that has been used to strengthen Mexico's
bargaining position in relation to the United States in the past. It has
been argued that a major US objective in trade negotiations with Mexico
and Canada has been to gain secure access to the petroleum sources of
its neighbours.41
 The Bush Administration's energy strategy called for
greater reliance on oil imports from countries outside the Persian Cuff,
such as Canada and Mexico. American geopolitical interests demanded
'° Harry Browne, For Richer, For Poorer, p. 20.
41 John Difion, "The Petroleum Sector under Continental Integration", in Ricardo
Grinspun and Maxwell Cameron, eds. The Political Economy of North American Free
Trade (Macmifian, London 1993), p. 315.
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that Mexico and Canada concede substantial control over energy as the
price for a broad trade agreement. Indeed, to make Petroleos Mexicanos
(PEMEX) the stat&s petroleum company, more attractive to foreign
lenders, the Salinas government laid off more than 70,000 workers and
in June 1992 split the company into four divisions, isolating ownership
and production from refining, marketing and distribution. NAFTA's
energy provisions complemented these changes by opening up
procurement and offering service contracts to American firms. The
reorganisation facilitated increased foreign investment in downstream
operations while allowing Mexico to retain ownership over reserves.
The changes allowed such transnational corporations as Du Pont,
Union Carbide and Allied Chemical to increase their stakes in the
production of petroleum-based chemicals.42
NAFTA did not require major changes in American economic
policies toward trade and investment. The United States made clear
that Mexico would have to improve its trade, investment and related
policies before an agreement could be concluded. Hence, NAFTA
deserves credit for some part of the Mexican economic reforms
implemented since 1990, as well as the substantial further reduction of
Mexican tariffs and other trade and investment barriers since NAFTA
formally took effect. However, only a few changes that Mexico had not
4 Harry Browne, For Richer For Poorer, p. 27.
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already made or was not planning to make have been implemented.
NAFTA represented just another step down the road toward the
Washington Consensus. For the most part, economic liberalisation had
been occurring within the context of GATL For Washington the free
trade proposal offered the opportunity to achieve multiple objectives. It
presented the chance to open the door to Mexico's long-protected
market even wider than it had been opened by the country's drive to
liberalise trade (table 3.3).
TABLE 4.4- PERCENTAGE OF US-MEXICAN TRADE THAT IS TARIFF-
FREE*
MEXICAN MEXICAN IMPORTS
EXPORTS TO THE FROM THE UNITED
	
UNITED STATES	 STATES
Free Before NAFTA
	 13.9	 17.9
Free from January 1994
	 67.7	 48.9
Free within 10 years
	 99.3	 98.1
Free within 15 years
	 100.0	 100.0
Source: The Economist, October 28, 1995.
*Based on trade in 1990
A boom in industrial investment and production would result in
greater demand for US products. In addition, opening new sectors of
Mexico's economy - such as financial services and automobiles - to US
exports and investment could boost specific troubled industries in the
United States. Beyond its own economic reasons, the United States had
long sought to ensure that its southern neighbour remained politically
stable, even when Mexican leaders attacked the United States
rhetorically. A free trade accord could accomplish this by aiding a
friendly administration and supporting Mexico's neoliberal economic
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strategy. Economic growth could also reduce the flow of Mexican
migrants seeking a better life north of the border. As Mexico became
more prosperous, so fewer illegal immigrants would enter the United
States and as a result local governments would not have to spend as
much on providing social services for illegal immigrants.43
For the United States, NAFTA could also serve as a model for
multilateral trade agreements with other countries of the Americas.
NAFTA represented an attempt to shape economic integration along
neoliberal lines, using trade as a tool to limit government's ability to
interfere with business priorities. Indeed the case of NAFTA the core of
rules and norms around which state actors have made a compromise
was to the benefit of market actors, mainly firms and transnational
companies. The implementation of NAFTA consolidated and
institutionalised the salinista reforms, one of the key objectives of
American administration. The existence of NAFTA sharply narrowed
the available range of policy options for Salina's successors. From the
1940s to the 1980s, Mexico derived some of its stability from the ability
of its various regimes to swing from Left to Centre to the Right in their
social and economic policies. That option does not exist anymore -
whatever the nature of Mexican public opinion. In a sense, it was the
autonomy of the state that enabled it to carry out such far-reaching
Senate Record Vote Analysis, "North American Free Trade Agreement/Passage"
(Bifi Passed, 61-38), 103d Congress, 1st Session, November 20, 1993, Vote No. 395, (The
US Senate Website, http://www.senate.gov/
—rpc/rva/1031/1031395.htm).
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reforms. One consequence of the salinista strategy was the surrender of
this autonomy vls-à-vis the business class. Moreover, it seems unlikely
that, under NAFTA, Mexico will be able to express serious
disagreement with the United States on major issues of international
diplomacy. As the then US ambassador in Mexico, John D. Negroponte
pointed out in 1991, from a foreign policy perspective, "an FTA would
institutionalise acceptance of a North American orientation to Mexico's
foreign relations."
After NAFTA, the following elements of the Washington
Consensus were in place in Mexico: fiscal discipline, financial
liberalisation, trade liberalisation, foreign direct investment,
privatisation, deregulation and property rights. NAFTA was designed
in the aftermath of a decade or more of forced structural adjustment in
Mexico and other Latin American economies and it sought in effect to
set out and enforce new economic and political rules of the game in the
hemisphere along the lines of the Washington Consensus. These rules
reflected the triumph of the Washington Consensus based on economic
liberalism, of faith in export-led growth and of belief in the centrality of
the private sector to the development process. The core of the consensus
under NAFTA was to build a more transparent and predictable
environment for market actors, in order to increase the efficiency of
Peter Smith, "The Political Impact of Free Trade on Mexico", Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 34, 1992,, pp. 17-18.
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cross-country trade, services and investment transactions. 45 In a period
of intensified global competition, the United States saw Latin America
as a part of the world where the United States had a greater natuTal
advantage than either of its main trading rivals. NAFTA was conceived
as a device by which to create an increasingly integrated hemispheric
economy which the United States could then use as the base from
which to export ever more competitively to other markets.46
Congressional passage of NAFTA on November 20, 1993 enabled
President Clinton, only two days later, on November 22, 1993 to launch
a new era in Asia-Pacific economic cooperation via the APEC summit in
Seattle. The two events together played a critical role in completing the
"trade triple play" of 1993 by bringing the Uruguay Round to a
successful conclusion in the following month. NAFTA also represented
an initial test of the US strategy of asymmetrical trade liberalisation
with important developing countries. NAFTA provided a model for the
proposed Western Hemisphere and APEC free trade arrangements
where free trade was so clearly in the interest of the United States. 47 The
United States had an important stake in the economic health of Latin
America which was already an important market for American
Isidro Morales, "NAFFA: The Governance of Economic Openness t , The Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, no. 565, September 1995, pp.
40-41.
Anthony Payne, "The United States and its Enterprise for the Americas", P. 107.
47 Bergsten and Jeffrey Schott, "A Preliminary Evaluation of NAFTA", Statement
before the Subcommittee on Trade, US House of Representatives, (The Institute for
International Economics Website, http://www.iie.com/septll.htm).
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companies and had become increasingly attractive for direct investment
as economic reforms had taken root
This fact was illustrated at the Summit for the Americas in
Miami in December 1994, where the United States and 33 other
countries in the Western Hemisphere committed themselves to
completing negotiations on a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
by the year 2005. The trade talks were officially launched at the second
Sunimit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile in April 1998. The
negotiation of a FTAA with Latin America would not require
substantial changes in the existing US law or trade practices. As with
NAFTA, an FTAA would require much more from America's trading
partners in terms of trade liberalisation and regulatory reform. An
FTAA bargain will likely entail substantial new liberalisation by Latin
American countries in return for guarantees of continued access to
American market48 It was during the age of colonialism in the late
nineteenth century that the United States, utiuising the implied threat of
the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 impeded foreign political competitors and
targeted Mexico (and also the Caribbean and Latin America) as its
"backyard°. Presently, NAFTA can be understood as the economic
48 Jeffrey Schott, "The Free Trade Area of the Americas: US Interests and Objectives",
Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade, House of Representatives, Washington
DC, July 22, 1997 (The Institute for International Economics Website,
http://www.iie.com/ftaa.htm).
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equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine.49
 A state-sponsored economic pact
by a hegemonic state in relative decline with a state that is historically
perceived as a region of influence is described by Wallerstein as a
situation in which "the declining hegemon corners potential markets
and labour via rather traditional zone-of-interest diplomacy".50
The Fifth Variable in the form of The Peso Crisis of 1994-1995
In an increasingly globalised economy, domestic economic
policies, whether good or bad, do not alone determine the country's
current account. From 1991 to 1993, when large-scale capital inflows to
Mexico resumed after years of debt crisis, interest rates in the United
States were lower than they had been in years. In 1992 and 1993, three-
month US Treasury bifis yielded less than 4 per cent for the first time
since 1965. With US interest rates so low, investors were willing to
consider moving funds to Mexico in the hope of earning higher returns.
A significant part of the capital inflow went into short-term financial
investments, such as bank deposits and government bonds that could
flow out of Mexico with tremendous speed if a financial crisis arose.
Miguel De Oliver, "The Hegemonic Cycle and Free Trade: The United States and
Mexico", Political Geography, vol. 12, no.5, September 1993, p. 468.
° Irnmanuel Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture, (Cambridge University Press,
New York 1991) P. 43
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Mexico's private capital inflow from 1990 through 1994 totalled $95
billion and appeared in three main forms. The first was direct
investment by foreigners, usually companies, buying or building
factories, and retail stores in Mexico. This type of investment, however,
was frequently long-term because it involved commitments that could
not be reversed quickly and at a low cost. From 1990 through 1994, this
type of investment totalled $24 billion, only a quarter of the total capital
inflow. Second, capital inflow took the form of purchases in the
Mexican stock market, which totalled $28 bfflion over the five years.
The third and largest form of capital inflow was the purchase of bonds.
From 1990-1994, $43 billion came into Mexico for this purpose. A large
portion of these securities was short-term of one to three months
duration. Of the three forms of capital inflow the third posed the
greatest danger to the exchange rate of the peso. if anything caused
foreign investors to decide to pull out of Mexico, they could simply take
their money out of the country, putting tremendous pressure on the
government within a matter of weeks.51
During October and November 1994, the US Treasury cautioned
Mexican officials that the peso seemed overvalued and indicated that it
was risky to continue the existing exchange rate policy. Federal Reserve
and Treasury officials, however, were undecided about the extent to
51 Joseph Whitt Jr., "The Mexican Peso Crisis", Economic Review, Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta, January 1996, p. 5.
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which the peso was overvalued and if and when financial markets
might force Mexico to take action. The IMF was less aware of the
seriousness of the situation that was developing in Mexico during 1994
than was the American government and for most of 1994 it did not see a
compelling case for a change in Mexico's exchange rate policy.52
 Due in
part to a forthcoming presidential election, Mexican authorities were
reluctant to take action in the spring and summer of 1994, such as
devaluing the peso, that could have reduced this inconsistency. In
response to investor concerns, the government issued large amounts of
short-term dollar-indexed notes called "tesobonos". Furthermore, the
Mexican government treated the production and release of official
statistics more like a secret than part of its accountability to society. In
fact, for months before the crisis erupted, no official information was
available about the level of international reserves, capital flows or
outstanding short-term debt.53
The first significant drop in investor confidence in Mexico in
1994, and the related drop in Mexican foreign currency reserves,
occurred following the assassination of Mexican presidential candidate
Luis Donaldo Colosio on March 23, 1994. On March 24, 1994 the
American authorities agreed to make available a temporary short-term
52 United States General Accounting Office, "Mexico's Financial Crisis. Origins,
Awareness, Assistance and Initial Efforts to Recover", February 1996, pp. 5-6.
Moises Naim, "Mexico's Larger Story", p. 120.
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credit facility of $6 billion. Mexico's foreign currency reserves fell from
$24.4 billion at the end of March to $17.3 billion at the end of April 1994.
The peso was allowed to depreciate less than 1 per cent against the
dollar, following a 7 per cent depreciation that had taken place in the
month preceding the assassination. Also the Bank of Mexico increased
domestic interest rates from 9 per cent to 18 per cent on short-term
peso-denominated notes called "cetes" in an attempt to stem the
oufflow of capital. However, despite the higher interest rates, investor
demand for cetes continued to lag. Options available to the Mexican
government at this time included offering even higher interest rates on
cetes or reducing government expenditure to reduce domestic demand,
decreasing imports and relieving pressure on the peso, or alternatively
devaluing the peso. From the perspective of the Mexican authorities,
the first two choices were unattractive in a presidential election year
because they could have led to a significant downturn in economic
activity. The third choice was also unattractive, since Mexico's success
in attracting foreign investment depended on its commitment to
maintain a stable exchange rate.M
Rather than adopt any of these options, the government chose to
increase its issuance of tesobonos. Because tesobonos were dollar-
indexed, holders could avoid losses that would otherwise result if
Mexico subsequently chose to devalue its currency. Tesobonos proved
34 GA0, Mexico's Financial Crisis, p. 10.
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attractive to domestic and foreign investors. However, as sales of
tesobonos rose, Mexico became vulnerable to a financial market crisis
because many tesobono holders were portfolio investors who were very
sensitive to changes in interest rates and risks. Mexican authorities
viewed tesobono financing as the best way to stabiise foreign exchange
reserves over the short term and to avoid the immediate costs implicit
in the other alternatives. Indeed Mexico's foreign exchange reserves did
stabiise at a level of about $17 billion from the end of April through
August, when the presidential elections came to a conclusion. But
Mexico had become heavily exposed to a run on its foreign exchange
reserves as a result of substantial tesobono financing. Outstanding
tesobono obligations increased from $3.1 billion at the end of March
1994 to $29.2 billion in December 1994. By that time cetes had shrunk to
only 25 per cent of foreign holdings of Mexican government securities;
70 per cent was in tesobonos. 55 An important external shock added to
the problems. Between January 1994 and November 1994, US three-
month Treasury bill yields had risen from 3.04 per cent to 5.45 per cent,
substantially increasing the attractiveness of American government
securities. Concerned that inflationary pressures were building as the
American economy approached its potential, the Federal Reserve raised
its federal funds rate target for the first time since the recession of 1990-
91. In the weeks following the Federal Reserve's interest rate hike, in
55 Joseph Witt., "The Mexican Peso Crisis", p. 12.
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early February 1994, virtually all major emerging stock markets fall by
20-30 per cent. As US rates continued to rise, net additions to foreign
portfolio exposure in emerging markets and elsewhere declined. This
decline in foreign flows affected all major Latin American markets, as
well as most other emerging markets. Due to its large external financial
needs, Mexico was significantly more vulnerable than most other
emerging economies.56
 Mexican economic policymakers responded to
this succession of internal and external shocks mostly by heating them
as temporary problems and trying to avoid major policy changes.
Mexico's presidential election provided strong motivation to delay
major initiatives, even after the election policy continued as before.57
Sauna's reasons for not devaluing the peso before leaving office
(December 1, 1994) were both political and personal. Salinas' intention
was first to guarantee a PRI victory in the August 1994 presidential
election, assuring his place in history as Mexico's great moderniser and
becoming the head of the World trade Organisation. No other
institution within the Mexican government had the power or autonomy
to question the soundness of the president's judgement.58
56 Testimony by Robert Hormats, Vice Chairman, Goldman Sachs mt., before the
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, US House of Representatives, on the
Mexican Financial Crisis, February 10, 1995, US Government Printing Office, Serial
No. 104-1, Washington DC 1995.
57	 Will Jr., "The Mexican Peso Crisis", p. 11.
Denise Dresser, "Post-NAFTA Politics in Mexico: Uneasy, Uncertain,
Unpredictable", in Carol Wise ed. The Post-NAFFA Political Economy: Mexico and
the Western Hemisphere, (Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania 1998) p.
225.
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In October 1994 and in an effort to attract new foreign capital,
Mexico agreed to grant opening licenses to 52 foreign banks and
brokerage houses. It was expected that this policy would result in the
short to medium run in a flow of at least $5 billion. 59 It did not happen.
On December 9, 1994 the Mexican administration revealed that it
expected an even higher current account deficit in 1995 but planned no
change in its exchange rate policy. This decision led to a further loss in
confidence by investors and a significant drop in foreign exchange
reserves to $10 billion. On December 20, 1994 Mexican authorities
sought to relieve pressure on the exchange rate by announcing a
widening of the peso/dollar exchange rate band. The widening of the
band effectively devalued the peso by about 15 per cent. However, the
government did not announce any new fiscal or monetary measures to
accompany the devaluation - such as raising interest rates. The
devaluation was accompanied by more than $4 billion in losses in
foreign reserves on December 21 and on December 22, 1994 with
reserves reduced to less than $6 bfflion, Mexico was forced to float its
currency. As a result, the peso plunged and the government's access to
credit markets dropped sharply. Almost overnight, Mexico lost its
reputation for maintaining a stable exchange rate and sound financial
policies - and the major benefits of that reputation. By the end of
See Sebastian Edwards, "The Mexican Peso Crisis: How Much Did We Know?
When Did We Know It?", National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, no.
6334, December 1997, p 23.
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December 1994, the peso had depreciated to 5.3 pesos per dollar, 35 per
cent below its value a month earlier. In real terms the peso reached
levels previously seen only during the crises of 1982 and 1986-87, even
though Mexican economic fundamentals seemed much better than in
those earlier years. In short, the Mexican crisis stemmed from a
combination of an over-valued exchange rate; a large and growing
account deficit; a relatively high level of short-term external debt;
political instability; and inappropriate economic policies. An economy
reliant on foreign capital had subjected itself to external vulnerabiities.
The financial crisis of 1994-95 showed the fragile stabifity of such a
model and its sensitivity to political disturbances.
By the time of the peso crisis, Mexico had applied all ten
elements of the Washington Consensus regarding fiscal discipline,
public expenditure, tax reform, financial liberalisation, exchange rates,
trade liberalisation, foreign direct investment, privatisation,
deregulation and property rights. As was demonstrated in this chapter,
the advance of the Washington Consensus in Mexico before 1995 was
based on the four of the five variables of this thesis' framework:
globalisation of finance, mobility of capital, international institutions
and ideas accepted by the domestic elites. The fifth variable, the limited
instability of the system as expressed through financial crises and
episodes was introduced with the peso crisis, which challenged the
financial liberalisation that took place in Mexico after 1982. The next
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chapter (Chapter Five) analyses the policy response of the United States
in order to restore confidence in market-oriented reforms not only in
Mexico but also in the rest of Latin America. Chapter Five demonstrates
that with the fifth variable in function the result was further
entrenchment of the Washington Consensus in Mexico and the rest of
Latin America.
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CHAPTER FIVE
ENTRENCHING THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS IN
LATIN AMERICA: THE RESPONSE OF THE UNITED
STATES TO THE PESO CRISIS OF 1994-95
This chapter examines the policy response of the United States to
the peso crisis (1994-95) and the effect that it had on the Mexican
economy. The first part of this chapter focuses on the debate over the
policy of the United States toward Mexico, which led to the decision by
the US President to approve a bailout of Mexico through the US
Treasury. The second part of this chapter analyses the conditionality
that accompanied the bailout of Mexico to demonstrate tha applicability
of tha afore mentioned conceptual framework's five key variables on
which the entrenchment of the Washington Consensus was based in
Mexico.
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The Peso Crisis, the Interests of the United States and the Debate over
Financial Assistance to Mexico
The Clinton administration judged that it was in the interest of
the United States to intervene in the Mexican economic crisis of 1994-
1995 on the basis of four considerations. First, the possible loss of jobs in
the United States if the crisis forced Mexico to slash its American
imports. Second, the possible political turmoil if Mexico's financial
meltdown continued. Third, the possibility of the new wave of illegal
immigrants entering the United States. A near-collapse of the Mexican
economy would have led to regional slowdowns in California and
Texas and a substantial increase in illegal immigration to the United
States. Fourth, was a possibility that the crisis would spread to other
developing countries. It was feared that a sudden end to the $150 billion
annual flow of private investment from the industrial core of the world
economy to the developing periphery would have caused serious
economic crises in Argentina, elsewhere in Latin America and beyond.'
Some observers, including members of the US Congress (mainly
Republicans but also a few Democrats) believed that Mexico and its
creditors should have handled the crisis alone, without any special US
1 See Bradford De Long, Christopher De Long and Sherman Robinson, "The Case for
Mexico's Rescue. The Peso Package Looks Even Better Now", Foreign Affairs, vol. 75,
no. 3, 1996, p. 12.
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government loans or guarantees to stave off Mexican government
default In that case, both Mexico and its creditors would suffer but in
the future both borrowers and lenders would be more careful. 2 In this
case, American guarantees were portrayed as increasing the likeithood
of future crises by encouraging the Mexican government and other
developing countries to behave less cautiously. Liberals opposed the
bailout because they argued it sent the wrong signal to private markets
and developing countries. Any intervention would undermine the
credibility of the market-oriented approach to development by
substituting official for private capital, by offering implicit insurance to
private capital flow and, most importantly, by indicating a lack of
confidence in the self correcting capacity of financial markets.3
On January 2, 1995 an $18 billion line of credit for Mexico was
committed, composed of $9 billion from the United States and $9 billion
from other major governments and a few large private banks, with the
hope that investor confidence would be restored sufficiently to end the
financial crisis.4
 On January 11, 1995 a letter opposing the proposed
assistance package to Mexico was sent by four members of the House of
Representatives to the Treasury Secretary arguing that the total sum of
2	 situation is related to what is called moral hazard - the tendency for insurance
to encourage irresponsible behaviour in the future.
Cited in Maxwell Cameron and Vinod Aggarwal, "Mexican Meltdown: States,
Markets and post-NAFTA Financial Turmoil", Thfrd World Quarterly, vol.17,1996, p.
982.
Joseph Witt, "The Mexican Peso Crisis", Economic Review, The Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta, January 1996, p. 16.
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the bailout represented a huge commitment by the United States, its
taxpayers and its banking system. In that letter crucial questions were
posed:
'a) Under what conditions is Mexico permitted to draw on the $9
billion line of credit?
b) If Mexico defaults is it the intention of the US Treasury to enlarge
the assistance?
c) In the NAFTA agreement, American banks won access to the
Mexican financial system up to 8%. In view of the peso devaluation
what risks are posed to the United States of complete foreign
ownership of the Mexican banking system by other nations?'5
When the crisis deepened on January 18, 1995, the Clinton
administration proposed a large package of $40 billion in loan
guarantees to protect private creditors. Under this plan Mexico would
have borrowed dollars to roll over maturing obligations in the financial
markets, with the United States guaranteeing repayment if Mexico
defaulted. However, it soon became clear that the US Congress would
be reluctant to approve it. The arguments against helping Wall Street
and bfflionaires were persuasive for many members in both houses (the
House and the Senate).6 By January 31 Mexico needed cash quickly to
avoid default, but congressional approval of the loan-guarantee
Letter sent to the Treasury Secretary by Representatives Peter Defazio, Duncan
Hunter, Terry Everett and Marcy Kaptur, January 11, 1995 (The Library of Congress
Website, http://thomas.loc.gov/).
6 Rogelio Ramirez de la 0, "The Mexican Peso Crisis and Recession of 1994-1995:
Preventable Then, Avoidable in the Future?", in Riordan Roett, ed. The Mexican Peso
Crisis: International Perspectiyes (Lynne Rienner, New York 1996) p. 41.
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package was nowhere in sight. 7
 President Clinton suggested that a
refusal to extend this financial support, "would throw Mexico into a
major political and economic upheaval, which was bound to hurt the
United States. Other emerging markets would suffer too, and with
them, the prospects for US exporters and investors".8 Furthermore,
what was at stake there was nothing less than the post-Cold War model
of opening formerly closed markets the core of the changing basis of
American hegemony. The issue was whether the peso collapse was
merely the result of some discrete mistakes or whether it was the
inevitable outcome of opening an economy.9
Supporters of American involvement, such as Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan, believed that the immediate problems that
would arise if Mexico defaulted outweighed these issues and the moral
hazard problem. In Greenspans's opinion, default by the Mexican
government would set off a wave of defaults by private entities in
Mexico and elsewhere, with unacceptably severe consequences:
'The objective of the proposed package is to halt the erosion in
Mexico's financing capabilities before it has dramatic impacts far
7 The reaction by the Republican leadership to the President's announcement on
January 18, 1995 of a loan guarantee package was initially positive. However, within
twenty-four hours the opposition began to assemble. Members of Congress, those
especially who have voted against NAFFA, said that pending legislation would
provide an opportunity for Congress to reassess American participation in NAFTA.
See Riordan Roett, "The Mexican Devaluation and the US Response: Potomac Politics,
1995-Style", in Riordan Roett, ed. The Mexican Peso Crisis: International Perspectives
(Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 1996) pp. 36-37.
8 Gannett News Service, January 31, 1995, (Gannet News Service Website,
www.gannet.com).
Wall Street Jo urnal, "Guaranteeing Mexico", January 23, 1995.
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beyond those already evident around the world. This program is the
least worst of the various initiatives, which present themselves as
possible solutions to a very unsettling international financial problem.
Our concerns are with what economists call moral hazard problem
where the active involvement of an external guarantor distorts the
incentives perceived by investors. Thus appropriate conditionality
must be associated with the guarantee to underline the fact that it is
being provided at high cost and on rigorous terms in exceptional
circumstances.' 10
After the end of the Cold War the economic structure of the
United States and the rest of the industrial world based on free markets
and private ownership appeared as a clearly superior model for the
developing nations to emulate. Mexico was perceived to be the model
of economic transition from a state-directed system toward a free-
market economy. A Mexican failure could have brought a reversal in
the global trend towards adopting market-oriented development
strategies.11 One of the Washington Consensus' leading commentators
on trade policy, Fred Bergsten of the Institute of International
Economics, described a potential situation in which:
Io Testimony by Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, before the Foreign
Relations Committee, House of Representatives, January 26, 1995, US Government
Printing Office, Serial No. 104-I, Washington DC 1995.
11 According to Bradford De Long, Assistant Deputy Secretary of the Treasury (1993-
1995) a historical analogy to the Mexican financial crisis was the Austrian crisis of
1930-1931, when French Premier Pierre Laval blocked the proposed international
support package for Austria that followed the collapse of Austria's largest bank, the
Credit-Anstalt, in 1931. Premier Laval refused to provide the French contribution to
the Bank for International Settlements-led attempt to provide Austria with the
resources to deal with the run on its currency in 1931. Laval insisted on substantial
political concessions and a sharp distancing of the relations with Germany as the price
of French support The Austrian government refused to make the required political
concessions and the support package collapsed. The crisis spread by contagion first to
Germany and then to Britain. A moderate recession in Europe turned into the Great
Depression. See Bradford De Long et al., "The Medcan Peso Crisis. In Defence of US
Policy Toward Mexico", March 1996 (The University of California at Berkeley Brad
DeLong's Website, http://econ161.berkeley.edu ).
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'Many countries would have concluded that it was a serious mistake to
rely on market forces and private capital flows, and could easily have
reverted to the discredited dfrig.iste policies of the past. Such a
reversion would be extremely adverse to the interests of the United
States. Indeed a widespread reversal of the liberalisation trend could
be even more unfavourable from our standpoint than an immediate
financial crisis.'l2
During the last week of January 1995, congressional hearings
were held, in which officials from both the administration and Federal
Reserve summarised the case in favour of the package. Secretary of
State Warren Christopher testified before the House Banking and
Financial Services Committee that the United States had an immense
economic and political stake in Mexico's stability. The Secretary also
warned that non-approval of the package would have far-reaching
implications for the prosperity and stability of Latin America and other
emerging markets:
'A reversal of Mexico's economic reforms and a spread of Mexico's
financial difficulties to other emerging markets could halt or even
reverse the global trend toward market-oriented reform and
democratisation. This would be a tragic setback not only for these
countries, but for the United States and the rest of the world as well.
This is a test of American leadership. By extending this package to
Mexico, the United States will demonstrate its unwavering
commitment to lead this hemisphere toward stability and prosperity...
Only the United States has the capacity to provide the kind of
leadership that is necessary in this situation.' 13
12 Testimony by Fred Bergsten, Director of the Institute for International Economics,
before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, US House of
Representatives, February 10, 1995,US Government Printing Office, Serial No. 104-1,
Washington DC 1995.
'3 Testimony by Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, before the House Banking and
Financial Services Committee, House of Representatives, January 25, 1995, US
Government Printing Office, Serial No. 104-1, Washington DC 1995.
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Failure to address that crisis would have undermined faith in US
leadership. The United States could not afford to let this happen.
christopher stressed that the proposed package for Mexico was about
far more than Mexico's economic future:
'It is about America's leadership in this hemisphere and beyond. It is
about American jobs, the security of our borders and the future of
trade and economic cooperation in our hemisphere. Most
fundamentally, this package is about stability in a nation in which the
United States has a vital strategic interest and a vast economic
interest.'14
Both the United States and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) were concerned that the loss of confidence in Mexico's economy
would disrupt capital flows to developing countries in Latin America.
For example, early in the crisis, Argentina was affected by Mexico's
problems as investors began to limit capital flows to these countries.15
According to a US General Accounting Office (GAO) analysis, Mexico
had been a paradigm for countries striving to put inward-looking, state-
controlled models of economic development behind them and move to
14 Testimony by Secretary of State, Warren Christopher before the House Committee
on Banking and Financial Services, January 25, 1995, US Government Printing Office,
Serial No. 104-1, Washington DC 1995.
15 Argentina was the most affected country by the peso devaluation of December 20,
1994, besides Mexico itself. On December 28, 1994, the Central Bank of Argentina sold
$353 millions of reserves. In the three months following the devaluation of the
Mexican peso, the central banks sold more than one third of its foreign exchange
reserves. Argentina's stock market index dropped by 50 per cent between December
19, 1994 and March 8, 1995 and the Argentine peso interest rate jumped from 11 per
cent to 19 per cent during the same period. For an analysis of the financial crisis in
Argentina see Eduardo Ganapoisky and Sergio Schmulder, Crisis Management in
Capital Markets: The Impact of Argentine Policy During the Tequila Effect (World
Bank, Washington DC 1998).
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free market models. A spread of Mexico's financial difficulties to other
emerging markets could have halted or even reversed the global trend
toward market-oriented reform and democratisation.16 The United
States had a fundamental national interest in making sure that financial
confidence in Mexico was restored. Mexico at the time was the third-
largest market for American exports, and the third-largest source for US
imports. If the United States had failed to act, American exports to
Mexico would have been severely affected and exports to Mexico are
critically important to the economies of many American states. For
example, exports to Mexico have accounted for about one-fifth of total
exports from Michigan, Arizona and New Mexico and for about one-
third of those of Texas.17 Many of the 700,000 jobs these exports
supported could have been jeopardised in that event. Based on their
belief that inmiigration from Mexico is inversely related to Mexican
economic growth, American officials from the US Treasury were also
concerned that turmoil in the Mexican economy could be a catalyst for a
surge in illegal immigration to the United States. According to one
Treasury Department estimate, Mexican illegal immigration to the
United States could have increased by as much as 30 per cent per
16 United States General Accounting Office, Mexico's Financial Crisis: Origins,
A wareness, Assistance and Initial Efforts to Recover, Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, House of Representatives, February
1996, p. 111.
17 Testimony by Robert Reich, Secretary, Department of Labour, before the Committee
on Banking and Financial Services, House of Representatives, January 25, 1995, US
Government Printing Office, Serial No. 104-1, Washington DC 1995.
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annually as a result of economic difficulties stemming from a financial
collapse in Mexico.18
Even as Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan were lobbying Congress on behalf of the
loan guarantee package, support for it appeared to be weak. More and
more members of Congress demanded that special conditions be
attached to the package. For instance, some of the conditions proposed
were for Mexico to sever relations with Cuba, privatise Petroleos
Mexicanos (PEMEX) and seal the US-Mexican border against Mexicans
emigrating to the United States without authorisation.19 Many
Republicans were opposed to the assistance package because as they
claimed, they were elected to Congress to "focus on passing the
I!Contract with America", not to approve a handout to the international
financial community."20
 In 1994 the Republican Contract with America,
with its domestic focus prevented Republican members of Congress
from foreign economic policy considerations. The main focus of the
House Speaker Newt Gingrich and the Republican members of the
House was to bring within the first hundred days of the 104th Congress
bills aiming to a balanced budget, withdrawal of all American troops
18 United States General Accounting Office, "Mexico's Financial Crisis", p. 114
19 Sidney Weintraub, "The Depth of Economic Integration Between Mexico and the
United States", Washington Quarterly, vol. 18, no.4, p. 183.
20 Riordan Roett, "The Mexican Devaluation and the US Response: Potomac Politics,
1995 style", in R. Roett, ed. The Mexican Peso Crisis. InternationalPerspectives (Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Boulder 1996) p. 37.
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under United Nations (UN) command, and increased national security
funding.2'
Once it became apparent that the US Congress would not
approve the assistance package, President Clinton moved on January 31
to use his executive authority.22 The Clinton administration announced
a direct-loan package that included $20 bfflion from the United States
and $18 billion from the IMF plus about $13 billion from the Bank of
International Settlements. 23 In order to avoid a special congressional
vote authorising the assistance, the American contribution was taken
from the Exchange Stabiisation Fund (ESF) controlled by the Secretary
of the Treasury and normally used for short-term foreign exchange
21 Under the Contract with America, Republicans, with a pure domestic focus aimed
to bring in the House of Representatives the following bills: the Fiscal Responsibility
Act, for a balanced budget; the Taking Back Our Streets Act for cuts in social spending
for prison construction and additional law enforcement; the Personal Responsibility
Act, to discourage teen pregnancy by prohibiting welfare to minor mothers; the
Family Reinforcement Act, for child support enforcement and tax incentives for
adoption; the American Dream Restoration Act, with $500 per child tax credit; the
National Security Restoration Act, for withdrawal of American troops under UN
command; the Senior Citizens Fairness Act, to raise the social security earnings limit;
the Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act, with small business incentives and
capital gains cuts; the Common Sense Legal Reform Act, for reasonable limits on
punitive damages; and the Citizens' Legislature Act, to replace career politicians with
citizens legislators. For more details see the Newt Gingrich Official Website,
http://www.newt.org/contracthtm).
Alexander Watson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, "United
States-Mexico Relations", Address to The World Affairs Council of Northern
California, San Francisco, February 23,1995, (http://www.state.gov ).
Since its creation at the Hague Conference in January 1930, the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) has been a central banking institution, which is unique
at the international level. it is owned and controlled by central banks and provides a
number of highly specialised services to central banks and, through them, to the
international financial system more generally. At 31 March 1999 forty-five central
banks had rights of voting and representation at General Meetings. These included all
the GlO central banks - those of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. (The
Bank for International Settlements Website, http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm).
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intervention, not for medium-term loans such as those to Mexico.24
However, the United States through ESF had a history of assistance to
Mexico dating back to the late 1940s. Mexico had been the only
emerging market country that was part of the Federal Reserve "swap
network".25 Mexico's inclusion reflected both the close economic ties
that the United States possessed with Mexico and the importance of
Mexico's economy for the United States.26 The Treasury Secretary, with
the approval of the president, had complete discretion to decide when
the use of ESF was consistent with the obligations of the United States
to the IMP. In deciding to implement the assistance package, the
Secretary and the President exercised their executive powers. President
Clinton was able to achieve this by linking the crisis to US security and
leadership in the global economy.
24 Congress established ESF in 1934 "for the purpose of stabiising the exchange value
of the dollar." Since its passage the statute has been amended to broaden its purpose
from the stabiisation of the dollar to include the promotion of orderly exchange
arrangements and a stable system of exchange rates. ESF has been used to buy and
sell foreign currencies, extend short-term swaps to foreign countries and guarantee
obligations of foreign governments. See GAO, "Mexico's Financial Crisis", pp. 115-
116).
An important feature of the foreign currency operations of the Federal Reserve over
the past thirty years has been the reciprocal currency (swap) network, which consists
of reciprocal short-term arrangements among the Federal Reserve, other central banks
and the Bank of International Settlements. These arrangements give the Federal
Reserve temporary access to the foreign currencies it needs for intervention operations
to support the dollar and give the partner foreign central banks temporary access to
the dollars they need to support their own currencies. See The Federal Reserve
System: Purposes and Functions, (The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Bank Website, http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/pf/pdf/frspf4.pdf).
26 Mexico's original standing swap line with Treasury was established in 1941. Mexico
drew on this line in the late 1940s and in 1965. Between 1980 and 1994, Mexico drew
on ESF six times, for amounts ranging from $273 million to $1 billion See, United
States General Accounting Office, "Mexico's Financial Crisis", p. 150.
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The executive decision of the President to use the ESF in order to
provide Mexico with financial assistance was the result of different
point of views between the President and the US Treasury on the one
hand and the Congress on the other, while the State Department was
not involved in the final decision. In fact the executive decision of the
President came as a surprise for the State Department. 27
 It was a
situation where the executive branch took the initiative from the
legislative branch over an important foreign economic policy decision.
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin justified the actions taken by pointing
out that there were enormous American interests at stake and "it was
clear that the risks of failing to act far outweighed the risks of acting."28
For Alan Greenspan, the actions taken by the Administration and the
Treasury were justified because "Mexico is of such special importance
to the United States and only the US Administration seemed able to
respond with the necessary speed and magnitude". 29 It was this
decision that led the IMF to extend an assistance package seven times
bigger than the normal limit and to expend a fifth of its liquid
resources. However, the bail-out revealed cracks in the international
Disclosed by John Harrington, Senior Economist at the US-Mexico Chamber at
Commerce during an interview conducted by the author of this thesis in Washington
DC on September 11, 1998. John Harrington during the peso crisis was serving as a
policy advisor on Mexican affairs at the State Department.
Testimony by Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, before the House Committee on
Banking and Financial Services, February 9, 1995, US Government Printing Office,
Serial No. 104-1, Washington DC 1995.
29 Testimony by Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, before the House
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, January 25, 1995, US Government
Printing Office, Serial No. 104-1, Washington DC 1995.
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financial system. Six European members of the IMF - Britain, Germany,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland - abstained on the
vote to provide $17 billion in loans to Mexico. They said the plan was
pushed through too hastily and without regard for the IMF's other
obligations or problems of moral hazard. On the other hand American
officials noted that the speed of the markets had outstripped the ability
of agencies like the IMF to respond. Overall the IMF provided 688 per
cent of the quota3° for which Mexico was eligible, the largest financial
package ever approved by the Fund at that jucture.31
The ESF-IMF Assistance Package to Mexico.
The main aim of the $51 billion assistance package was to help
Mexico avoid financial collapse and to limit any spread of the crisis to
other emerging market economies. The United States provided three
forms of support to Mexico: short-term swaps through which Mexico
3°Each member of the IMF is assigned a quota, which is expressed in Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs) and is equal to its subscription of capital to the IMP. Members' quotas,
apart from providing the IMF with its financial resources, serve several other
functions with respect to their financial and organizational relations with the IMF. A
member's quota determines its voting power in the IMF; each member has 250 basic
votes plus one additional vote for each SDR 100,000 of quota. The quota also
determines the maximum amount of balance of payments assistance that a member
can normally obtain from the IMF. Finally, the quota determines a member's share in
allocations of SDRs (The IMF Website,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/pam/pam45/II/IIA.htm).
31 Maxwell Cameron and Vinod Aggarwal, "Mexican Meltdown: States, Markets and
post-NAFTA Financial Turmoil", p.980
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borrowed dollars for 90 days that could be rolled over for up to one
year; medium term swaps for up to five years and securities guarantees
for up to ten years.32 The interest rates applied to the short-term swaps
were intended to cover the cost of funds to Treasury. Mexico was
charged a higher interest rate for medium-term assistance that was at
least sufficient to meet the current US government credit risk rating for
Mexico.33 Mexico was required to maintain the dollar value of peso
credits to the United States, adjusting the amount of pesos on a
quarterly basis, to reflect changes in the peso-dollar exchange rate. In
exchange for the assistance, Mexico also agreed to abide by terms and
conditions specified in the ESF-IMF packages, including paying interest
and fees, implementing a comprehensive and stringent economic plan
and providing economic information on a timely basis. Treasury,
Federal Reserve and the IMF officials believed that providing
immediate assistance would prevent the effects of Mexico's crisis from
spreading to the economies of other emerging market nations and
beyond. For the United States, an additional concern was to limit the
negative effects of the crisis in the areas of trade, employment and
immigration. American officials judged that Mexico's imminent
32 "The United States Support for Mexico" - Message from the President of the United
States, March 9, 1995, House Document No. 44 (The Library of Congress - Thomas
Website, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/).
As of August 1, 1995 the annual rate for short-term swaps was 5.45% and the rates
for medium-term swaps were 7.8% for funds disbursed in March, 10.16% for funds
disbursed in April and May and 9.2% for funds disbursed in July. See GAO Report,
Mexico's Financial Crisis, pp. 17-18.
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financial collapse could be prevented and investor confidence in Mexico
restored by making available large amounts of money to allow for the
refinancing of a large portion of Mexico's maturing short-term
liabilities.
After the first key decision by President Clinton on January 31,
1995 the second key decision was that on February 21, 1995, when the
United States and Mexico entered into four financial agreements that
provided Mexico with up to $20 billion. These were the Framework
Agreement, the oil agreement, the Medium-Term Exchange
Stabiisation Agreement and the Guarantee Agreement and collectively
referred to as "the agreements". Under these agreements, in return for
American and IMF assistance, Mexico agreed to an austerity
programme, which included the following measures:
a) The deposit of all Mexican oil earnings in the United States
b) Adherence to IMF monetary targets through:
- gas and electricity price increases
- an increase in the Value Added Tax (VAT)
- the privatisation of ports, airports and railways
- fiscal budget cuts
c) The payment of high interest rates on the loan
184
Chapter Five: The American Response to the Peso Crisis
d) The allowance of foreign participation in extraction and
exploration in
The oil agreement provided a source of repayment and set forth
the rights and responsibilities of various parties as to the use of
proceeds from the export of crude oil and oil derivatives by PEMEX. It
remained in place until all of Mexico's payment obligations under the
assistance agreements were fully satisfied. Banco de Mexico established
a special funds account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as
required under the oil agreement. The Bank of Mexico authorised the
Federal Reserve of New York to use the funds in the special funds
account to repay all amounts due and payable under the assistance
agreements. The Mexican government was to authorise the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York to debit any account, to liquidate
investments and to transfer all proceeds to a Treasury account in the
event that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York received a notice from
the Treasury that Mexico had failed to make any payment under the
assistance agreements. The oil agreement also required that PEMEX
must cause any of its subsidiaries that export crude oil or oil derivatives
in the future to become a party to the oil agreement. Moreover, Mexico
had to assure the US Treasury through a consultation arrangement, that
' Gary Springer and Jorge Molina, "The Mexican Financial Crisis: Genesis, Impact
and Implications", Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, voL 37, no. 2,
1995, pp. 66-67.
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it continued to have the means to repay its loan obligations from
PEMEX oil and oil derivative export revenues. If the US Treasury was
not assured, it and the Mexican government had to agree on new terms
that provided such assurance. If Mexico and the Treasury could not
reach agreement after consultation the Treasury could enforce
mandatory prepayment provisions. These arrangements required close
monitoring, frequent consultation and "timely information-sharing"
between the Treasury and Mexico. The oil agreement provided an
important incentive for the Mexican government to take actions to
avoid a default since it would be a politically sensitive issue in Mexico
if a point was reached where the United States could start claiming
revenues from oil sales.35
The second largest component of the assistance package came
from the IMF. The 1MB assistance was designed to restructure Mexican
debt and was contingent upon several things, including Mexico's
reduction of its current account deficit and inflation rate. On February
1, 1995, the 1MB announced an 18-month standby credit of $17.8 bfflion
for Mexico. This was the largest standby arrangement that the IMF had
ever extended as a percentage of a country's 1MB quota, the
subscription that member countries pay to the IMF. The package's
specific objectives for 1995 were: a) the reduction in the external current
GAO, "Mexico's Financial Crisis", pp. 120-122 & 132.
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account deficit from 8 per cent of GDP in 1994 to 4 per cent of GDP in
1995, and to 3-3 1/2 per cent of GDP in 1996; arid b) a lowering of the
annualised rate of inflation to around 9 per cent in the fourth quarter of
1995, from more than 30 per cent in the first quarter of the year.36
However, during the first week of March, the peso had fallen to a
record low against the dollar, as financial markets reacted to the
Mexican government's delay in announcing policies to deal with the
rapid deterioration of the economy. This was largely due to the
difficulties encountered in the negotiations for external support and to
the perception that Mexico's economy had weakened. Hence, interest
rates and the exchange rate continued to show substantial volatility and
reached unexpected levels.
In Washington, Deputy Treasury Secretary, Lawrence Summers,
indicated that it was clear that economic forecasts made at the time the
agreements were first negotiated would have to be revised, but he
expected Mexico to live up to its policy commitments to control the
growth of credit, maintain budget discipline and continue with the
process of privatisation.37
 Indeed, the revised plan contained stringent
economic policy adjustments consistent with the agreements reached
with the IMF and the United States. Its goals were to restore financial
stability, strengthen public finances and the banking sector and regain
36 
"IMF Approves $17.8 bfflion Stand-By Credit to Mexico", JMF Press Release, no.
95/10, February 1, 1995.
37 Riordan Roett, "Devaluation and the US Response", The Mexican Peso Crisis, p. 42.
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confidence. The initial programme was reinforced in four major policy
areas that reflected basic elements of the Washington Consensus: a)
additional correction in public balances, b) restrictive monetary policy,
c) reinforcement of the banking sector and d) minimum wages and
rural employment programme. It was recognised that the revised plan
would result in an economic shock for the country more severe than
had been anticipated in early January 1995.38
All of the announced reforms that accompanied the joint ESF-
IMF assistance package, signalled Mexico's firm conimitment to pursue
market-oriented policies and to provide investors with an adequate and
safe environment for the development projects. At this point the role
Mexican domestic elites was important in accepting the Washington
Consensus and applying the IMF's and ESF's conditionalities. As
analysed in Chapter Four, during the 1980s and early 1990s a new
coalition of interests was built on the basis of promoting financial
liberalisation and a free market economy. Based on these new
relationships between the administration and business and social
groups that favoured reforms along the lines of the Washington
Consensus, the Zedillo Administration implemented the economic
adjustment despite social pressures and criticisms. The top
policymakers of the Zedfflo Administration viewed economic decisions
GAO, "Mexico's Financial Crisis", pp. 128-131.
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as largely technical in nature and believed that these decisions should
not be subject to bargaining and politicising. This was very well
demonstrated when the Zedillo Administration modffied the Mexican
constitution in 1995 to allow for private participation and equity in
Mexican telecommunication satellites. The state-owned satellite firm
was privatised through sale of stock in late 1997. The TelMex monopoly
on long distance and international telephone service ended in August
1996 for corporate accoi.mts and for residential service in the 60 largest
cities in 1997. Eight firms were authorised at that time to provide long
distance service, five of which had American partners. New rules
adopted in 1995 allowed foreign banks to acquire up to 100 per cent
ownership in existing banks which have less than 6 per cent of the total
capital in the banking system. With the new rules, both Mexican and
foreign individuals and companies could own up to 20 per cent of a
Mexican financial institution. 39
 Legislation passed in December 1998
removed the 6 per cent cap, allowing foreigners to own up to 25 per
cent of the total net capital of the banking system. °
Furthermore, Banco de Mexico, the central bank of Mexico, after
the IMF-ESF bailout was agreed announced its commitment to
See, The 1997 Mexico Report, submitted by the Department of State to the House
Conunittees on International Relations and Ways and Means and the Senate
Committees on Foreign Relations and Finance, (The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve Bank Website, http://www.bog.frb.fed.us ).
40 See the 1999 Mexico Report on Economic Policy and Trade Practices, released by the
Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, US Department of State, March 2000. (US
Department of State Website, http:// www.state.gov).
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conducting a tight monetary policy in order to stabilise the foreign
exchange market. In line with this objective, Banco de Mexico
established a ceiling on the growth of its net domestic credit of 12
billion new pesos for 1995. This ceiling which represented a 21 percent
increase in the monetary base for 1995 was consistent with a projected
rate of inflation of 19 per cent and a rate of economic growth of 1.5
percent for the year. The 12 billion new pesos' ceiling was subsequently
revised to 10 billion new pesos for 1995.41
A 1997 Department of State report on Mexico's economic policy
and trade practices noted that Mexico had largely achieved the
objectives laid out in the emergency economic program developed to
cope with the 1995 peso crisis and that Mexico had successfully
returned to the international financial markets. According to this report,
among the most telling indicators of the success of Mexico's debt
strategy were early repayment to the US Treasury of all of the economic
support funds extended to Mexico during the 1995 crisis (table 4.1) and
the placement by Mexico of over $24 billion in international capital
markets.42
41 Augustin Carstens and Moises Schwartz, "Mexico's Economic Programme:
Achievements and Challenges", in Monica Serrano and Victor Bulmer-Thomas, eds.
Rebuilding the State: Mexico After Salinas (Lynne Rienner, New York 1996) P. 124.
Department of State, "Country Reports on Economic Policy and Trade Practices-
Mexico", Submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and on Finance and
to the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and on Ways and Means, January 1998
(The State Department Website,
http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/trade
 reports/latin america97/).
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TABLE 5.1 - DISBURSEMENTS AND AMORTISATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PACKAGE ($ millions)
DATE	 DISBURSEMENTS	 AMORTISATIONS	 NET ACC. DEBT
January 11, 1995
	 500	 0	 500
January 13, 1995	 500	 0	 1000
February 2, 19
	 2000	 0	 3000
March 14, 1995
	 0	 1000	 2000
March 14, 1995	 3000	 0	 5000
April 19, 1995
	 3000	 0	 8000
May 19, 1995
	 2000	 0	 10000
July 5, 1995
	 2500	 0	 12500
i1i99	 0	 700	 11800
January 29, 1996	 0	 1300	 10500
August 5, 1996	 0	 7000	 3500
January 17, 1997	 0	 3500	 0
Total	 13500	 13500
Source: The Mexican Economy 1997, J3anco de Mexico, Mexico City 1997.
The ESF-IMF assistance package ifiustrated the crucial
importance of Mexico to the United States in the context of NAFTA and
the extent to which American business interests were affected by the
devaluation. If the December 1994 devaluation demonstrated the
vulnerability of small nation-states that rely heavily on foreign capital,
then the January 1995 bailout demonstrated the power of the United
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States in the global economy to act in response to perceived threats to
the national interest. 43
 According to Jeffrey Shafer, then Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs at the Treasury, the Mexico support
package was designed first and foremost to safeguard American
interests and was also critical for averting a crisis that could
substantially harm these interests. Indeed the bailout brought Mexico
closer to the Washington Consensus, which meant keeping faith with
the market and integrating more closely with the United States through
NAFTA (table 4.3).
TABLE 5.2 - MEXICO'S FOREIGN TRADE AND US SHARE BEFORE AND
AFTER THE PESO CRISIS
($billion)
1994	 1995	 1996	 1997
Mexico's Total Exports	 60.8	 79.5	 96.0	 110.4
Exports to US
	 51.6	 61.7	 74.2	 94.2
US Share (%)	 84.9	 77.6	 77.3	 85.3
Mexico's Total Imports 	 79.4	 72.5	 89.5	 109.8
Imports from US
	 54.8	 46.3	 56.8	 78.8
USShare(%)	 69.0	 63.9	 63.5	 71.8
Source: US International Trade Commission, International Economic Review, March-
April 1998, p.5
For example, in September 1998, leading private sector institutions in
Mexico were favouring a monetary union with the United States. The
debate is expected to grow because of the fragility of the peso, which in
Maxwell Cameron and Vinod Aggarwal, "Mexican Meltdown: States, Markets and
Post-NAFTA Financial Turmoil", p. 982
Testimony of Jeffrey Shafer, Assistant Secretary of International Affairs, US
Department of the Treasury, before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services,
House of Representatives, April 6, 1995, US Government Printing Office, Serial No.
104-13, Washington DC 1995.
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1998 dropped 25% against the dollar. 45
 Furthermore, in 1999, Mexico
has requested further assistance from the IMF in the form of a Stand-By
Arrangement, to support an economic programme aiming at
"consolidating the substantial reform efforts initiated during the 1980s
and the gains made during 1996-98 following the 1995 financial crisis to
set the economy on a higher, sustainable growth path". The economic
programme of 1999 also aimed at maintaining tight financial policies,
promoting structural reforms and reducing external vulnerability.46
On the one hand, the peso crisis had resulted in a further
implementation of neoliberal reforms along the lines of the Washington
Consensus and increased dependence on foreign finance. On the other
hand, even before the peso crisis, as successive FRI governments
opened up the economy and ceded space to dissent, the PRI's
monopoly of power slowly eroded. For example, in 1988 the Partido de
la Revolucion Democratica (PRD) split away from the FRI and has
become a legitimate political force. Former FRI member, Cuahtemoc
Cardenas, founded the PRD on a centre-left platform, including
increased government control of the economy, expanded social welfare
and opposition to foreign trade and investment. In 1997 Cardenas was
elected mayor of Mexico City. However, it was the Partido Accion
' The Financial Times, "Mexico Ponders Adopting US Dollar: Monetary Union Slide
in Peso Sparks Debate on Future of Currency and Links with Washington", September
24, 1998.
"Letter of Intent of the Government of Mexico to the IMF", June 15, 1999 (IMF Web
Site, htp://www.imf.org).
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Nacional (PAN) founded in 1939, that won the presidential election of
July 2, 2000 with Vicente Fox, a former Cocal Cola executive in Mexico.
PAN is a pro-business, pro-Catholic, centre-right party. The party won
its first senate seat in 1991 and its first governorship in the northern
state of Chihuahua in 1992. In the elections of 1996 the PAN captured
121 seats and the PRD 125. Despite the first transition of power in 71
years, neoliberal policies will not be disrupted and the Washington
Consensus will not be cancelled in Mexico. Just two weeks after Vicente
Fox took office (December 2 2000) his administration has received three
World Bank loans totalling $1.13 billion to enhance disaster insurance
and reconstruction projects in Mexico. 47 President Fox has also talked of
turning the NAFTA into a common market. Tax reform is on his agenda
as well as a restructuring of Pemex.48
During 1995 there was a debate as to whether NAFTA had
played a role in causing the peso crisis. During hearings before the US
Subcommittee on Trade, Bergsten argued that NAFTA was not
responsible for the peso crisis, but it did facilitate the recovery of the
Mexican-economy in three ways:
47	 World Bank Website, www.wbln0018.worldbank.org
Vicente Fox's proposal for turning NAFTA into a common market has been received
with scepticism by Washington. See, "After the Revolution", A Survey of Mexico, The
Economis1 October 28, 2000.
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a) The financial rescue package helped Mexico restructure its short-
term dollar-denominated debt and ease its liquidity crisis;
b) Because of NAFTA obligations Mexico followed a recovery
programme based on Washington Consensus directions rather
than trade and capital controls; and
c) Open access to the American market, backed by NAFTA
obligations helped prevented a more drastic recession in Mexico in
1995.
The argument that NAFTA caused the peso crisis is problematic since
economic liberalisation in Mexico began in the mid-1980s under the
presidency of Miguel de la Madrid and accelerated under Carlos
Salinas. But NAFTA may have inspired overconfidence in the Mexican
economy. At least in the area of foreign capital inflows, the hype
surrounding NAFTA may have helped generate unrealistic
expectations and an overvaluation of financial assets. However, within
NAFTA import controls were no longer an option for the Mexican
government. The speed and magnitude of the response was rather a
direct outgrowth of the expanded relationship between the two
countries and it would not have occurred without NAFTA. 5° As
Statement by Fred Bergsten, before the Subcommittee on Trade, Ways and Means
Committee, US House of Representatives, September 11, 1997 (rhe Institute for
International Economics Website, http://www.iie.com/septll.htm).
50 See Barry Bosworth, Susan Collins and Nora Claudia Lustig, eds. Coming Together?
Mexico-United States Relations, pp. 7-8 & 22.
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Congressman Jim Kolbe argued, far from worsening the crisis, NAFTA
helped stabilise Mexico's political and economic response to the crisis.
It prevented Mexico from resorting to the solution of imposing barriers,
restricting capital movements and limiting economic activity.
Furthermore, the recovery of Mexico was more rapid and consistent
compared to the crisis of 1982. 51
 In 1996 the Mexican economy grew by
5.1 per cent and in 1997 by 7.1 per cent in real terms (table 4.2)
TABLE 5.3 - ANNUAL MEXICAN GDP GROWTH IN 1981-1997
YEAR	 GDP-ANNUAL YEAR
	
GDP-ANNUAL
GROWTH (%)
	
GROWTH(%)
	
______________________________ 1990
	
4.44
1981	 8.77	 1991	 3.63
1982	
-0.063	 1992	 2.81
1983	
-4.20	 1993	 0.76
1984	 3.61	 1994	 3.52
1985	 2.59	 1995	 -4.65
1986	
-3.75	 1996	 5.1
1987	 1.86	 1997	 7.1
1988	 1.25
1989	 3.35
Source: Bank of Mexico. Economic Indicators, 1997 (http://banxico.org.mex ).
As a result of the peso crisis, the bilateral relationship between
the United States and Mexico has become increasingly multifaceted.
Issues such as immigration and drugs that had been ignored in the
early 1990s have become prominent policy issues after the peso
devaluation and the ESF-IMF assistance package. Furthermore, while
51 Interview with Congressman Jim Kolbe, member of the Subcommittee on Trade of
the House Committee on Ways and Means, conducted by the author of this thesis in
Washington DC, on September 9, 1998.
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the peso crisis had a major impact on the Mexican economy it has not
slowed regional integration as many have expected. 52 As a broader
result of the assistance package, at the end of the 1990s, in Latin
America there was a consensus on the fundamental benefits of open
markets and free trade. Latin American economies accepted the
outward-oriented model of economic development.53 For example, in
March 1995, Argentina launched a programme to restructure ifs
financial system and privatise provincial banks, in order to receive a
$2.8 billion loan from the IMF. In November 1998, Brazil jointly with the
IMF initialised a fiscal adjustment and privatisation programme in
order to receive an $18 billion loan from the IMF and $5 billion from the
United States through the ESF. M Furthermore, on December 14 2000,
Mercosur the South American customs union (composed of four
members: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) outlined its first
common fiscal and inflation targets as part of a wide effort to
52 Interview conducted by the author of this thesis with Prof. Riordan Roett, Johns
Hopkins University, Washington DC, September 10, 1998.
3 The projections are that by the year 2010 the Western Hemisphere will be a larger
market than Western Europe and the Pacific Rim combined. See Stuart Eizenstat,
Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, "Latin
America and US Policy", Remarks at the Wail Street Journal Conference on the
Americas, New York, October 1, 1998,
(http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/). See also Peter Romero,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Remarks at the Miami Herald
Conference on the Americas, Coral Gables, Florida, September 18, 1998, (The State
Department Website, http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/).
For details see "IMF Management and Argentina Agree on Programme for 1995",
March 23, 1995
(IMF Website, http://www.iml.org/external/np/sec/nbf 1995/NB9510.HTM);
"Letter of Intent of the Government of Brazil", November 13, 1998
(IMF Website, (http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/111398.HTM);  "Brazil: Last
Tango In Rio", Financial Times, November 18, 1998.
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coordinate macroeconomic policy. Reflecting basic elements of the
Washington Consensus, the finance ministers and central bank chiefs of
Merocsur's four member countries as well as Bolivia and Chile, its two
associate members, agreed on an annual inflation ceiling of 5 per cent
between 2002-2005 and to limit their net consolidated public sector
deficit to a maximum of 3 per cent of GDP as of 2002. Furthermore,
Chile has announced in November 2000, that it would negotiate a free
trade agreement with the United States.55
The IMF-ESF assistance package to Mexico was driven by a
concern to protect the returns of foreign and domestic investors and
restore confidence in Mexico; to safeguard the stability of the
international economic order; to guarantee the continuation of the
process of hemispheric integration based on competition for foreign
capital and to assure the stability of the Mexican political system and
the restructuring of the economy in line with the interests of
Washington.56 The elements of the Washington Consensus that were in
place before the crisis of 1995 regarding fiscal discipline, financial
liberalisation, trade liberalisation, exchange rates, foreign direct
investment, privatisation, deregulation and property rights were
further entrenched. But the entrenchment of the Washington Consensus
was a result of a clear split between the President and the US Treasury
55 "Mercosur Sets Inflation Targets", Financial Times, December 14, 2000.
56 Maxweil Cameron and Vinod Aggarwal, "Mexican Meltdown: States, Markets and
post-NAFTA Financial Turmoil", p. 983,
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on the one side and the Republican-dominated Congress on the other.
Beyond that, after the peso crisis the market-oriented development of
the region was consolidated and the ability of the United States to
influence outcomes in the region was confirmed and further
strengthened.
As demonstrated in Chapters Four and Five, the entrenchment of
the Washington Consensus in Mexico since 1982 was based on the
following variables of this thesis' framework: globalisation of finance,
mobility of capital, international institutions and ideas accepted by the
domestic elites. With the peso crisis the limited instability of the system
(the fifth variable of the framework) was added to confirm the original
hypothesis of this thesis that during the 1990s the strengthening of the
Washington Consensus was based on all five variables of the
framework. Without the fifth variable, American policymakers would
not have had the opportunity to "lock" and further advance
adjustments and reforms along neoliberal lines in Mexico. However,
the Washington Consensus was further questioned with the Asian
financial crisis in 1997-98. Chapters Six and Seven therefore analyse the
process of financial liberalisation, the financial crisis in South Korea and
how the policy response of the United States through the IMF,
effectively entrenched the Washington Consensus in South Korea.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE REDEFINITION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH KOREA: FROM
THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE TO ECONOMIC
LIBERALISATION AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1997
This chapter provides a general background to the basic
elements of what is described as the Asian model of development. The
main focus is on South Korean economic development and the events
that led to the economic crisis of 1997-1998. The aim is not to explain the
causes of the Asian crisis but to highlight the links between East Asian
and especially South Korean economic development and American
foreign economic policy, and also to idenfify the conceptual
framework's variables on which the advance of the Washington
Consensus was based before 1997. The first part of the chapter describes
the general characteristics of Asian development in relation to
developments in the world economy. The second part of the chapter
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focuses upon South Korean development and the third part provides an
analysis of the shift in American polices from the late 1980s that
resulted in increasing pressures from the United States for financial
liberalisation in South Korea.
As a basis for the following analysis a definition of South Korean
and Japanese development models is provided here. Although a
specific single model cannot be applied for the region as a whole, we
can distinguish a common denominator, based on an export-led
industrial strategy and a close relationship between government and
big industries. The relationship between the state, finance and industry
in Japan and South Korea has been very different from that of the
United States. The former countries have followed a model which
involves long-term relationships between the corporations and the
main banks. South Korea provides an excellent case because an export-
led strategy was the cornerstone of its development policy and because
the close relationship between state and industry has been more evident
and influential than anywhere else apart from Japan.l
1 For an extensive analysis of the Asian developmental state see Chalmers Johnson,
MITI and the Japanese Mfracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy (Stanford UP,
Stanford 1982). Additionally, in order to describe Asian development, Wade proposed
the term "governed market" which says that East Asian growth was due to a
combination of a) very high levels of productive investment, making for faster
implementation of new techniques into actual production; b) more investment in
certain key industries than would have occurred in the absence of government
intervention and c) exposure of many industries to international competition in
foreign markets if not at home. See Robert Wade, Governing the MarkeL Economic
Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialisation (Princeton UP,
Princeton 1990); See also Ajit Singh, "Asian Capitalism and the Financial Crisis", in
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Japan had been a colonial power in the Korean peninsula,
establishing its influence there in the late nineteenth century and
formally annexing the country in 1910. Its occupation of Korea was
undoubtedly brutal - particularly during the Second World War - but it
came at a time when Japan turned itself into a major world industrial
power. When South Korea became an independent state in 1948, and
again after the Korean War, the Japanese example loomed large in the
mind of South Korean leaders. In particular, South Korea borrowed two
major concepts from the Japanese. First, it oriented the domestic
economy towards aggressive exporting rather than trying, as many
poorer countries did, to cope with the superiority of Western economies
by 'import substitution', or creating domestic industries that replaced
foreign imports.2
 The second major borrowing was the system of
joining companies together in large interlocking corporations or
conglomerates. In Japan, they were called keiretsu, (known as zeibetsu
before 1945) in South Korea, chaebol. Chaebol started while the
Japanese were still in Korea as colonial overlords before the 1940s.
There are some big differences between the two. South Korean chaebol
have tended to be spread over more than one industry, for example, in
Jonathan Michie and John G. Smith, ed. Global Instability: The Political Economy of
World Economic Governance (Routledge, London 1999) p. 11.
2 Byung..Nak Song, The Rise of the Korean Economy (Oxford University Press, Oxford
I997)p.l2I.
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the manner of old-fashioned conglomerates in the West, whereas
Japanese keiretsu have been focused more on one central industry.3
Both Japan and South Korea have very limited natural resources
compared to those of most of the advanced Western economies. Since
exporting goods was considered the best survival strategy for Japan, the
Japanese government has emphasised exports of manufactured goods
and services to other countries. From the 1970s, that strategy made
Japan the second largest economy in the world. 4 South Korea also
followed the Japanese model in one other important way: although
geared towards exports, it closed its own markets to foreign goods. In a
sense, both these countries exploited a lag in world competitiveness
caused by communism - because half the world was not even trying to
be economically competitive, it created exporter slots for countries like
Japan and South Korea to walk into.
Furthermore, the Japanese and South Korean development
models were followed to varying degrees in Taiwan and Singapore but,
more significantly, in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. There have
been important differences in aspects of industrial strategy followed by
these countries. Nevertheless, all these countries have followed what is
generally called the Asian developmental state model - a centralised
T. W. Kang, Is Korea the Next Japan? Understanding the Structure, Strategy, and
Tactics of America s Next Competitior (The Free Press, New York 1989) PP. 30-35.
According to OECD figures, as of 1998, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
United States and Japan were respectively $8178.8 billion and $3049.1 billion (OECD
Website, http://www.oecd.org/  publications/figures).
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state interacting with the private sector from a position of preeminence
so as to secure development objectives - rather than relying on free
competitive markets.
The Asian Developmental State
What were described by advocates of the Washington
Consensus, as "corrupt crony capitalism" regimes, were created in the
Cold War climate during which the United States supported regimes
committed to maintaining a close relationship with Washington. 5 In an
effort to gain legitimacy through economic growth these regimes were
accorded privileges by the United States as part of its Cold War
strategy. As a result, the United States was often unable to use its
dominance in the security realm to achieve economic and other policy
changes in East Asian economies. However, while East Asia could often
resist external pressure for change the countries of the region proved
unwilling to challenge Washington in many issue areas. For example, as
Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter have argued, predictions that
Japan/East Asia would wield financial power to demand changes in
See Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics (Penguin Press, New York
1999); See also Morris Goldstein, The Asian Financial Crisis: Cause, Cures and
Systemic Implications (Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, June
1998) pp. 12-14. See also Michael Pomerleano, "The East Asian Crisis arid Corprorate
Finances: The Untold, Micro Story", World Bank Policy Research Working Papers, no.
1990, October 1998.
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American policy never materialised, even at the height of America's
deficit and general allied dissatisfaction with various American policies
in the later 1980s. Most of the states in the region remain highly
dependent upon the continued openness of American markets as well
as the American security umbrella.6
The 1985 Plaza Accord was a major external catalyst for the
subsequent Asian export boom because it caused a large fall in the
dollar-yen ratio relative to the dollar rates against other Asian
currencies. Meanwhile the Asian economies had pegged their
currencies to the dollar. This boosted Asian competitiveness at the
expense of Japan. The belief that exchange rate pegs would last
convinced many investors to borrow in foreign currencies. In addition,
the weakness of the dollar and the strength and stability of the Asian
currencies facilitated capital inflows to these economies. However, the
Plaza Accord and the devaluation of the dollar actually were a domestic
policy change for the United States rather than a change forced by
international events. As Callum Henderson has stressed, it was in fact a
deliberate attempt to get Japan to the negotiating table on trade - and it
achieved some results, such as the US-Japan auto trade accord. When
the dollar's fall achieved its objectives the policy was reversed. This was
6 dependent relationship with the United States has conditioned many of Japan's
aid decisions, which tend to be either supportive of or at least not opposite to
American security interests in the region. See Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter,
"Whatever Happened to the Pacific Century?", in Review of International Studies, voL
25, Special Issue, December 1999, pp. 254-255.
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clearly demonstrated ten years later, at the G7 Accord of April 1995 to
support the dollar. This was the first warning signal for Asia. Support
for the dollar led to a rise of more than 50% against the yen. Under
these conditions, Asian countries should have allowed their currencies
to weaken to reflect the new international market dynamics. However,
strong currencies were seen as status symbols and the Asian
governments and central banks tried to maintain the stability and
strength of the early 1990s. "
The East Asian economies' disciplined fiscal positions had given
lenders confidence that, should local financial institutions encounter
difficulties, the state would have the resources to provide assistance.8
While in the more advanced industrialised economies, financial
transactions had been heavily supervised and regulated to a much
greater degree than trade and investment, the Asian economies simply
had not developed sufficient experience in managing a market-based
financial sector.9 As Jason Furman and Joseph Stiglitz point out, the
financial and capital account liberalisation of the 1980s left the East
Asian countries with fewer tools to cope with the strains imposed by
7 Callum Henderson, Asia Falling: Making Sense of the Asian Crisis and its Aftermath
(McGraw-Hffl, New York 1998) pp. 12,13 & 28.
8 Morris Goldstein, The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures and Systemic
Implications, (Institute for International Economics, Washington DC 1998) P. 14.
Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "What Have we Learned So Far From the Asian
Financial Crisis?", paper sponsored by the US Agency for International Development
(USIA) January 4, 1999, p. 12 (The Harvard Institute for International Development
Website, http://www.hiid.harvard.edu).
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the surge of capital inflows in the 1990s.1° Since the early 1990s Asian
countries had gone under pressure from both the IMF and the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) to modemise, liberalise and deregulate their
banking and financial systems. In 1993 for example, Thailand created
the Offshore International Banking Facility, which was an important
reason for the increase in cross-border inter-bank credit flown to
Thailand. The Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) allowed
for a very rapid growth in the number of financial institutions that
could borrow and lend in foreign currencies. Also in 1994, South Korea
initiated the conversion of short-term finance companies into
investment banks as part of an attempt to introduce features of
developed countries' financial systems, such as the creation of offshore
investment funds, that were the major vehicles for the sale of derivative
products of Korean banks and corporations. This eventually, provided
an extra source of foreign borrowing.11
Meanwhile, the World Bank undertook a major study in 1991,
published as The East Asian Miracle report (1993) which took a critical
view of Asian developmental state. The report interpreted East Asian
success as a challenge to Bank orthodoxy and to the Washington
Consensus and acknowledged a significant role for the state. It also
'°See Jason Furman and Joseph Stiglitz, "Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights from
East Asia", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 2,1998
11 J.A. Kregel, "East Asia is not Mexico: The Difference Between Balance of Payment
Crises and Debt Inflation", in Jomo K.S., ed. Tigers in Trouble (Zed Books, London
1998) p. 48.
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placed emphasis on the market-consistency of the successful aspects of
East Asian industrial policy interventionism and maintained that most
important was the promotion by East Asian governments of export
orientation. The report did not satisfy fully either those who felt that
East Asian growth demonstrated the superiority of the market, or those
who claimed it underrated the guiding role of the state. The report also
rejected the notion of a single East Asian model, noting the great
diversity of policy practice throughout the region.12
For decades the results of the Asian model and its variations
were indeed impressive. But the events of 1997 exposed some
weaknesses in that model. According to Robert Garan, the Asian model
suppressed the true cost of money, fuelling unproductive and
unprofitable investments.13 Problems began to emerge in the 1990s in
both the macroeconomic field (capital inflows, real exchange rate
appreciation) and microeconomic fundamentals (credit expansion,
financial regulation). At least partly, the Asian financial crisis had its
roots in attempts at financial reform in the early 1990s that were aimed
at upgrading financial institutions but left individual economies
exposed to the instabilities of international financial markets. This rapid
expansion in financial services was not matched by careful regulation
12 Soe, World Bank, The East Asian Mirade, Washington DC 1993.
13	 Garan, Tigers Tamed: The End of the Asian Miracle, (Univ. of Hawaii Press,
1998) p. 4.
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and supervision. The huge expansion in banking activity made
supervision very difficult In numerous countries in the region, many
banks were owned by politically well-connected individuals who used
them to finance the operations of affiliated companies. In Indonesia for
example, almost every major corporation had its own bank.14
As in the case of Mexico in 1994-1995, the East Asian economies
had started, but had not completed the process of financial market
liberalisation and reform. These reforms led to a dramatic growth of
linkages to the international economy, which increased the exposure of
these economies to international financial shocks, mainly through a
rapid build-up of short-term debts. Countries with stronger financial
systems, such as Singapore and Hong Kong, had taken steps to
introduce adequate regulations and better supervision and thus were
less vulnerable to a crisis. On the other hand, countries that had not
undertaken significant financial sector reforms, such as China and
Vietnam, were shielded by the fact that they had received much less
short-term capital inflow in the early 1990s. Seen in this light, Steven
Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs suggest that the crisis was actually an
accident of partial financial reforms that exposed these economies more
directly to the instability of international financial markets. 15
 As with
14 Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "The East Asian Fhiancial Crisis: Diagnosis,
Remedies, Prospects" Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 1, 1998, p. 22.
15 Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis,
Remedies, Prospects", p. 23.
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Mexico before the crisis, the East Asian economies were widely viewed
by lenders to be among the most attractive sovereign borrowers among
emerging markets. After all, during the 1980s and 1990s these
economies had been integrated into the world economy and recorded
unusually rapid rates of economic growth. (table 5.1)
TABLE 6.1 - GDP GROWTH IN SELECTED EAST ASIAN ECONOMIES 1981-
1996
1981-90 1990	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994	 1995	 1996
Korea	 12.7	 9.5	 9.1	 5.1	 5.8	 8.4	 9.2	 7.1
Singapore	 6.5	 8.8	 6.7	 6.3	 10.1	 10.1	 8.9	 7.0
Indonesia	 6.0	 9.0	 8.9	 7.2	 7.3	 7.5	 7.6	 8.0
Malaysia	 5.2	 9.7	 8.6	 7.8	 8.3	 9.2	 9.3	 8.2
Thailand	 7.9	 11.2	 8.5	 8.1	 8.3	 8.7	 8.6	 6.4
Source: Callum Henderson, Asia Falling, p. 7
In July 1997, Thailand eventually acted as a wake-up call for
international investors to reassess the creditworthiness of their Asian
borrowers and when they did this reassessment, they found that other
Asian economies had weaknesses similar to those in Thailand: weak
financial sectors, large external deficits, appreciating real exchange
rates, dedining quality of investment and overexpansion in certain key
industries. As one country after another in the region depreciated its
currency, the countries that did not devalue experienced a deterioration
in their global competitiveness, which made their currencies more
vulnerable to speculative attacks. These competitive dynamics of
successive devaluations meant that some Asian currencies came under
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increasing pressure after the initial depreciation of the Thai baht on July
2, 1997 16 (table 6.2).
TABLE 6.2 - THE DEPRECIATION OF MAJOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN
CURRENCIES 1997-1998
COUNTRY CURRENCY RATE/DOLLAR RATE/DOLLAR DEPRECIATION
JAN. 31, 1997	 JAN. 20, 1998	 (%)
Indonesia	 Rupiah	 2375.0	 10200.0	 329.5
Thailand	 Baht	 25.9	 53.0	 104.8
S. Korea	 Won	 863.0	 1638.0	 89.9
Malaysia	 Ringgit	 2.4	 4.1	 68.2
Singapore	 S. Dollar	 1.4	 1.7	 24.6
Source: Kavaijit Smgh, The Globalisation of Finance, p. 82
Thus, the devaluation of the baht triggered a process of contagion in the
other Asian countries. Shortly after the Thai devaluation, Malaysia and
Indonesia floated their currencies. Taiwan devalued in autumn 1997
later, putting the Korean won and the Hong Kong dollar under
pressure. Taiwan's small devaluation (12 per cent) in October 1997,
despite its high foreign exchange reserves, acted as a bridge from
Southeast to East Asia.17
16 Morris Goldstein, The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures and Systemic
Implications, pp. 19-20.
1' Robert Wade, "From Miracle to Cronyism: Explaining the Great Asian Slump",
Cam bridge Jo urnal of Economics, no. 22,1998, p. 699.
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South Korean Development
Since the 1950s South Korea had depended heavily on American
aid. After the Korean War (1950-1953) the United States recognised a
responsibility for economic and military assistance to South Korea.
From 1953 through 1962 economic assistance amounted to roughly $2
bfflion and military assistance to roughly $1 billion as Washington also
maintained a Mutual Defence Treaty and stationed 37,000 soldiers on
the Korean peninsula. 18
 American military assistance relieved the South
Korean budget of a major part of military expenditure. During the
1960s and the 1970s, defence expenditures varied between 22 and 32 per
cent of the South Korean national budget and amounted to 4.5 per cent
of GNP.19
 South Korea had spent years investing in its economy the
funds saved by relying on the United States. South Korea concentrated
on its economic and social development. South Korean economic policy
18 Republic of Korea (ROK) - United States Mutual Defence Treaty was signed on
October 1, 1953, in Washington, DC, right after the end of the Korean War. It took
effect on November 18, 1954. As a framework for jointly countering invasion into
South Korea including any North Korean provocations, it has significantly
contributed to ROK security and to the stability of Northeast Asia as a whole. Even if
the current Armistice Agreement is replaced by a peace treaty and the United Nations
Command is disbanded, the Mutual Defence Treaty wifi serve as the basis for
continued presence of the US Forces in Korea (USFK). The ROK-US Mutual Defence
Treaty consists of a preamble and six articles. The preamble states the resolve between
the two countries for combined defence against armed aggression, and Article 3
defines courses of action according to each country's constitutional procedures. The
United States is allowed under Article 4 to deploy its armed forces in the territory of
the ROK and its vicinity.
(http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/korea/milit2e.html).
19 Edward Mason, Mahn Je Kim, Dwight Perkins and others, "The Economic and
Social Modernisation of the Republic of Korea" Harvard East Asian Monographs, no.
92 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1990) pp. 183-184.
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was never laissez faire, but it generally relied on private
entrepreneurship and export-driven growth.2°
Especially during the 1950s and the 1960s, American aid funds,
managed by the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) established in 1963, were the prime source of American
influence on South Korean economic policy. In 1962, the Korean
military government introduced the first Five-Year Plan on the basis of
a strategy for industrialisation with priority given to light industry.21
One of the reasons for choosing industrialisation as the main road to
economic development was a preference on the part of the military
government for rapid profits from investments and the practical need
to solve the problem of employment by enlarging the number of labour
intensive factories. At the time the South Korean government could not
oppose the constant influx of surplus American agricultural products
and manufactured goods. Its main preoccupation at the time was to
receive aid in increasing quantity.22
There were differences of opinion between the United States and
the military government. South Koreans, despite the risk of inflation,
had given priority to rapid growth to solve the problem of poverty and
20 Doug Bandow, "Free Rider. South Korea's Dual Dependence on America", Cato
Policy Analysis, no. 308, May 19, 1998.
21 It involved labour intensive industries such as textiles, clothing, shoes and metal-
plating.
Hyung-Dong Kim, Korea and the United States: The Evolving Transpacific Alliance
in the 1960s, (Research Centre for Peace and Unification of Korea, Seoul 1990) pp. 176-
178.
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unemployment while the American authorities considered that inflation
was the main cause of the economic difficulties and insisted on a
programme of economic stabiisation and a restrictive policy on the
flow of money and credit. Although American aid was reduced, the
American right to intervene was maintained as a result of negotiations
for American aid between the United States and South Korea. 23 From
the American point of view, the continuing commitment not only to aid
but also to keep American forces in South Korea aimed at deterring
aggression by North Korea and showing the American determination to
remain an Asian power and to maintain a balance of power in the
region.24
During the South Korean government's First Plan (1962-1966) the
principal objective was to establish the foundations of a self-reliant
economy by expanding key industries. Industrialisation in the 1960s,
encouraged by General Park's government (1961-1979) with tax
incentives and low-investment loans from the government, involved
high rates of investment - 25 per cent of GDP in 1965-70. During the
23 It was the Foreign Operation Administration (FOA) established in 1953 and the US
Agency for International Development (USAID) established in 1961, together with the
Combined Economic Board (CEB) established in 1953, that negotiated the policy with
South Korea. See Hyung-Dong Kim, Korea and the United States. The Evolving
TranspacificAlliancein the 1960s, pp.100-107.
24 Especially for the Reagan Administration (1981-1989) South Korea constituted an
outpost in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. The American interest was mainly
geopolitical. The Reagan Administration recognised that uncertainty would have
occurred from a change in its security and financial commitments not only to South
Korea but also to East Asia in general. See Brian Bridges, Korea and the West, (The
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Rutledge, London 1986) pp. 60-61.
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Second Plan (1967-1971) the emphasis was placed more on the
modernisalion of the industrial structure and export industries were
encouraged at the expense of other sectors. The success of the first two
Plans resulted in a decrease in the dependence of South Korea on
American economic aid. Between 1955-1958, the proportion of
American aid was between 10 and 16 per cent of South Korea's GNP. At
the start of the first Five-Year Plan it was about 8 per cent and by the
end of the First Plan the proportion of American aid decreased to 2 per
cent of South Korea's GNP.
After 1967 foreign capital inflows began to be dominated by
foreign loans and investments coming not only from the United States
but also from Japan and other countries. In these circumstances USAID
in Seoul placed more emphasis on public loans at the inter-
governmental level. There was also a considerable increase in trade
with the United States in the form of commercial loans and direct
investments. As the main importer of South Korean goods, the United
States began to contribute to the economic development of South Korea
but no longer from the taxes of the American public. The entrance of
American commercial capital from mid 1960s enabled to continue the
economic cooperation between the United States and South Korea. For
South Korea business, direct contacts in search for foreign capital
helped them not only to broaden their horizons with regard to the
outside world but also helped them to acquire advanced technologies
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for industrial production and management However, American capital
still had considerable influence on South Koran business and political
circles.25 For example, American foreign assistance activity involved
support for the creation of the Korea Institute of Science and
Technology (KJST) in 1966 and the Korea Development Institute (KDI)
in 1971. The former institution was intended to help South Korean
industry with the adoption and adaptation of modern technology and
the latter was to assist the South Korean government with research and
analysis of critical economic policy and planning problems.26
American influence at the initial stages of South Korean
development is also evident in the fact that South Korea began its
export thrust in the mid-1960s by providing shoes, clothing and
construction workers to American forces in Vietnam. In 1965, under
strong American pressure, General Park signed a normalisation treaty
with Japan, Korea's former coloniser. As part of the deal, Japan
provided nearly $1 billion in loans and investments that helped South
Korean manufacturing industries including textile and manufacturing.
Furthermore, in 1972, President Nixon recognised Japan's role in South
For example, such industrial companies as the Ssang Yong Cement, Lucky and
Sinjiin were the big recipients of foreign commercial loans, while Hyundai and
Hankuk benefited from loans through USAID during the 1960s. See, Hyung-Dong
Kim, Korea and the United States: The Evolving Transpacific Alliance in the 1960s, pp.
207-230.
26 Edward Mason, Mahn Je Kim, Dwight Perkins and others, The Economic and Social
Modernisation of the Republic of Korea, (Harvard University Pres, Massachusetts
1980) p. 203.
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Korea when he revised the US-Japan Security Treaty with a clause
stating that South Korea was essential to Japanese security.27
By the 1970s, foreign assistance was a relatively minor factor in
South Korea's external relations. Export earnings and foreign private
capital were the major elements while, the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank became more active in financing infrastructure
projects. Once South Korea had established a credible and firm base it
was in a position to enter a phase of more rapid economic expansion.
American economic cooperation with South Korea at a governmental
level, moved to the corporate sector. 28 The Third Plan (1972-1976)
emphasised more balanced growth and concentrated on the heavy and
chemical industries. The major transformation occurred during that
period of time when government planners decided to move out of
labour-intensive industries like textiles and into heavy industry:
construction, shipbuilding, steel and petrochemicals. In 1976, 74 per
cent of all manufacturing investment went to heavy industries; by 1979
this figure was over 80 per cent. World Bank figures suggest that
between 1960 and 1979 only three other countries (Japan, Singapore and
Romania) grew faster than South Korea. The first three Plans achieved
average annual growth rates above those actually planned
27 Tim Shorrock, "In Focus: Korea", Foreign Policy in Focus, vol. 3, no. 2, February
1998, (The Foreign Policy in Focus Journal Website, http://www.foreignpolicy-
infocus.org/briefs/vol3/v3n2kor.html).
28 I-.IyungDong Kim, Korea and the United States: The Evolving Transpacific Alliance
in the 1960s, pp. 287-288.
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(respectively achieving 7.9, 9.7 and 10.2 per cent). 29 In 1980,
manufacturing in Korea accounted for about one-third of total output
compared with 12 per cent in 1967.° As table 5.3 shows, the structure of
the South Korean economy changed as rapidly as it had grown.
TABLE 6.3 - THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRY AND MANUFACTURING
IN SOUTH KOREA 1960-1996
1960	 1970	 1973	 1977	 1980	 1990	 1996
Industry
Primary	 36.8	 27.9	 24.9	 22.3	 14.7	 8.7	 6.3
Secondary	 15.9	 21.7	 26.2	 28.4	 29.7	 29.7	 26.1
Tertiary	 47.3	 50.4	 48.8	 49.2	 55.6	 61.6	 67.6
Manufactur.
Light	 76.6	 62.2	 59.1	 48.5	 46.4	 34.1	 23.8
Heavy	 23.4	 37.8	 40.9	 51.5	 53.6	 65.9	 76.2
Source: Kim Dae Hwan, "Rush to Growth, Economic Crisis, Limping Modernisation and Dual
Risk Society", Korea Journal, Spring 1998, p. 32.
In this context, the role of the big financial conglomerates known
as chaebol in South Korea is essential. The Park government
encouraged the growth of chaebol under direct family control with
cross-directorships and cross-shareholdings. Most of the chaebol spread
their interests across a large number of industries. As Francis
Fukuyama has observed, between 1970 and 1980 the entire sectoral
makeup of the Korean economy had shifted. For example, the
government urged Hyundai, one of the biggest chaebol, to move into
29 Brian Bridges, Korea and the West, pp. 23-24.
30 Korean construction companies also took advantage of the economic boom in
Middle East oil-exporting countries after 1973; in 1980 more than 130,000 Korean
construction workers were in the Middle East, contributing to Korea's earnings of
foreign exchange. See Robert Solomon, The Transformation of the World Economy,
(Macmillan Press, London 1999) p. 141.
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shipbuilding in the early 1970s. The South Korean shipbuilding
industry, which had never previously constructed a vessel of more than
10,000 tons jumped into the production of huge 260,000-ton crude
carriers.31 Chaebol were also selected to conduct big projects beneficial
for the South Korean economy, while the chaebol in return rewarded
politicians with funds needed to achieve their political goals and
economic targets. As a result an excessive influence of the chaebol over
government policy-making was created. Banks were also lax in
examining large-scale investment project loans for which bank credits
were requested by chaebol.
Both the government and the chaebol invested heavily in rapid
economic growth, the government attempting to establish its political
legitimacy and the chaebol to enjoy economic gains. The government
used a number of mechanisms to encourage the growth of the chaebol.
First and foremost was its control over credit. The government
channelled large amounts of money to the chaebol in an effort to
strengthen their global competitive positions. This credit often came at
negative real interest rates, a fact, which according to Fukuyama
explained the rapid expansion of these conglomerates into businesses
even though they had "scant management expertise". Through a high
degree of indicative planning, the South Korean government created a
31 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity
(Penguin, London 1995) pp. 139.
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reasonably stable domestic economic environment in which large
companies could operate knowing that they would be protected from
foreign companies in their domestic markets and supported in their
export drives abroad.32
Given the state's concentrated policy support, the chaebol were
able to extend even into fields where small and medium-sized firms
were involved. As a result, the number of firms owned by the thirty
largest chaebol increased to 819 in 1997, while the average number of
business fields per chaebol rose to twenty. Largely this was a result of
the government's perception that "size equals modernity". Economic
policies, which promoted colossal projects proudly heralded as "the
biggest in the Orient" or "one of the biggest in the world". 33 Chaebol
were motivated by the desire to increase the size of the group, the
number of employees and to produce more sophisticated products,
rather than, as in Anglo-American capitalism, to enhance stockholder
wealth. As long as the necessary funds could be obtained from the
banks, there was little incentive to use resources efficiently. As Nicola
Bullard, Walden Bello and Kamal Malihotra point out, even by the early
1980s, the inefficiencies of what at the time was an extremely successful
state-led strategy were becoming evident, as the economy grew and the
32 Francis Fukuyama, Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, pp. 138-
139.
Kim Dae Hwan, ,"Rush-To Growth, Economic Crisis, Limping Modernization and a
Dual-Risk Society", Korea Journal, vol. 38, no. 1, PP. 33-35.
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corruption in the state-bank-chaebol nexus multiplied and became
apparent Furthermore, many of the chaebol were protected from
competition by a number of barriers to entry into industries, including
restrictions on mergers and acquisitions. Many big firms protected their
interest by providing financial support to influential politicians. In
addition, government-directed banking prevented and delayed any
serious efforts at reforming and adapting the South Korean financial
system. For many observers, cronyism caused the economy to lose
dynamism and flexibility, by making it unresponsive to a changing
global economy. Despite this no action was taken to reform the system
by either politicians, economists or government bureaucrats or by any
of their international backers.34
Three Variables at Work and the Fifth Variable in the form of the
Financial Crisis of 1997
From the end of the 1980s, three variables (globalisation of
finance, increased capital mobffity and international institutions)
formed the basis on which the Washington Consensus was
strengthened. More specifically, at the end of the 1980s, under the
' Nicola Bullard, Walden Bello and Kamal Malihotra, "Taming the Tigers: The TMF
and the Asian Crisis", pp. 518-519.
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Reagan Administration, American policy changed to one of repeatedly
pressurising the East Asian states in order to force them to liberalise
their economies. Fearing the emergence of another Japan with which it
would constantly be in deficit, Washington subjected Seoul to a trade
offensive. In 1988, the change of American policy was reflected in the
amendments to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (also known as
"Super 301"), the main American trade law designed to open foreign
markets to American investment and exports of goods and services and
to achieve adequate and effective protection abroad for intellectual
property rights.35 In April 1989, the United States Treasury accused
South Korea of continued manipulation of the South Korean currency
to retain an artificial trade advantage. South Korean officials and
businesspeople, however, complained that the already rapid
appreciation of the won was slowing economic growth and threatening
exports. In May 1989, South Korea avoided being called an unfair trader
by the United States and forestalled possible United States trade
sanctions, by promising to open up its agricultural market, ease
investment by foreigners, and remove many import restrictions.36
For a detailed analysis on Super 301, see Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh Patrick, ed.
Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301 Trade Policy and the World Trading System,
(The University of Michigan Press, 1990).
36 See Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, South Korea: A Country Study
(Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC 1990, The Library of
Congress Website, http://lcweb.loc.gov/frd).
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As a consequence of "Super 301", following negotiations with
American policy-makers South Korea agreed to remove border closure
provisions for reasons of promoting local production. South Korea also
agreed to simplify import procedures and abide by the GATT standards
code with respect to technical regulations, quality controls and testing
and certification. In the foreign direct investment area, South Korea
committed itself to terminating the performance requirements on
foreign investment. 37 The end of the Cold War reduced the willingness
of the United States to ignore the negative aspects of authoritarian
government in Asia. Pressures for change were exercised directly and
indirectly through international institutions in the areas of democratic
enlargement, transparency, and economic reforms. Furthermore, from
1993 the "Clinton Doctrine" became one of aggressive foreign economic
policy designed to promote exports, to open targeted economies like
South Korea's to American goods and investment to further entrench
the Washington Consensus.
In the early 1990s pursuing membership of the OECD, South
Korea adopted a more liberal attitude towards foreign capital and
finance. In its 1993 Blueprint for Financial Reform, the government
outlined a five-year programme of gradual financial sector
South Korea also agreed to move from a case-by-case investment approval system
to an automatic approval system on a gradual basis. See Chulsu Kim, "Super 301 and
the World Trading System: A Koran View", Aggressive Unilateralism: America's 301
Trade Policy and the World Trading System, p.255.
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deregulation. Under the plan all interest rate controls were to be
removed by 1997. Other principal measures of the blueprint included
reducing controls on short and long-term capital flows and giving
banks greater autonomy on managing their business. Furthermore, in
1994 in return for OECD membership, South Korea abolished the
Economic Planning Board, the main body for making economic policy
since the early 1960s and loosened virtually all controls over financial
institutions.38
 South Korea's 1996 accession to the OECD was contingent
upon its acceptance of the obligations of the OECD Codes of
Liberalisation of Capital Movements. 39
 The codes are binding on OECD
member countries and required them to remove specific restrictions on
the movement of capital that are consistent with basic elements of the
Washington Consensus. The average acceptance rate among the OECD
member countries of the codes on financial liberalisation was 89 per
38 Chalmers Johnson, "Economic Crisis in East Asia: The Clash of Capitalisms",
Cam bridge Journal of Economics, no. 22,1998 p. 655.
The Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements and the Code of Liberailsation of
Current Invisible Operations constitute legally binding rules, stipulating progressive,
non-discriminatory liberalisation of capital movements, the right of establishment and
current invisible transactions (mostly services). Implementation of the Codes, in
particular by removal of restrictions on cross-border capital flows and trade in
services and the concomitant lifting of country reservations against the Codes,
involves "peer pressure" exercised through policy reviews and country examinations
to encourage unilateral rather than negotiated liberailsation. The Codes have been
improved on varions occasions since their initial adoption in 1961; important recent
additions were the right of establishment (1986) and cross-border financial services
(1992) (OECD Website, http://www.oecd.org//daf/investment/legal-
instruments/codes.htm).
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cent. South Korea accepted 65 per cent of the codes with many of its
reservations and exceptions to be phased out by 2000.40
The relaxation of controls which had accompanied South Korea's
compliance with the requirements of OECD membership and the
pressures of globalisation led to massive short-term borrowing abroad
by the banks and the chaebol to maintain their profitability by rolling
over loans that could not be repaid. In December 1996, the government
attempted to deal with the situation by introducing legislation intended
to facilitate the shedding of labour. This resulted in a general strike in
January 1997 and created much industrial dislocation. After the failed
attempt to regain profitability by expanding their rights to shed labour
and reduce the workforce, the chaebols had no choice but to rely even
more on their close relationship with the state and the banks, to draw
even greater amounts of funds to keep their money-losing operations
alive. Furthermore, the domestic banking system was not able to
neutralise the impact of foreign capital flows by directing the funds into
productive and safe lending and eventually the excess liquidity spilled
over into risky and speculative investments. 41 A series of bankruptcies
of business firms including chaebol such as Hanbo, Sammi and Kia,
4° Wendy Dobson & Pierre Jacquet, Financial Services Liberlisation in the Wit
(Institute for International Economics, 1998) pp. 237-238.
41 Nicola Bullard, Walden Bello & Kamal Malihotra, "Taming the Tigers: The IMF and
the Asian Crisis", pp. 520-521.
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further depressed the economy and exposed the weakness of the
banking system.42
Until the financial crisis of 1997 it was thought to be more
profitable for chaebol to engage in interest arbitrage than ordinary
manufacturing. The crisis demonstrated the South Korean government
was not well prepared for the sudden changes in international financial
markets. The domestic financial market, which was controlled by the
government, did not respond quickly to the change in international
financial markets and the inflow of dollars to domestic firms due to
getting loans from abroad. 43 The domestic banking system was not able
to optimise the impact of foreign capital flows by directing the funds
into productive and safe lending and eventually the excess liquidity
spified over into risky and speculative investments.44
As foreign bank lending continued to rise in the first half of 1997
to a level of $67.3 billion, the average debt-equity ratio of the thirty
largest chaebol grew to almost 4.0 by April 1997 (table 5.4).45
Young Back Choi, "On Financial Crisis in Korea", Korea Observer, voL XXXIX, no.
3, 1998, pp.493-495.
Joo-Kwang Yun, "Economic Crisis in South Korea: Causes and Prescription for
Private Industries", Korea Observer, voL XXIX, no.3,1998, pp. 442-443
A characteristic example is that of Hanbo Group, which went bankrupt in January
1997. Hanbo's steel company amassed $4.7 billion in debt building a new mill, 22
times its equity. However, the actual investment into the new mill was only $3.8
bfflion, which reflected a difference of almost $1 billion from the outstanding loan.
Debt equity (D/E) ratio is calculated as long-term debt divided by total
shareholders' equity. The ratio only includes long-term debt. High DIE ratio in
general implies more financial risk for the firm which may in turn lead to restrictions
in business activities because of the restrictive debt covenants. Therefore, South
Korean chaebol should have experienced more restrictions on their decisions than
companies in the Unite States, for instance, with lower D/E ratio. On the contrary, the
chaebol had kept expanding under the umbrella of the government protection. See Joo
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TABLE 6.4 - DEBT/EQUITY RATIOS OF THE LARGEST NINE CHAEBOL
(JUNE 1997)
CHAEBOL	 LONG-TERM DEBT	 DEBT/EQUITY
($ BILLIONS)	 RATIO
HYUNDAI	 47.89	 4.4
SAMSUNG	 40.95	 2.7
LG	 31.80	 3.5
DAEWOO	 29.16	 3.4
SUNKYUNG	 19.94	 3.9
SSANGYONG	 14.04	 4.1
HANJIN	 13.03	 5.6
KIA	 13.14	 5.2
HA WI-IA	 10.74	 7.8
Source: Joo-Kwang Yun, "Economic Crisis in South Korea", p.447
By October 1997 it was estimated that non-performing loans by
South Korean enterprises totalled more than $50 billion. At the same
time foreign banks, which already had about $200 billion worth of
investments and loans in South Korea became reluctant to release new
funds.46
 South Korea's merchant banks had outstanding loans of $5.35
billion to chaebol that had either gone bankrupt or sought protection
from creditors.47 Moreover, a massive and panic withdrawal of funds
from the Seoul stock market by foreign investors, combined with a
rapid depreciation of the won, created additional demand for the
dollar. The South Korean government was not in a position to stabiise
its currency, without increasing interest rates. When the won began to
depreciate in early November 1997, the government initially claimed
Kwang Yun, "Economic Crisis in South Korea: Causes and Prescription for Private
Industries", pp. 447-449.
46 Nicola Bullard, Walden Bello and Kamal Malihotra, "Taming the Tigers: The IMF
and the Asian Crisis", p. 521.
47 Youn-Suk Kim, "The Korea's Financial and Industrial Crisis: Cause and
Implications", p. 515.
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that it would not let the won fall below the rate of 1,000 to the US dollar
(table 5.5).
TABLE 6.5 - THE WON DEPRECIATION 1996-1998
DEC.	 OCT.	 NOV. DEC.	 JAN. 98 FEB. 98
96	 97	 97	 97
Won/US	 841	 929	 1035	 1494	 1707	 1628
dollar
Usable	 29.4	 22.3	 7.3	 8.9	 12.4	 18.5
Reserves
($ billions)
Source: Young Back Choi, "On Financial Crisis in Korea", p. 486
As the exit from the won intensified, the government expanded
the won's daily band of flexibility to 10 per cent and spent almost $10
billion of its foreign exchange reserves in efforts to protect the
currency.48
 Official reserves stood at $30 billion at the end of 1996; by
mid-November 1997 they were depleted to $7.3 billion. 49
 In November
1997, it became clear that the Bank of Korea had been using its foreign
exchange reserves for lender of last resort lending to domestic banks
unable to roll over their exchange borrowing. And with around $100
billion of lending to be repaid to foreign lenders, the Bank of Korea was
unable to defend the won. When even the wider band of 10 per cent
proved ineffective, the government let the won float on November 17,
1997. Those events forced South Korea to seek an IMF rescue. On
48 llene Grabel, "Rejecting Exceptionalism. Reinterpreting the Asian Financial Crises",
in Mitchie and Smith, eds. Global Instability (Routledge, London 1999) p.52.
49 Young Back Choi, "On Financial Crisis in Korea", pp. 491-492.
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December 3, 1997 the government and the IMF reached an agreement
on a record $57 bfflion bailout.
By the time of the financial crisis the South Korean economy had
moved closer to the Washington Consensus in varying degrees in the
following areas: fiscal discipline, public expenditure, financial
liberalisation, exchange rates, trade liberalisafion, foreign direct
investment and property rights. However, the South Korean economy
was not as close to the Washington Consensus as the Mexican economy
before the peso crisis. In the areas of privatisation and deregulation
South Korea's economy was far from the Washington Consensus. The
strengthening of the Washington Consensus in South Korea, before the
financial crisis of 1997, was based on the following framework's
variables: globalisation of finance, mobility of capital, international
institutions. The role of domestic elites in accepting ideas related to the
Washington Consensus was not as important as in Mexico. The
financial crisis challenged the Washington Consensus in South Korea
and the rest of East Asia. The next chapter analyses the American policy
in relation to the IMF assistance package to South Korea.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
ENTRENCHING THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS IN
EAST ASIA: THE RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE IMF TO THE SOUTH KOREAN CRISIS OF 1997-
1998 1
This chapter discusses the American response to the South
Korean crisis (1997-98) and tests the framework of five variables that
were introduced in Chapter Two. The first part of the chapter examines
the policy of the United States at the initial stages of the crisis and the
role of the IMF in promoting American policy goals. The second part of
the chapter analyses the details of the US Treasury-led assistance
package of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to South Korea and
1 A shorter version of this chapter appears as: Panayotis Karayannis, "The Response of
the United States to the Asian Crisis", in Simon Lee, ed. The Asian Financial Crisis:
Causes and Consequences (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 2001).
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its role along with the change in South Korea's domestic policies in
realigning South Korean capitalism toward the Washington Consensus
The Policy of the United States at the Initial Stages of the Asian Crisis
The Asian crisis represented a unique historical opportunity for
the United States to promote a particular sort of market-oriented
regulatory framework in the region. American observers were prone to
believe that just as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 had vindicated the
American political model, so the fall of Asia's markets in 1997 proved
the wisdom of the American economic model - free market capitalism.2
It was a shared belief among analysts and policy-makers in Washington
that financial liberalisation exposed the policies of crony capitalism that
were being held responsible for causing the recent financial crisis. 3 It
was also believed that liberalising trade and investment in East Asia
would assist the economies of the region to become more market-
2 See W. Rober Warne, "Washington's Perceptions on Korea's Financial Crisis", Korea
Observer, vol. XXIX, no. 3, 1998, pp. 535-545; See also Donald Emmerson,
"Americanising Asia?", Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 3, May/June 1998, p. 48.
See Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics (Penguin Press, New York
1999).
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oriented helping the United States to sustain its continued economic
expansion.4
In his statement before the House Committee on Banking and
Financial Services in January 1998, Lawrence Lindsey, from the
American Enterprise Institute, suggested that the United States should
use its negotiating leverage effectively to advance its principles about
the workings of the global economy:
'The taxpayers of Europe and Japan and the working people of Asia
would be much better of today if their governments had imitated the
actions taken by the United States with regard to reforming its
financial system and deregulating its economy. We should be using the
present crisis to insist that other nations take those actions now and
make those actions a precondition for our assistance.'
The Washington Consensus view, most clearly associated with Alan
Greenspan at the US Federal Reserve, the US Treasury and the IMF was
that the Achilles heel of the Asian model had been excessive
government interventionism. In addition, by the time of the crisis the
United States was at its seventh consecutive year of economic
expansion with growth at 4 per cent and the unemployment rate
averaging only 4.9 per cent. According to the Economic Report of the
4 Robert O'Quinn, "Solving the Asian Crisis Through Trade and Investment
Liberalisation", The Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum, No. 523, April 10,
1998.
5 Statement by Lawrence Lindsey, Resident Scholar of the American Enterprise
Institute, before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, US House of
Representatives, January 30, 1998 (The House of Representatives Website,
http://www.house.gov/bariking).
232
Chapter Seven: The American Response to the South Korean Crisis
President 1998, more jobs were created in 1997 than in either of the two
previous years. Inflation remained subdued, with the consumer price
index (CPI) rising just 1.7 percent during the year. 6 Thus, market
capitalism, as practised in the United States was seen as providing
greater promise of producing rising standards of living and continuous
growth. As Alan Greenspan, Chairman of Federal Reserve Bank argued
in 1998:
'Many of the leaders of these [East Asian] countries and their economic
advisors are endeavouring to move their economies much more
rapidly toward the type of economic system that we have in the United
States. The IMF's approach in Asia is fully supportive of the views of
those in the West who understand the importance of greater reliance
on market forces, reduced government controls and scaling back of
government-directed investments. My sense is that there is a growing
understanding and appreciation of the benefits of market-capitalism as
we [the United States] practice it.' 7
In Asia, such arguments were widely seen as driven by
American interests which perceived an opportunity to open East Asian
markets to foreign investment and which thereby threatened, as Foot
and Walter have argued, to unravel what was a large number of
developing success stories.8
 However, the United States had a very
strong stake in the restoration of confidence, sustainable flows of capital
6 See Economic Report of the President 1998, pp. 105-106 (Government Printing Office
Gate, University of California Website,
http://www.gpo.ucop.edu/catalog/erp98.html).
Testimony by Alan Greens pan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, before the
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Committee on Appropriations, US Senate,
March 3, 1998 (The United States Information Agency Website,
http:/ /www.usia.gov/regional/ea/asiafin/grnspn33.htm).
8 Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, "Whatever Happened to the Pacific Century?",
Review of International Studies, Special Issue, December 1999, p. 263.
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and a return to growth in countries where the consequences of the
Asian crisis were serious. Equally there was a strong stake in avoiding
further contagion to other emerging economies. This stake was based
on the growing importance of these markets for American exports and
it was also based on the recognition that a prosperous, integrated Asia
and a prosperous, integrated global economy were in the strategic
interest of the United States. 9 The Asian markets provided significant
trade and investment opportunities for American businesses and
through them create substantial employment in the United States. It
was estimated that in 1998 almost 3,000,000 American jobs were directly
related to trade with Asian economies. 10
 According to one calculation,
the East Asian economies were expected to absorb a total of $910 billion
worth of global imports in 2010 and if the 1993 US market share was
maintained, this would amount to $120 billion worth of US exports to
these economies.11
After the onset of the Asian financial crisis in July 1997, there
were high expectations that the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation
group (APEC) would play a leading role in coping with the crisis
Testimony by Lawrence Summers, Deputy Secretary, US Treasury, before the House
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, of the Committee on International Relations,
US House of Representatives, November 6, 1997 (The House of Representatives
Website, http:/ /www.house.gov/international_relations).
10 Robert O'Quinn, "Solving Asian Crisis Through Trade and Investment
Liberalisation", Executive Memorandum no. 523, The Heritage Foundation, April 10,
1998.
11 This figure is possibly on the low side since the US market share in these countries,
particularly in China is likely to expand. See Helen Nesadurai, "APEC: A Tool for US
Regional Domination?", The Pacific Review, vol. 9, no. 1,1996, p. 39.
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because of the belief that APEC was one of the leading forces in the
world for trade liberalisation. Fred Bergsten argued that, given the fact
that APEC's members accounted for half of the world economy, its
commitment to achieve free trade by 2010/2020 remained potentially
the most far-reaching trade agreement in history.12 It was also thought
that APEC could provide a solution to the crisis by creating a standby
funding agreement to support future IMF programmes in the region.
Even when the IMF had given generous multiples of quotas - 700 per
cent to Mexico, 500 per cent to Thailand - it was still only a small part of
the total package that would be needed to reassure markets and force
the troubled economies to take the prescribed corrective action.13
However, for American policymakers, it was very important that the
IMF remained central to the process of working out the adjustment
programmes for the economies in crisis. The centrality of the IMF was
critical to the United States. Even if APEC was involved it had to be in
coordination with the IMF. A combination of the two institutions
(APEC and the IMF), where there was the appearance of consensus in
12 Statement by Fred Bergsten, Director of the Institute for International Economics,
before the Subcommittee on Trade, Committee on Ways and Means, US House of
Representatives, February 24, 1998 (The Institute for International Economics Website,
http:/ /www.iie.testimony/fredw&m.html).
13 Testimony by Fred Bergsten, Director, Institute for International Economics, before
the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations, US
House of Representatives, November 6, 1997, (The US House of Representatives
Website, http://www.house.gov/international_relations).
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APEC but the delivery mechanism was through the IMP was the
favourable way to deal with the crisis at the time.
A case that demonstrated the preferences of the United States
was its attitude toward a Japanese proposal in September 1997 to
establish an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) of $500 billion (Japan's share
being about $100 billion) to alleviate the financial distress of Asian
economies. The initiative arose from the need to bail out Thailand and
the refusal of the United States to participate in the initial $17 billion
IMF assistance. Asian leaders criticised the United States for its
reluctance to support Thailand therefore making the spread of the crisis
to the other economies of the region easier. 14 For that reason, Japan took
the initiative in trying to persuade the United States that an Asian Fund
was additional to, not incompatible with the IMF. Japanese support for
an AMIF offered a good opportunity to demonstrate a leadership role
closely connected with its economic importance in the region. Japan
had also some good reasons for putting such a proposal on the table.
Japanese banks were heavily exposed in Thailand, South Korea and the
rest of the region and it was in Japan's interest also to stabilise these
economies. The Japanese economy had become deeply integrated with
14 Southeast Asians were concerned by what many of them saw as congressional
indifference, if not hostility, toward helping the region recover. They pointed to the
inability of the Clinton Administration to quickly persuade Congress to authorise
additional financing for the IMF. See Donald Emmerson, "Americanising Asia?", p.
49.
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its neighbours and any regional recession would have had a direct
domestic impact.15
The AMF proposal could have broken the IMF monopoly on
economic thought and opened up the market to new ideas and different
solutions. The United States insisted that the IMF controlled the
adjustment funding and in November 1997 APEC backed an IMF-led
response to Asia's problems. For the United States there was the
question of whether such an institution as the AMF could act as the
basis for the creation of a common currency in East Asia based on the
strength of yen. Establishing a yen zone in the region would have
weakened American influence on the policy process in Asia. There were
also fears expressed from the United States and the IMF that any
adjustment funds not under the direct control of the IMF might not be
properly used. One of the main concerns was that an AMF-style
orgamsation would slow down the liberalisation of Asian financial
markets. 16 Possessing more voting power than any other nation in the
IMIF, the United States was not convinced of the superiority of a
regional rescue effort. Finally, the American desire for the IMF to
control adjustment funding prevailed and its dominant role in the
adjustment process was endorsed at the Vancouver APEC Forum on
15 Nicola Bullard, Walden Bello and Kamal Mallhotra, "Taming the Tigers: the IMP
and the Asian Crisis", Third World Quarterly, voL 19, no.3,1998, p. 541.
16 Richard Higgott, "The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of
Resentment", New Political Economy, vol. 3, no. 3, 1998, pp. 340-341 & 345.
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November 25, 1997. Ambassador John Wolf, who was the US
coordinator for the APEC Forum, justified the importance of the IMF's
role in the Asian crisis on the need to ensure that even when countries
received funds from outside financial sources, these funds would be
used in supported of an adjustment programme that supported the
necessary measures to restore financial stability. Thus the IMF was
"best positioned to assure a credible adjustment programme".17
The IME had served American interests by promoting desired
economic reform and it could possibly further improve that role, with
greater attention to issues of equity, corruption and more transparent
operations. 18 The American policy towards an AMF or in general the
creation of new institutions for the world economy reflected, as Higgott
has pointed out, a private-sector desire for continued financial
liberalisation and a political/bureaucratic institutional desire not to
cede the power of the existing international financial institutions over
which they would have less ideological and practical control. 19
 The
main concern of American foreign economic policy was that an AMF-
17 Testimony by Ambassador John Wolf, US Coordinator for the APEC Forum,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, of the Committee on International Relations,
US House of Representatives, November 6, 1997, (The US House of Representatives
Website, http://www.house.gov/international_relations).
18 Testimony by Stephan Haggard, Director, Institute on Global Conflict and
Cooperation, before the Subcommittees on Asia and the Pacific and International
Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on International Relations, US House of
Representatives, February 4, 1998 (The US House of Representatives Web Site,
http://www.house.gov/international_relations).
19	 Higgott, "The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of
Resentment", p. 344.
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style organisation would slow down the liberalisation of Asian financial
markets. Furthermore, the IMF and the broader network of financial
institutions such as the World Bank and the WTO had been very
important in legitimising the interests of American foreign policy. The
United States remained still the dominant actor in the international
institutions and a creation of viable alternative organisations would
diminish its influence. Indeed the American administration was now
having to rely even more on bodies such as the IlviF, the WTO and the
APEC to push its trade objectives.20
The agenda of the United States and the 1MB has been very well
summarised by Congressman John LaFalce who has indicated some
important elements of conditionality that the United States and the 1MB
should promote in the context of the Asian crisis:
a) 'It is critical that the IMF's primary goal should be to stabilise
currencies. Agreement should be reached to avoid competitive
devaluations that will further destabilise the international financial
and trading systems;
b) The IMF must also seek vast improvements in the financial services
sectors of countries using IMF stand-by instruments. The IMF must
should seek agreement from the affected countries to reform the
laws and regulations governing their domestic financial
institutions so that they meet generally accepted international
standards;
20 After Michel Camdessus announced his retirement from the IMF, in November
1999, Japan nominated Eisuke Sakakibara, ex-deputy minister of finance, for the
position of the managing director of the IMF. During the Asian crisis, Sakakibara led
Tokyo's effort to offer unconditional aid as an alternative to the IMF's prescriptions.
While the Fund remains Atlanticist, espousing an Anglo-American ideology, Japan
lobbied among neighbouring nations to advance Skakibara's candidacy. See Patrick
Smith, "Tokyo's Coup de Theatre at the IMF", International Herald Tribune, January
22, 2000.
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c) The economies of these countries must be open. The IMF must
insist on economic reforms that open economies to both internal
and external competition. Assisted countries must be open to
competition, trade, investment and capital flows - domestically
and internationally. The use of overt trade and investment barriers
or indirect regulatory schemes to exdude outside competition must
not be tolerated.' 21
The American pursuit of Washington Consensus-style IMF
reform packages at the Vancouver summit, made the gap across the
Pacific greater rather than smaller and the inherent tensions more
transparent. In that sense the crisis demonstrated the limits of APEC. It
was no coincidence as Richard Higgott has suggested, that APEC
always found its strongest intellectual and political support among its
American, Australian and Canadian members. In East Asia APEC was
considered as an additional tool by which the United States could
promote the case for further market liberalisation?2
 Evidence of that
was provided by the fact that in the midst of economic turmoil, in
November 1997, the APEC leaders agreed to liberalise trade in fifteen
key sectors.
21 Address by John LaFalce, US House of Representatives, before the Institute for
International Economics, Washington DC, January 27, 1998, (The USIA Website,
http:/ /www.usia.gov/regional/ea/asiafin/lafalce.htm).
Richard Higgott, "The Asian Economic Crisis. A Study in the Politics of
Resentment", pp. 341-342 & 651.
Referred to as the Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalisation (EVSL) initiative, these
sectors included chemicals, energy goods and services, environmental goods and
services, fish, forest products, gems and jewelry, medical equipment and instruments,
toys, civil aircraft, automotive, natural and synthetic rubber, food and oilseed and a
mutual recognition agreement in telecommunications products and systems. See
Arlene Mayeda, "APEC: Making the Vision a Reality", Business America, vol.119,
January 7, 1998, p. 26.
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However, by November 1997, it became obvious that an
international loan agreement was required, encompassing not just the
IMF but other cotmtries with the United States playing an active and
important role24 (see table 6.1). It soon became apparent that a major
crisis in South Korea would have significant implications for the
Japanese yen, the Tokyo Stock Exchange and a contagion effect on
markets in Europe and North America. It could also have military
implications that might cause North Korea itself to become more
assertive if it felt that South Korea was consumed in a great crisis of its
form of capitalism. Furthermore, Japan and China, were not able to
provide effective leadership, without a major role being played by the
United States.25 Influential economists, such as Bergsten, argued that:
"we [the United States] should not have to take the lead in Asia like we
did with Mexico in this hemisphere but there is nobody else out there
that can or will do it".26 The United States responded to the Asian crisis
through the IMF, and as in the case of the peso crisis, through separate
24 The Thai authorities were expecting the United States to participate in the bailout
programme as Thailand had been one of the region's closest US partners. Thailand
was the first country in Asia to establish diplomatic relations with the United States in
1833. Thailand also has maintained a special treaty with the United States since World
War II, which gives American citizens and investments a national treatment allowing
them special privileges to operate in many areas of business See Kvaljit Singh, The
Globalisation ofFinance, Zed Books, London 1999, p. 105.
25 Testimony by David Hale, Chief Global Economist, Zurich Kemper Investments,
before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, US House of
Representatives, November 13, 1997 (The US House of Representatives Website,
http:/ /www.house.gov/banking).
26 Testimony by Dr Fred Bergsten, before the Committee on Banking and Financial
Services, US House of Representatives, November 13, 1997 (The US House of
Representatives Website, http://www.house.gov/banking).
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decisions involving the Exchange Stabiisation Fund. It was the
Treasury Department rather than the State Department that had the
crucial relationships with finance ministers and central bank directors
and understood both the technical details and policy issues. In the case
of the Asian crisis there was not a split or any major disagreement
between the executive branch and the Congress but there was some
degree of fragmentation within the executive branch. The Asian crisis
revealed the fact that the State Department was sidelined when it came
to crucial global financial issues. 27 In this regard the IMF programmes
in South Korea and other countries of the region were put in place with
the support of the US Treasury and the IlviF. However, in contrast to
the situation in Mexico in 1995, the IMIF was responsible for a major
part of the assistance provided, meaning a limited direct financial
exposure for the United States.
For American policy-makers the IME was the appropriate
institution to be at the centre of the effort because it could press for
Washington Consensus-style reforms in the affected countries and
would internationalise the burden of managing international crises. In
27 On many important questions the State Department's advice was decisively
overruled. For example, when Thailand asked for immediate assistance from
individual governments in the early stages of its crisis, the State Department argued
that the United States had to come to Thailand's aid. This advice was not followed
and the United States did not contribute to the aid package. In the case of Indonesia,
the State Department called for a less intrusive approach to restructuring out of fear of
massive social unrest - and yet again it lost the argument. See Jeffrey Garten, "Lessons
for the Next Financial Crisis", Fore%n Affairs, March-April 1999, pp. 84-85.
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this context, the IMP served as "a multilateral insurance policy against
the prospect of financial meltdown". 28 During a discussion in Congress
about the 1999 budget request for funding for the IMF and the World
Bank, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin insisted that:
'To make the most of the opportunities and manage the risks, we must
participate in - and lead in - the international institutions that help
shape the global economy. These programmes provide an enormous
return for American taxpayers. They help build free markets and free
trade, promote growth and reform, promote sustainable development
and assist in responding to financial crises such as the current one in
Asia. All of which importantly protects and promotes US economic
and national security interests.' 29
The support of the United States for the IMF as the central institution in
the effort to resolve the crisis in Asia is also evident in the words of the
Secretary of State Madeleine Aibright
'The United States is participating in these [IMF] programmes for a
very clear reason: the stability of the Asia-Pacific region is in our
economic and national security interest These countries are our
friends and allies and their prosperity makes them better customers for
US exports. The resources we pledge to the IMF for helping other
nations also protect and benefit the United States and the American
people. A stable and growing American economy depends on a stable
and growing world economy. The IMP supported by the United States,
is best suited to monitor the reform process and ensure that
momentum is sustained.' 30
28 Opening Statement of James Leach, The House Committee on Banking and
Financial Services, January 30, 1998 (The USIA Website,
http://www.usia.gov/regional/ea/ asianfin/leachl3O.htm).
29 Testimony by Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin before the House Appropriations
Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programmes Subcommittee,
February 11, 1998 (The US Treasury Website,
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/pr2207.htm).
30 Madeleine Aibright, Secretary of State, "The Economic Crisis in Asia", Diana Las
Americas, Miami, February 1, 1998 (The Secretary of State Website,
http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/).
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Indeed, it has been difficult to distinguish between what the IMF
is promoting and what the United States is promoting. As Bergsten
suggested: "We (the United States) get most of what we want They (the
IMF) pursue most of what we believe in." 31 The United States has had
critical economic and national security interests at stake, when
promoting restoration of financial stabifity. For Robert Rubin, Treasury
Secretary, "when we (the United States) support IMF-led programmes,
our purpose is clear: to protect and benefit the American people,
American workers and American businesses".32
The Fourth Variable at Work and The US Treasury-led IMF Agreement
with South Korea
Regarding the fourth variable, domestic elites started to accept
and promote basic principles of the Washington Consensus only after
the eruption of the financial crisis as expressed in the Letters of Intent to
the IMF. The original IMIF Stand-By Arrangement with South Korea
31 Testimony by Fred Bergsten, before the House Committee on Banking and Financial
Services, January 30, 1998, (The US House of representatives Website,
http://www.house.gov/banking).
32 Testimony by Robert Rubin, Treasury Secretary, before the House Committee on
Banking and Financial Services, January 30, 1998 (The US House of representatives
Website http://www.house.gov/banking).
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was set on December 5, 1997. For the first time an advanced industrial
country (Korea became a member of the OECD in 1996) was to be
subjected to the tough IMF conditions usually reserved for developing
countries. The $57 billion package comprised $21 billion from the IMF,
$10 billion from the World Bank, $4 bfflion from the Asian
Development Bank and $20 billion from leading industrial countries,
including $10 billion from Japan and $5 billion from the United States.34
(table 7.1)
TABLE 7.1 - APPROXIMATE CONTBUTIONS TO IMF LOANS
($ BILLIONS)	 __________________
SOURCE	 THAILAN INDONESI SOUTH
D	 A	 KOREA
21
4
10
10
5
7
57
INT. MONETARY FUND
ASIA DEVELOPMENT
BANK
WORLD BANK
JAPAN
UNITED STATES
OTHER MULTILATERAL
TOTAL
4	 10
1.2	 3.5
1.5	 4.5
4	 5
0	 6
6.5	 13
17.2	 41
Source: Bullard, Bello, Mallhotra, "Taming the Tigers", p. 522
The $21 billion contribution of the IMF to South Korea exceeded the
previous record loan of $17.8 billion to Mexico in 1995 and it was
During August - December 1997, the IMP signed three emergency lending
arrangements with Thailand (August), Indonesia (November), and Korea (December).
These programmes established packages of international financial support at an
unprecedented cumulative sum of approximately $115 billion ($17.2 bfflion for
Thailand, $41 billion for Indonesia and $57 billion for Korea).
Furthermore, the American money should it be disbursed, would come from a
special fund administered by the Treasury that did not require congressional
approval. On top of the American share of the IMF bailout was $1 billion in credit
guarantees for the purchase of American agricultural products. See Doug Bandow,
"Free Rider. South Korea's Dual Dependence on America", Cato Policy Analysis No.
308, May 19, 1998.
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equivalent to almost twenty times South Korea's quota of $1.09 billion
in the IMF. The agreement reflected a mix of the traditional IMF
formula of fiscal and monetary lightening, combined with measures
serving the special interests of foreign bankers and business, such as
labour market reform, further opening the South Korean financial
sector to American banks. In return the South Korean government
agreed to a long list of economic, institutional, labour and industrial
reforms aimed at reviving the economy. Despite the fact that American
contribution in the assistance package was smaller than that of Japan,
IMF conditionalities reflected the Washington Consensus. Nicola
Bullard, Walden Bello and other economists argued that the bailout
conditions were agreed by the US Treasury, the US Chamber of
Commerce and Wall Street bankers even before Korean officials had
signed the agreement.36
The key elements of the initial arrangement between the South
Korean government and the IMF were in line with the Washington
Consensus: a) tightening monetary policy to "restore and sustain calm
Of the total $21 bfflion of the IMF contribution, $5.56 bfflion was available
immediately, $3.58 bfflion was available December 18 following the first review under
the programme and a further $2 bfflion on January 8, 1998 following the second
review. Subsequent disbursements were to be made available subject to the
attainment of performance targets and in some cases programme reviews. See "IMP
Approves SDR 15.5 Billion Stand-By Credit for Korea '. JMF Press Release No. 97/55,
December 4, 1997, (The IMP Website,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/pr9/55.htm).
36 Bullard, Bello, Mallhotra and Chossudovsky, "Taming the Tigers. The IMF and the
Asian Crisis, p. 521 and Robert Wade, "From Miracle to Cronyism: Explaining the
Great Asian Slump", Cambridge Jo urnal of Economics, no.22,1998, p.702.
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in the markets", b) raising interest rates from 12.5 per cent to 21 per cent
to control liquidity, c) controlling money supply to contain inflation
below 5 per cent, d) floating the exchange rate with minimal
interventions and e) maintaining a balanced or slightly surplus budget.
In addition to these policies the agreement included a series of
institutional reforms, notably, establishing an independent central
bank, closing troubled financial institutions and accelerating the
approval of foreign entry into the domestic financial sector thus
allowing foreign banks to establish subsidiaries. The initial programme
of economic reform assumed growth of 2.5 per cent in 1998 and
featured:
a) a comprehensive financial sector restructuring that introduced a
strong market and supervisory discipline and independence for the
central bank and the operations of nine insolvent merchant banks
were suspended.
b) Fiscal measures equivalent to about 2 per cent of GDP to make
room for the costs of financial sector restructuring in the budget;
fiscal measures also included widening the bases for corporate,
income and VAT taxes.
c) Efforts to dismantle the "inefficient ties" among the government,
banks and businesses. The initial agreement committed the big
chaebol (such as Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, LG) to cutting the
number of their affiliates in half and dramatically reducing their
debt by the year 2000.
d) Trade liberalisation measures, including setting a timetable in line
with the WTO commitments to eliminate trade-related subsidies.
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e) Capital account liberalisation measures to open up the Korean
money, bond and equity markets and to liberalise foreign direct
investment.37
The US Treasury-led IMF programme aimed to increase
confidence, attract private capital in the short run and to address the
longer term problem of allocating capital on a more market-oriented
basis. A more market-oriented Asia would be a better trading partner
for the United States (ie, more open to American exports) better able to
grow and finance American imports and less likely to distort markets
with excess capacity, excess concentration of industiy and selective
production. 38 Indeed, the South Korea stabilisation package aimed to
open and expand competition in Korea by creating a more market-
driven economy. South Korea faced many challenges but for American
policymakers such as US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, "if
South Korea continued on the path to reform there would be important
benefits not only for Korea but also for the United States".39
37	 Initial IMP programme as approved by the IMF's Executive Board on December
4, 1997 (The IMF Website,
http://www.imf.org/externa1/pubs/ft/survey/pdf/121597.pdf).
38 Lawrence Summers, Deputy Treasury Secretary, "Emerging From Crisis: the
Beginnings of a New Asia", Remarks at the Economic Strategy Institute, February 11,
1998 (The US Treasury Website,
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/pr2217.html).
39 Testimony by Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, US Trade Representative, before
the Subcommittee on Trade of the Ways & Means, US House of Representatives,
February 24, 1998 (The US House of Representatives Website, http://waysand
means.house.gov).
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However, the initial IMF programme failed to meet the objective
of restoring market confidence. The initial response to the crisis led by
the US Treasury and the IMP, exacerbated rather than eased the crisis in
its early stages. The IMF initially viewed the situation as a series of
traditional balance of payments crises, rather than a financial panic and
as a result demanded tight and fiscal monetary policies. The IMF's
initial approach was to close a series of banks and financial institutions
as a means to introduce tough reform measures in East Asian
economies. The failed banking approach was clearly demonstrated in
Indonesia where 16 banks were closed on November 1, 1997. The
problem was that these banks were closed without a comprehensive
financial restructuring plan in place. The closures in Indonesia, South
Korea and elsewhere, set off a bank run that undermined the rest of the
banking system, including healthy banks. 4° Foreign investors remained
unconvinced about the debt servicing capacity of the private debtors
despite the announced availability of IMF loans and continued to
demand the repayment of short-term loans. Official reserves fell more
rapidly than the IMP had predicted. In the case of Korea, the
withdrawal of short-term debts was so much more intense than
predicted that Korea face imminent default by December 24. By January
4° Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "What Have We Learned So Far from the Asian
Financial Crisis?", Paper sponsored by the US Agency for International Development
(USAID) pp. 14-16 (The Harvard Institute for International Development Website,
http://www.hiid.harvrad.edu/research).
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1998, the inflation target had been revised upward from 5 per cent to 9
per cent as was the monetary growth target (from 9 per cent to 14 per
cent).
Less than a month after the initial agreement, following three
weeks of market and currency turmoil South Korea received emergency
assistance of $10 billion to avoid default. The IMF was too slow in
disbursing funds but this was partly because the United States was
keen to extract additional concessions from South Korea in return for
the first tranche of funding. The additional concessions to the United
States included: a) closing ailing merchant banks and reducing risky
assets to make them more attractive for foreign take-over, b) opening
the bond market by the end of 1997, c) liberalising interest rates and d)
opening domestic markets to cars and other key industrial goods by
mid-1999.41 Furthermore, on December 30, 1997, the South Korean
National Assembly passed legislation, which was needed to implement
some of the IMF-imposed reform programmes. The legislation
consisted of a) establishing an independent central bank with the
primary goal of controlling inflation; b) creating a consolidated
supervisory body with jurisdiction over all financial operations and
firm independence and; c) mandating companies to report audited and
consolidated financial statements. 42
41 Nicola Bullard et a1, "Taming the Tigers", pp. 523-525.
Youn-Suk Kim, "The Korea's Financial and Industrial Crisis: Cause and
Implications", Korea Observer, VoL XXIX, No.3 Autumn 1998, p. 517.
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Structural reforms in South Korea's IM1F/US Treasury package
aimed also to complement the trade agenda of the United States by
reinforcing and expanding Korea's commitments in the WTO and in the
OECD. The South Korean government, by signing the agreement with
the IMF on December 4, 1997, also agreed to: a) accelerate
implementation of its commitments to WTO members on the
elimination of trade-related subsidies and its import diversification
programme; and b) liberalise its rules on import licensing and
certification, which could help lower entry and distribution barriers for
agricultural commodities, food and industrial protects, including autos
and pharmaceuticals.43 The bailout programme clearly stated that
'Timetables will be set, in compliance with WTO commitments, at the
time of the first review, to eliminate trade-related subsidies; eliminate
restrictive import licensing; eliminate the import diversification
programme and streamline and improve transparency of the import
certification procedures.'
What the United States was unable to attain for many years, through
bilateral negotiations or under the WTO, it very quickly achieved
through the IMP programme within a few months not only in Korea but
also in other troubled East Asian economies. For example, during the
negotiation of the World Trade Organisation's financial-services
4 Testimony by USER Charlene Barshefsky, before the House Ways & Means Trade
Subcommittee, February 24, 1998 (I'he US House of Representatives Website,
http://waysandmeans.house.gov).
44	 IMF Stand-By Arrangement with Republic of Korea, December 4, 1997 (The IMF
Website, http://www.irnf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/pdf/121597.pdf).
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agreement, many developing countries, especially in Asia had opposed
this agreement in 1996-97. By December 1997, Asian leaders had
dropped their objections and signed an agreement that committed them
to open their banldng, insurance and securities markets to foreign
firms.45 In Thailand, where laws were changed in October 1997 to allow
foreign majority ownership in Thai financial institutions, foreign banks
had arranged to take control of many Thai banks and finance firms. For
instance, the American Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok had pressed
the government to open up the economy further by issuing a statement
calling for additional financial liberalisation, lifting of all restrictions on
foreign ownership of assets and greater foreign participation in the
service sector.46
With the implementation of these conditionalities, American
financial companies would be the biggest beneficiaries as the United
States had been putting pressure on Korea to open up its financial
sector since the late 1980s. As part of its IMF package in early
December, South Korea raised its limit on foreign ownership in local
listed companies from 26 per cent to 50 per cent in mid-December 1997
and to 55 per cent in December 1998. The IMF also pushed South Korea
to let foreign banks establish subsidiaries and brokerage houses and
45 Robert Wade, "The Coming Fight Over Capital Flows", Fore4-n Policy, pp. 45-47.
See Martin Khor, "Are Asians Partners to Be Helped or Rivals to Be Hurt??,
International Herald Tribune, January 15,1998.
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enable foreign companies to have access to domestic money-market
instruments and bond markets. On January 15, 1998, the chaebol had
agreed to accept substantial changes such as adopting Western
accounting standards, to bring outsiders into their boards of directors
and to reduce their debt-equity ratios so that they would be closer to
Western standards.47 In May 1998, for example, Motorola acquired a
stake in Pantech Seoul, a Korean electronics firm, becoming its second
largest shareholder with 20 per cent equity. Motorola was planning to
invest $300 million in South Korea to expand its operations and set up
new partnerships.48 After the IMF bailout, South Korea also launched
privatisation of Steelmaker POSCO, Korea Telecom, Korea Gas and
others. General Motors and Daewoo, once competitotrs, signed an
exclusive agreement for a new joint venture. The Hanwha Group of
South Korea sold its oil refineries to Royal Dutch/Shell after having
sold half its chemical joint venture to BASF of Germany. Procter and
Gamble Co. obtained a controlling share of Ssangyong Paper Co., in
what was the first large take-over of a Korean company by a foreign
firm.49
Further trade liberalisation on the basis of the Washington
Consensus was highly desirable from the standpoint of the United
47 Nicholas Kristof, "Crisis Pushing Asian Capitalism Closer to US-Style Free Market",
The New York Times, January 17,1998.
United Nations, World Investment Report 1998, New York 1998, P. 225.
49 Kavaljit Singh, The Globalisation of Finance, A Citizen's Guide, pp. 111-112
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States because it could then fully exploit its strong competitive position.
The prevailing view among business people and politicians in
Washington was that the United States should continue to play a
leadership role in liberalising trade. As Phil Condit from the Boeing
Company stated:
'Without continued strong leadership by the United States, the
enormous progress we [the United States] have made to date to
advance open trade wifi begin to slip backwards. And such a
development would significantly hurt the economy of the world's
largest exporting and trading nation - the United States - to say
nothing of what it would do to the economies of all other countries in
the world. Stabilising Asia is essential to keeping the global economy -
our own economy induded - growing and prospering.'50
TABLE 7.2 - INTERNATIONAL BANK LENDING TO EAST ASIA -
($ billions, outstanding at the end of 1996)
SELECTED	 US BANKS	 JAPANESE	 TOTAL
COUNTRIES	 BANKS INTERNATIONAL.
LENDING
INDONESIA	 5.3	 22.0	 55.5
KOREA	 9.4	 24.3	 100.0
MALAYSIA	 2.3	 8.2	 22.2
THAILAND	 5.0	 37.5	 70.2
EAST ASIA TOTAL	 46.4	 260.6	 736.6
Source: Kavaijit Singh, The Globalisation of Finance, p. 84
In January 1998, the United States took a more active role despite
the limited exposure of the American banks to the region (table 7.2).
Concerns about a possible global financial crisis, the dollar's role as the
5° Testimony by Phil Condit, Chairman and CEO, The Boeing Company, before the
House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee, February 24, 1998 (The US House of
representatives Website, http://waysandmeans.house.gov ).
254
Chapter Seven: The American Response to the South Korean Crisis
leading international reserve currency and the opportunities for
American banks and other investors to take advantage of the situation
influenced this change of policy. 51 The United States (led by the Federal
Reserve and the Treasury) decided to press foreign commercial banks
to roll over their short-term credits rather than waiting for market
confidence to be restored. On January 28, 1998, $24 billion of South
Korea's short-term debt was restructured into medium-term debt over
one to three years, after an agreement was reached with a group of
commercial bank creditors in New York. Nevertheless, the South
Korean government guaranteed to cover that amount, in case of default
by the private sector debtors. In one sense, this arrangement
represented the failure of the initial loan package of December, in
combination with economic reforms to restore market confidence. The
second programme eased off on the monetary and fiscal targets and
had as its centrepiece a restructuring of South Korean bank loans owed
to international banks. The new arrangements managed to stop the fall
of the won and the decline in the stock market. 52 According to the
Economic Report of the President (1999) the fact that the crisis in South
Korea eased after the new arrangement justified the view that the
private sector needed to be involved in preventing the financial crises
51 Jomo K.S., "Introduction: Financial Governance, Liberalisation and Crises in East
Asia", Ti-ers in Trouble, Jomo KS ed., (Zed Books, London 1998), pp. 20-21.
52 Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs, "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis,
Remedies, Prospects",, pp. 55-56.
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and when the crises occurred, needed to contribute constructively to
their containment and orderly resolution.53
In a Letter of Intent of May 2 1998, the South Korean authorities
updated the programme of economic reform in view of the weak
outlook for economic activity, with the growth forecast for 1998 revised
down to -2.0 per cent. The new measures included:
a) The accommodation of a larger fiscal deficit of about 2 per cent of
GD? in 1998, and through the operation of measures to strengthen
the social safety net.
b) Measures to strengthen and expand the social safety net through a
widening of the coverage of unemployment insurance.
c) Formation of an appraisal committee, induding international
experts to evaluate the recapitalisation plans of undercapitalised
commercial banks.
d) The publication by August 15, 1998 of regulations to bring South
Korea's prudential regulations doser to international best practices.
e) Further liberalisation of the capital account, including loosening
restrictions on foreign exchange transactions and foreign
ownership of certain assets.54
The IMP and the government of South Korea announced a
further easing of macroeconomic policies, while giving further priority
to financial sector restructuring. The measures in a new Letter of Intent
on July 24, 1998, included:
Economic Report of the President 1999 (Government Printing Office Gate,
University of California Website, http://www.gpo.ucop.edu/catalog/erp99.htm1) .
54 Letter of Intent of the South Korean Government to the IMF, May 2, 1998 (The IMF
Website, http://www.inif.org/external/np/1oi/O5O298.HTM).
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a) The accommodation of a larger fiscal deficit of about 5 per cent of
GDP in 1998, reflecting among others an emergency relief spending
related to the floods of the summer of 1998.
b) Measures to bolster the social expenditure programme through
another extension of the coverage of unemployment benefits.
c) The putting in place of a framework for corporate restructuring
negotiated with the World Bank to facilitate debt workouts and
minimise the use of "rescue" loans.
d) Further progress in financial sector restructuring including
progress on the implementation plans of the remaining seven of
the twelve undercapitalised banks.
e) Further improving capital market development through legislation
that allows for the creation of mutual funds and the issuance of
asset-backed securities.55
In the case of South Korea, it was important that economic and
security issues were interlinked. Economic instability in South Korea
could affect adversely a fragile peace that the United States had helped
to keep in place since 1953 with 37,000 troops stationed in South
Korea.56 However, since the end of the Cold War, American foreign
economic policy had been less concerned with traditional security
issues and more concerned with setting a market framework through
the IMF, World Bank and WTO to provide opportunities for American
55 Letter of Intent of the South Korean Government to the IMF, July 24, 1998 (The IMF
Website, http://www.imf.org/externa1/np/1oi/072498.HTM).
56 In addition, the United States has 40,000 troops in Japan and another 30,000 at sea,
which makes a total of more than 100,000 troops in Asia-Pacific.
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corporations. In that sense, the effect of delivering a package of $57
billion was regarded by American policymakers as being similar to the
military strategy of overwhelming force - the doctrine that the greater
the power committed, the less the likeithood of significant casualties or
policy failures.57 Furthermore, in the contemporary context, the actions
of American companies could be considered more crucial than those of
the US Treasury-led IMIF package. The investment decisions of Citicorp
or Merill Lynch, for instance, could be more important than assistance
decisions of the US Government. American firms would be unlikely to
support Washington's bargaining position with other states unless it
was in their commercial interests or these interests were not
compromised.58
The financial crisis also had an impact on the domestic politics
and relationships between dominant groups and political parties. After
the IMF agreement in December 1997, the presidential elections were
held in South Korea. Kim Dae Jung, a long-time dissident and
opposition leader, was elected President. A coalition government was
formed between Kim Dae Jung's National Congress, heavily supported
in the relatively less developed southwest and Kim Jong Pil's Liberal
Opening Statement of James Leach, Chairman, House Committee on Banking and
Financial	 Services,	 January	 30,	 1998	 (The	 USIA	 Website,
http:/ /www.usia.gov/regional/ea/asianfin/leachl3O.htm).
Helen Nesadurai, "APEC: A Tool for US Regional Domination?", The Pacific
Review, vol. 9, no. 1, 1996, P. 40.
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Democrats, based heavily in the centre of the country. The opposition
Grand National Party was based heavily in the more industrialised
southeast. IMF conditionalities were not easily accepted and applied by
the domestic elites. This was reflected by the fact that Kim Dae Jung
campaigned on platform of renegotiating the IMF programme.
However, after he came to office in February 1998, Kim Dae Jung
complied with the IMF prescriptions. 59 Furthermore, the new President
ascribed the financial crisis to the non-transparent decision making
process which was the legacy of military dictatorship in the past. As
President Kim Dae Jung stated:
'Today's economic crisis began with our failure to correctly push
democracy and a free market economic in parallel. That was why
collusion between politicians and businessmen, government-controlled
banking and corruption and irregularities began to bud. First and
foremost we must quickly and effectively carry out reform in four
major areas - banking, corporate management, labour and the public
sector. I believe that to improve the standard of living and reduce
unemployment we must reform the basics of our economy. Therefore,
we will concentrate all our efforts on the four biggest reforms to
readjust the economic structure'6°
President Kim's stance reflected a change of attitude in a country where
the economic structure was the product of four decades of state-
sponsored development. Government planners interested in controlling
economic activity for many years had favoured the domination of large
Uk Heo, "The Political Economy of Financial Crisis in South Korea: From Economic
Miracle to Financial Crisis", The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. XIV, 2000, pp. 51-
52.
60 South Korean President Kim Dae jung in an Opening Statement at a Press
Conference on the Economy, Seoul, September 28, 1998.
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conglomerates. The new South Korean government began restructuring
and recapitalising the banking system to address the problem of bad
loans and weak capital base. The South Korean government in
accordance with the IMF conditionalities strengthened the
independence of the Bank of Korea and consolidated all financial sector
supervision in a single Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC)
separate from the government. Foreign investors also contributed to the
recapitalisation of South Korea's banking system. In June 1998,
Germany's Commerzbank invested $249 million in Korea Exchange
Bank, acquiring a stake of 30 per cent. In December 1998 an American
consortium purchased a 51 per cent stake in the previously nationalised
Korea First Bank. In February 1999, HSBC Holdings agreed to purchase
a 70 per cent stake in Seoul Bank.61
Furthermore, under President Kim Dae Jung, the new Foreign
Investment Promotion Act, which became effective in 1998 eased
barriers to foreign direct investment across a range of sectors. In
addition, the United States and South Korea signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) in October 1998, in which South Korea agreed to
take measures to further open its automobile market and improve
market access for American automobiles. 62
 However, the reforms along
61 Tomas Jose Balino, The Korean Financial Crisis of 1997: A Strategy of Financial
Sector Reform, Working Paper 99/28, IMF Publications, March 1, 1999, pp. 32-35.
62 Republic of Korea Report on Economic Policy and Trade Practices, US Department
of State, March 2000, pp. 4-5.
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the lines of the Washington Consensus were not easily accepted in a
country whose model for economic development relied on the
government choosing the winners. That was the reason behind the
wfflingness of Kim Dae Jung's Administration, after American
pressures, to use the media to increase public understanding and
acceptance of open markets and free trade, through opinion pieces in
newspapers and advertisements. According to Ambassador Richard
Fischer, Deputy US Trade Representative this action stemmed at least in
part from the provisions in the 1998 MOU on motor vehicle trade on
improving consumer perception of imports.63
With regard to the chaebol reform, however, although the South
Korean government pressed the chaebol to reduce their unsustainable
debt/equity ratios, to improve corporate governance and to restructure
their operations, the chaebol only partially implemented government-
mandated changes in these areas. This was demonstrated by the World
Bank Quarterly Report, on Korea (September 2000) which was critical of
the progress of chaebol reform. According to this report many chaebols
remained over-leveraged and their profitability and cash flow remained
low. For instance, the World Bank report was especially critical of the
Daewoo case where it stated that "the restructuring of Daewoo
electronics and Daewoo Heavy Industries have been delayed by
"The United States and Korea. Charting a Course for a Renewed Pacific Age",
Ambassador Richard Fischer, Deputy US Trade Representative addressing the US-
Korea 21st Century Council, October 19, 1999.
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opposition of minority shareholders to planned debt for equity swaps
which would dilute their ownership interests". The report, more
generally, however concluded that "good progress has been made in
enhancing corporate governance and in improving corporate
accounting standards".M Before the end of the Stand-By Agreement
(December 2000) with a new Letter of Intent to the IMF, in July 2000, the
South Korean government, reflecting the change of attitude in domestic
elites and policymakers, reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining the
current economic expansion with macroeconomic stability and
deepening structural reforms in both the financial and corporate
sector.65 On December 16, 2000, the Fair Trade Commission (FTC)
announced its decision to fine the top four chaebol (Hyundai, Samsung,
LG and SK) 44.2 billion won for having conducted unfair intra-group
deals worth 2.46 trfflion won. The FTC had found eight hidden affiliates
held by the top four chaebol attesting that their resolution to reduce
their scope of operations had been an ifiusory facade. This has
demonstrated, on the one hand, the change of government policy
toward the chaebol and, on the other hand, the difficulties in applying
the new approach due to the use by the chaebol of increasingly
sophisticated means to continue their practices of purchasing worthless
64 See World Bank Quarterly Report on Korea, September 18, 2000, p. 9.
Letter of Intent of South Korean Government to the IMF, July 12, 2000 (IMF Website,
http://www.imf.org).
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bonds at face value and illicit transfer of personnel to engage in intra-
group deals.66
The Asian crisis also showed that the dramatic increase in global
capital flows had weakened the IMF's abifity to respond with the same
effect to future crises. That was the reason that President Clinton asked
Congress to approve: a) an increase in the quota subscription of the
United States and b) a contribution to an augmented emergency facility,
the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB), to supplement the IMF
resources to deal with these kinds of crises. Deputy Treasury Secretary
Lawrence Summers urged the Congress to support the IMF because:
'It is [the IMF], quite simply, the cheapest, most effective way for us to
promote those core American interests... It promotes changes that are
in our long-term interest such as making these economies more open
to foreign trade and reducing domestic subsidies. Arid it provides us
maximum leverage: each dollar we contribute levers more than five
from the rest of the world. Even with these new funds the IMF's
resources would still represent well under I per cent of global GDP -
little more than half what they were 20 years ago.' 67
For American policymakers, as an agent of market-oriented reform, the
IMF is a far more effective instrument than any one government.
Because it has an international mandate and financial leverage, it can
In total, South Korea's conglomerates- including the dismantled Daewoo Group -
have been subject to 215 bfflion won in fines since 1998 for engaging in unlawful intra-
group deals. See"Seoul Slaps W44.2 bn in fines on Top 4 Chaebol". The Korea Herald,
December 16, 2000.
67 Statement by Deputy Secretary Lawrence Summers, before the Senate Committee on
Finance, February 4, 1998
(http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/pr2195.htm).
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require a country to accept reform conditions that no single government
has the capacity to require on its own.68
On November 17, 1998, the US Congress had approved a bill by
which the United States provided $18 billion in new funding to the IMF.
Of this amount $14.5 billion represented the American share of a quota
increase applying to all IMF members. The remaining $3.5 billion was
the contribution of the United States to a new backup source of
financing, the New Arrangements to Borrow.69 The bill that had been
approved by the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services
aimed to increase the effectiveness of the IMF in promoting market-
oriented reform and trade liberalisation along the lines of the
Washington Consensus. Equally important was the fact that the IMF
funding bill required the US Treasury to coordinate with other
executive branch departments including Commerce, Labour, State,
USTR, USAID and EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) in pursuit
of American goals. Also included in the bifi was a proposal requiring an
annual report and testimony before Congress by the Secretary of the
Treasury with regard to financial stabilisation programmes. 7° However,
See Memorandum sent by Rep. James A. Leach, Chairman of the House Banking
and Financial Services Committee to the Majority Leader Dick Armey, April 20, 1998.
69 The NAB was activated shortly after it entered into effect on November 17, 1998, to
help finance the IMF arrangement for Brazil, which was agreed on November 13,
1998.
7° 
"Banking Committee Approves IMF Reform, Funding Bill", The Committee on
Banking and Financial Services, US House of Representatives, 105 th Congress, Press
Release, March 5, 1998 (The US House of Representatives Website,
http://www.house.gov/banking/3598pr.htm).
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even with the quota increase, the share of the IMF's resources had
declined, when measured against total international capital flows. For
example the daily turnover on the world's foreign exchange markets
amounts to some $1.5 trfflion, a figure that dwarfs the entire GNP of
Indonesia which in 1997 was about $136 billion. 71 In a testimony at the
House of Representatives Greenspan suggested that although "the IMF
can play an essential stabiising role, the availability of such support
must be limited because its size cannot be expected to expand at the
pace of the international financial system."72
As a result of the American and IMF response to the South
Korean crisis, the already existing elements of the Washington
Consensus regarding fiscal discipline, public expenditure, financial
liberalisation, exchange rates, trade liberalisation, foreign direct
investment and property rights were further entrenched. In addition,
the two elements that were not in place before the crisis - privatisation
and deregulation, were introduced as a result of the conditionalities
attached to the US Treasury-led IMF package. The case study of South
Korea confirms the theoretical framework of this thesis and the
Mark Beeson, "Indonesia, the East Asian Crisis and the Commodification of the
Nation-state", New Political Economy, vol.3, no.3,1998, p. 359.
Testimony by Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve before the
Committee on Banking and Financial Services, US House of Representatives, January
30, 1998 (The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Website,
http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/baarddocs/testimony/19980130.htnil).
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hypothesis that the entrenchment of the Washington Consensus during
the 1990s was based on the following variables: globalisation of finance,
mobility of capital, the role of international institutions, ideas mediated
through domestic elites and the limited instability of the system as
demonstrated by the financial crisis of 1997-98.
However, as will be suggested in the conclusion, the five
variables of the conceptual framework did not have the same leverage
in Mexico and South Korea. For instance the domestic elites in Mexico
were more open and bought more easily into the Washington
Consensus and the reforms attached to the American-led IMF assistance
packages. The Washington Consensus was not entrenched to the same
degree in Mexico and South Korea, while the role of the IMF was more
direct in South Korea than in Mexico where the American
Administration took a more active stance. The policy of the United
States toward South Korea was not a result of a split between the
Congress and the executive branch as was the case in the peso crisis.
Within the executive branch, the State Department was rather sidelined
regarding American decisions toward South Korea. Furthermore, the
US Treasury was again - as in the peso crisis, very influential in shaping
the overall policy not only of the United States but also of the IMF. The
result of these policies was the realignment of South Korean capitalism
towards Washington Consensus and the further entrenchment of
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American influence not only in South Korea but also in the rest of East
Asia.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE CHANGING BASIS OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY:
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the peso and
South Korean crises in the context of the framework that was
introduced in Chapter Two. The framework which consists of five
variables (mobility of capital, globalisation of finance, international
institutions, ideas and limited instability of the system) offers a fresh
perspective on the issue of American hegemony during the 1990s by
focusing on the American response to the two major financial crises of
that decade. This thesis argues that the five variables of the conceptual
framework define and explain American hegemony through the
entrenchment of the Washington Consensus. This is the first time that
such a framework has been tested through the peso and South Korean
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crises in order to explain the changing nature of American hegemony
and the entrenchment of the Washington Consensus.
This thesis has attempted to fifi a gap in the literature regarding
the changing basis of American hegemony during the 1990s by
highlighting the weaknesses but also the useful points from existing
theories and moving one step forward by taking into account the
special circumstances and conditions of the 1990s and especially the
financial crises of Mexico and South Korea. According to hegemonic
stability theory, the decline of the hegemon tends to be associated with
economic closure and instability. From this neorealist perspective, the
power of the United States was an essential element in the postwar
reconstruction of international capitalism but, since the United States
can no longer exercise its hegemony so effectively, the world economy
is likely to become unstable. The assumption of American decline
became very popular in the 1980s and was given a further boost during
the 1990s, especially after the end of the Cold War. The global economy
today is more complex, plural and diversified than in the 1950s and the
1960s and under these conditions the global power structure has
become much more fragmented and the probabilities of establishing an
international hegemonic order have been diminished. However, by
taking advantage of financial crises and episodes such as those in
Mexico and South Korea, the United States directly or indirectly
(through international institutions) promoted a specific model of
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economic restructuring in those economies hit by the crisis, making
them compatible with and open to its wider financial interests. This is
where the role of international institutions has been important. As the
earlier analysis of the peso and Asian crises has shown, international
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank largely reflected the
interests of the United States.
Indeed, during the two major financial crises of the 1990s, the
United States had the opportunity to advance its principles about the
workings of the global economy. Both crises were used in order to
persuade the countries involved to take actions towards reforming their
financial system and deregulating their economies. The United States
acted to stabifise Mexico and South Korea and to advance the economic
reforms that in the long run will make the Latin American and Asian
economies more market-driven, decentralised and open. The American
response to the crises was largely an attempt to transform the political
economy of Latin America and East Asia by calling for further market
liberalisation. In the aftermath of both the peso and South Korean
crises, the United States has emerged with much greater power and
influence in East Asia than it had before. The Asian crisis along with the
peso crisis has strengthened free-market capitalism and confirmed the
continuing influence of the United States in the world economy.
Hegemonic stability theory with its emphasis on the material
basis of power is inadequate to explain the present nature of American
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influence, although it is always a useful starting point in understanding
some basic concepts of power. Hegemonic stability theory in all its
variations has defined hegemony as a preponderance of material
resources. However it has failed to grasp some vital ideological aspects
of power. Indeed, today it is difficult to sustain any argument about the
decline of American hegemony simply on the basis of trends in the
possession or control of basic resources. Outside the realist school,
scholars have assigned greater importance to the ideological element of
hegemonic power. Scholars such as Calleo, Russett and Strange have
emphasised the extraordinary degree of American power and the
contributions of the United States to global economic instability. The
key concept in that perspective is structural power, which has been
manifested in four separate but interrelated structures, namely the
security structure, the production structure, the financial structure and
the knowledge structure. As Susan Strange has explained, the United
States maintains a combined structural power, which gives it
predominance in the world economy.
A radical school of political economy, the structuralist or neo-
Marxist, also has attempted to deal with the issue of hegemony. For
example, Wallerstein has defined hegemony as a rare situation in which
there is simultaneously advantage in industrial production, commerce
and finance. This view of hegemony has been problematic in explaining
the contemporary world order and, in the light of the case studies of the
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peso crisis and the Asian crisis, the neo-Marxist explanation of the link
between military and economic hegemony appears vague and
inaccurate. Within the Gramscian framework, scholars such as Cox,
Arrighi, Gill, Augelli and Murphy have assigned greater importance to
the role of ideology in exercising hegemony. For the neo-Gramscian
school, hegemony has been sustained by universal norms, institutions
and mechanisms, which lay down general rules of behaviour for states.
This conception of power has stressed the interrelationship between
ideological and material sources of power. Neo-Gramscian approaches
have differed from the hegemonic stabifity theory and other neorealist
approaches in making possible a broader definition of international
power relations. A state might be extremely powerful, in the sense that
it can impose its will and preferences on other nations, but not
necessarily hegemomc. While the neorealist approach has tended to
maintain a sharp distinction between domestic and international levels
of analysis, the neo-Gramscian analysis has developed a more
systematic account of the linkage between domestic and international
politics. Thus, the neo-Gramscian perspective has appeared to be more
comprehensive because it has suggested the need to pay closer
attention to the relationship between the American political economy
and the global political economy.
However, the response of the United States to the peso crisis and
the Asian crisis demonstrated that all previous theoretical approaches
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to hegemony (from Hegemonic Stability Theory, neoliberal
institutionalist and structuralist frameworks to neo-Gramscian
explanations) have their limitations in fully assessing and explaining
the degree of influence and power that United States has exercised in
the world economy during the 1990s. The framework that was
introduced in Chapter Two argued that the new basis of American
hegemony is to be found in the entrenchment of the Washington
Consensus which depends on a specific set of five interdependent
variables: a) mobility of capital, b) globalisation of finance, c)
international institutions, d) ideas accepted by the domestic elites and e)
limited instability of the system as demonstrated by financial crises
during the 1990s, not only in Mexico and South Korea but also in other
countries such as Russia and Brazil. This framework has been tested
through the two major financial crises of the 1990s in order to
demonstrate the entrenchment of the Washington Consensus in Mexico
and South Korea.
Each of these five variables had a different role and varying
degrees of influence in the cases of Mexico and South Korea. The
mobility of capital and the globalisation of finance have played a
significant role in opening and liberalising the economies of Mexico and
South Korea. This process started in Mexico after the debt crisis of 1982
and continued with rapid reforms through the 1980s and the 1990s,
leading to NAFTA in 1994. In South Korea there was a more gradual
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progress toward financial liberalisation during the 1980s, which has
accelerated during the 1990s following pressure from the United States.
As a result the Washington Consensus was more deeply rooted in
Mexico than in South Korea before their respective financial crises.
International institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank began to
play a significant role after the debt crisis of 1982 in Mexico. That was
the turning point at which the IMF and the World Bank began to take a
more active stance, with the support of the United States'
Administration and especially the US Treasury, in order to persuade
other countries to undertake structural reforms in accordance with
what became known as the Washington Consensus.
The rise of Reaganomics and neoliberalism in the United States
was matched by the changing intellectual attitudes of the international
financial institutions and also domestic elites in periphery countries.
The ideological triumph of neoliberalism in the United States was
mirrored by policy changes in developing countries either through
embracing the Washington Consensus with some enthusiasm (as in
Mexico and other Latin American countries) or through a contested,
gradual acceptance (as in South Korea and other East Asian countries).
In Mexico the IMIF was more involved in structural adjustment
programmes largely due to the debt crisis of 1982. On the other hand, in
South Korea prior to the financial crisis of 1997-98 there was not as
much involvement from the IMF or the World Bank. In Mexico during
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the 1980s and early 1990s, domestic elites accepted the Washington
Consensus and the free market ideas. The structural adjustment that
took place in Mexico was promoted with consistency by successive
Mexican Administrations reflecting a wider acceptance of the free
market model. In South Korea domestic elites were not as open as in
Mexico to the Washington Consensus since the South Korean
developmental state model produced high rates of growth and there
was a very close relationship between the government and the chaebol.
In sum, before the financial crises of the 1990s, the Washington
Consensus was more widely applied in Mexico than in South Korea on
the basis of the four (out of five) variables of the framework.
The fifth variable of the framework, the limited instability of the
system as a result of the increased mobifity of capital and the
globalisation of finance, was introduced in 1994 in Mexico with the peso
crisis and in 1997 in South Korea with the Asian financial crisis. This
thesis has demonstrated through the case studies that the result of these
financial crises was not the weakening of the Washington Consensus
but, on the contrary, was the strengthening of the free market
orthodoxy through the American-led IMF assistance packages and the
conditionalities attached to them. The IMF was more involved in South
Korea than in Mexico, after their respective crises. In the case of Mexico
there was more direct American involvement while in the case of South
Korea the IMF took the initiative. However in both cases the aim was
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the same: the entrenchment of the Washington Consensus of free
market orthodoxy. Furthermore, both financial crises had an impact on
domestic politics, favouring a more open democratic system, and
political change as demonstrated by the results of elections that
installed opposition parties in power in both countries (South Korea in
1998, Mexico in 2000).
Since the late 1980s and with the formation of NAFTA in 1994
and the eruption of the peso crisis in 1995, the United States has
managed to create a broad consensus across Latin America on the
fundamental benefits of open markets and free trade. Mexico's and
Latin America's commitment to the market model was tested in the
financial crisis which followed the Mexican devaluation of the peso in
December 1994. The Mexican economy recovered quickly and has been
growing ever since. That crisis has reinforced the commitment of the
region to market-based reforms. 1 Indeed the Latin American countries,
particularly after the peso crisis of 1994-95, consolidated the outward-
oriented model of economic development by replacing the import-
substitution model of the past.
As the peso crisis strengthened the Washington Consensus in the
Western Hemisphere, the crisis in Asia raised important questions
1 Peter Romero, Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
"Western Hemisphere Relations in the 21 st Century: The US Perspective", Remarks at
the Miami Herald Conference on the Americas, Florida, September 18, 1998
(http://www.state.gov).
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about the viability of the East Asian model of capitalism. The Asian
crisis seriously undermined the region's credentials as the site of an
economic miracle and has had a significant impact on the post-cold war
global political economy. Between the 1970s and the mid-1990s, the
debate about the causes of and the lessons which could be extracted
from the successful industrialisation of a number of economies in East
Asia occupied a key position in the wider international development
debate.2 The Asian financial crisis damaged the credibility of a
supposedly distinctive model of economic growth based on cooperation
between conglomerates (keiretsu in Japan, chaebol in South Korea,
konglomerat in Indonesia) and government. For American policy-
makers and analysts, collapsing Asian markets in the end of 1997
revealed the crony capitalism beneath the surface of East Asia's
developmental state. 3 As argued in chapters Five and Six, for the United
States, the recent economic turmoil in Asia had home-grown causes,
particularly corrupt national banking systems that promoted
misallocation of resources away from their most efficient uses. The IMP
concurred with the American diagnosis and made further financial
liberalisation a condition of its loans to Indonesia, South Korea and
Thailand.
2 Mark Berger arid Mark Beeson, "Lineages of Liberalism and Miracles of
Modernisation", Third World Quarterly, vol.19, no.3,1998, p. 501.
See Paul Krugman The Return of Depression Economic (Penguin Press, London
1999).
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Unlike the Latin American debt crisis of 1982 and the Mexican
crisis of 1995, the crisis in Asia involved corporate instead of national
debt - a situation that required a more complex policy process to
resolve jt. Another difference was that the East Asian economies
possessed a lot more domestic debt than Mexico, which made their
banking sector problems more serious. Furthermore, Mexico was
fortunate with the timing of its peso crisis because in 1994-95, the newly
established NAFTA gave it freer access to the American market. After
the peso devaluation, Mexico's exports increased by 40 per cent in
dollar terms and more than 90 per cent of the increase went to the
United States. On the other hand, two-thirds of the East Asian Tigers'
exports have gone to other Asian economies, so any post-crisis growth
was likely to be more muted than post-crisis Mexico. 5 In addition,
Japan's role in the Asian crisis has contrasted sharply with the
American role in the Mexican crisis of 1994-95. Whereas a strongly
expanding American economy helped Mexico avoid a worse outcome,
the weakness of Japan's economy and financial institutions added to
Asia's problems. The contrasting experience in Mexico and East Asia at
least at the initial phase of their respective crises, can be explained in
terms of different strategic importance. As Chandrasekhar and Ghosh
have pointed out, "there was even a sense of a glee in Washington at
4 Callum Henderson, Asia Failing: Making Sense of the Asian Crisis and its Aftermath
McGraw Hifi, New York 1998). p. 283
"Back from the Brink", East Asian Economies Survey, The Economist, March Z 1998.
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the humiliation of the former Tigers and the undoing of their claims to
an alternative Asian model of capitalist development6
 as long as
analysts in the United States, were confident that the contagion would
not spread to their own stock markets." 7 This is of extra significance
since the Asian-style capitalism was the most serious rival to classic
free-market capitalism as a model for other countries to follow. From
this perspective, at the core of the recent economic crisis in East Asia
was an incompatibility between the developmental statist and the
American model of capitalist economic development.8
it is in American interests to have the rest of the world play by
American rules for both international finance and transnational
corporations, rules that are encapsulated by the Washington
Consensus. This goal is especially important in Asia because the Asian
system of long-term market relationships and patient capital has put
American firms at a significant disadvantage. The peso crisis and the
Asian crisis confirmed that financial liberalisation and capital opening
have made it more difficult to sustain the long-term relationships and
national industrial policy arrangements that have prevailed in the past
6 As was mentioned in chapter five, to say that there is an Asian model of capitalism
applicable to every single economy of the region is a dangerous oversimplification.
Nevertheless, the Japanese and South Korean models of economic development have
acted as a pattern for the way in which the other economies of East Asia have
developed after World War II.
C.P. Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh, "Hubris, Hysteria, Hope: The Political
Economy of the Crisis and Response in Southeast Asia", in Jomo K.S., ed. Tigers in
Trouble (Zed Books, London 1998) p. 74.
8 Richard Higgott, "The Asian Economic Crisis and the Politics of Resentment", New
Political Econ omy, vol.3, no.3, 1998, p. 336.
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in the Latin American and especially in the Asian political economy.9
During the Cold War, the American willingness to supply capital and
open its markets for an initial one-way flow of exports was due to
security considerations and especially the containment of communism.
However, in the environment of the post-cold war years there was an
increasing American concern that its partners in East Asia were
continuing to "free ride". Thus, trade liberalisation and financial
deregulation in the region are now considered as the pay-off for a
continued American security presence. Those political and economic
practices of the Asian model that were acceptable for security reasons
during the Cold War are now clashing with the interests of private
capital in its search for greater market share and profitability in an era
of deregulation. 1° The best opportunity for that to be demonstrated was
offered by the Asian crisis. Although for a short period of time after the
crisis erupted in East Asia there was a hardening nationalist resistance
to neoliberalism (in Indonesia, for instance), by early 1999 the American
model of market liberalisation seemed to be gaining ground at the
expense of the Asian model of development.
Interview conducted by the author of this thesis with Catherine Maim, Senior
Economist at the Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, September 14,
1998. For example, the US Treasury has been leading a campaign to get the main
international economic and financial institutions to promote capital liberalisation. One
such effort is the revision of the IMF's constitution to require countries to commit
themselves to capital account Iiberalisation as a condition of fund membership. See
also Robert Wade, "The Coming Fight Over Capital Flows", p. 47.
10 Richard Higgott, "The Asian Economic Crisis and the Politics of Resentment", pp.
338-339
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After the peso crisis, but especially following the Asian financial
crisis and the initial IMF response, some observers such as Robin Broad,
John Cavanagh and Michael Mastanthmo announced the end of the
Washington Consensus and economists such as Joseph Stiglitz, who at
the time was Senior Vice President at the World Bank, criticised the IMF
for its approach to the Asian crisis and called for some degree of
regulation in capital flows. 11 However the case studies of this thesis
have demonstrated that the result of both financial crises was the
entrenchment rather than the "death" of the Washington Consensus.
There was only an extension or a slight adjustment of the Washington
Consensus in order to indude the political dimension of democracy and
transparency, which made it more acceptable. This change is evident
from the World Bank Development Reports of the 1980s which were
about structural adjustment in developing countries to the World
Development Reports at the end of the 1990s which were accompanied
by the phrase "attacking poverty".
However, the IMF and the Word Bank have never actually
questioned the need for market-oriented reforms; they simply
11 For the" death" of the Washington Consensus see Robin Broad and John Cavanagh,
"The Death of the Washington Consensus?", World Policy Journal, vol. XVI, no.3,
1999, pp. 79-88; Michael Mastanduno, "Models, Markets and Power: Political
Economy and the Asia Pacific, 1989-1999", Review of internationa/Studies, voL 26, no.
4, 2000, pp. 493-507. For a critique of the IMF conditionalities see Joseph Stiglitz,
Senior Vice President at the World Bank, "The Role of International Financial
Institutions in the Current Global Economy", Address to the Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations.
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recognised that "reforms to build markets can be designed and
implemented in a way that is measured and tailored to the economic
social and political circumstances of a country". 12 When the key issue
has been more transparency or how to fight corruption, the IMF has
insisted that this can only be done through new market-oriented
structures.13 Furthermore, the G7 has confirmed that the IMF should
continue to play a central role in advancing macroeconomic and
financial stability as an important precondition for sustainable global
growth.14 Thus the essence of the Washington Consensus remains intact
and is not being altered by the addition of elements such as democracy
or greater transparency. Even after the end of the Stand-By Agreements
of the IMF with Mexico and South Korea, both governments renewed
their commitment to financial and other structural reforms along the
lines of the Washington Consensus with new Letters of Intent to the
IMF (Mexico, June 15, 1999 and South Korea, July 12, 2000) 15 . These
Letters of Intent also reflected a wider acceptance by the domestic elites
and ruling classes of ideas and policies related to the Washington
Consensus by the end of the 1990s than ten years before.
12 World Bank, "World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty", p. 62.
13 See Horst Kohler, IMF Managing Director, Remarks at the Conference "Completing
Transition: The Main Challenges", Vieima, Austria, November 6, 2000, IMF Survey,
vol. 29, no. 22, 2000, pp. 370-371.
14 G7 Statement on the World Economy, Okinawa Japan, July 21, 2000 (US State
Department Web Site, http://www.state.gov).
15 5ee Appendix, pp. 277 & 290.
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Chapter Eight - Analysis and Conclusions
Another important issue has been the conduct of American
foreign economic policy. In both case studies, the Washington
Consensus created tensions within the institutions that shape American
foreign economic policy. In the case of the peso crisis, there was a clear
split between the President and the Executive Branch on the one hand
and the Congress on the other. In the end, the Executive Branch took
the initiative with the US Treasury playing a leading role and the State
Department sidelined. In the case of the South Korean crisis, there was
not a split between the Congress and the Executive Branch. However,
within the Executive Branch, the US Treasury again played an
important role in shaping the IMF assistance package, while the State
Department was once more in a secondary role. Thus, the Washington
Consensus was entrenched in both cases despite different perspectives
and relationships between the institutions shaping foreign policy but
with a leading role played by the US Treasury in both cases.
The five variables of the framework (mobility of capital,
globalisation of finance, international institutions, ideas accepted by
domestic elites and the limited instability of the system) were inherent
in both cases of the peso and Asian crises and have formed the basis of
the influential role that the United States along with the IMF have
played in aligning troubled economies toward the Washington
Consensus.
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This thesis has also recognised that there are different levels of
American influence in different regions of the world. As Chapters Five
and Seven have demonstrated, the United States has maintained a
greater degree of influence in Mexico and the rest of Latin America than
in East Asia. However there is a common denominator in both cases,
which is directly related to the five variables of the framework. In both
cases, the pursuit of foreign economic policy goals for the United States
was facilitated, and as a result, the Washington Consensus of market
economy and financial liberalisation is more widely applied today than
a decade ago. The framework for understanding the changing basis of
American hegemony developed in this thesis, leads one to conclude
that the United States is still a hegemonic power which has redefined its
capacity to project a specific set of political and economic principles
about effective governance and order in the world economy.
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Press Release No. 95/10
	 International Monetary Fund
700 19th Street, NW
February 1,1995	 Washington, D.C. 20431 USA
IMF Approves US$17.8 Billion Stand-By Credit for Mexico
The International Monetary Fund has approved an 18-month stand-by credit for
Mexico of up to the equivalent of SDR 12,070.2 million (about US$17.8 billion) in
support of the Government's 1995-96 economic and financial program. Of the total,
SDR 5.259 million (about US$7.8 billion) or 300 percent of Mexico's IMF quota —is
available immediately. As previously announced, the remaining SDR 6,810.3 million
(about US$10 billion) will be provided by the IMF to the extent that contributions of
governments and central banks fall short of the targeted amount of US$10 billion.
This is the hirgest-ever financing package approved by the IMF for a member
country, both in terms of the amount and the overall percentage of quota, 688.4
percent The exceptional action was taken with a view to providing an adequate
international response to Mexico's financial crisis and giving confidence to the
international financial system. The IMF credit is intended to complement other
external financing for Mexico announced in recent days..
Background
Mexico has achieved a remarkable economic transformation since the late 1980s on
the basis of prudent macroeconomic policies and far-reaching structural reforms. The
Government's program resulted in a sharp reduction in fiscal imbalances, a reduction
in the role of the state in the economy, a lowering of inflation to close to international
levels, and Mexico's greater integration into the global economy. The exchange rate
strategy, which limited the movement of the currency within a band that was
depreciated by a predetermined amount, played a key role in reducing inflation and
ensuring labor's support for the Government's economic program. At the same time,
there was a substantial real appreciation of the new peso and a sharp increase in the
external current account deficit. Domestic investment increased over this period,
while private savings declined substantially.
During 1994, investors' concerns about the sustainability of the current account deficit
began to increase, against the background of dramatic adverse political events in
Mexico, intense competition for foreign saving in other emerging markets, and
generally higher interest rates abroad. To stem capital outflows, the Mexican
authorities raised interest rates, allowed the currency to move to the more
depreciated limits of the exchange rate band, and substituted short-term
indebtedness denominated in foreign currency for local currency-denominated debt.
Nevertheless, there was a significant loss of external reserves between February and
April, after which the level of reserves stabilized until October.
A resurgence of investors' fears put further pressures on foreign exchange and
financial markets and precipitated the present financial crisis and led to the floating
of the peso in late December 1994. Events in Mexico contributed to serious pressures
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in financial and exchange markets in a number of other Latin American countries, as
well as increased volatility in markets in other parts of the world.
The 1995-96 Program
The program formulated by the Mexican authorities, and supported by the stand-by
credit, must be seen against the background of Mexico's favorable economic
fundamentals and its past record of macroeconomic and structural reforms. The
program involves a two-pronged approach aimed at consolidating the progress made
in the past several years and addressing the current liquidity problem of dealing with
substantial short-term obligations falling due. The availability of external financing to
support the conversion of short-term government debt into medium- and long-term
debt and to help domestic commercial banks to meet their short-term external
obligations is expected to ease investors' immediate concerns about the situation in
Mexico, and reverse the overshooting of the depreciation of the currency that has
occurred.
The program's specific objectives for 1995 are: (i) the reduction in the external current
account deficit from 8 percent of GDP in 1994 to 4 percent of GDP in 1995, and to 3-3
1/2 percent of GDP in 1996; and (ii) a lowering of the annualized rate of inflation to
around 9 percent in the fourth quarter of 1995, from more than 30 percent in the first
quarter of the year. Economic activity is expected to decline in the first half of the
year, as the effects of the change in relative prices and the financial adjustment work
through the economy. However, it is expected to recover in the second half of the
year as financial conditions stabilize. Real GDP should grow by around 1.5 percent
for 1995 as a whole.
To achieve these goals, the program is centered on a policy of wage, price, and credit
restraint supported by an improvement in the fiscal position. The revised 1995 budget
for the nonfinancial public sector provides for a fiscal surplus of 0.5 percent of GDP
(compared with a balanced position in 1994), and a primary surplus (the overall
balance excluding interest obligations) of 3.4 percent for the year as a whole,
compared with a primary surplus of 2.6 percent of GDP in 1994. The contribution of
the public sector to the adjustment process is to be particularly large in the first half of
1995. Moreover, the authorities stand ready to strengthen the public finances through
additional measures if necessary.
The fiscal tightening should help to achieve an early stabilization of financial and
exchange markets, and the measures can be expected to boost savings and result in a
substantial reduction in imports. In addition, an acceleration in export growth should
result from the real depreciation of the currency.
The policy on wages and prices that has been formulated within the context of the
Agreement of Unity to Overcome the Economic Emergency signed between the
Government, the Bank of Mexico, and the labor and business sectors, wifi set the path
for the evolution of wages and public sector price rises during 1995. This agreement
implies a significant reduction in real wages on average and represents a major
contribution on the part of labor to set the basis for a resumption of growth. Wage
policy under the agreement provides for an increase of 7 percent in minimum and
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public sector wages, and an additional 3 percent through an income tax credit for
workers with incomes of up to twice the minimum wage. Contractual wage
negotiations wifi adhere to these guidelines and, in addition, will indude
productivity bonuses freely negotiated between labor and business. The pact also
limits the increase in public sector tariffs during 1995 to about 10 percent, or about
two thirds of the expected average rate of inflation. The price strategy wifi result in a
revenue loss for the public sector (of about 0.6 percent of GDP) that will be
compensated by other fiscal measures. The authorities recognize the need to address
price distortions that may result from these measures in due course.
Credit policy will play a critical role in achieving the objectives of the program. The
monetary program establishes a limit on the growth of net domestic assets of the
Bank of Mexico of MexN $10 billion in 1995, compared with MexN $60 billion in 1994.
Under this limit, credit expansion by the Bank of Mexico would be 17 percent of the
monetary base at the end of 1994, a rate which is less than that of projected nominal
GDP and is consistent with the inflation target of 19 percent for 1995 as a whole. The
Bank of Mexico stands ready to tighten credit conditions further to counter
unforeseen pressures in the exchange market
The program provides for a reduction in the rate of credit expansion by the
development banks of more than one half (to 2.1 percent of GDP) in 1995. However,
the development banks and trust funds will continue to provide net financing to
priority sectors, including exports and agriculture.
The substantial depreciation of the exchange rate that has taken place is expected to
contribute to a significant improvement in the current account of the balance of
payments. Merchandise exports are projected to grow by close to 25 percent in 1995
helped by the devaluation, the increase in investment in export industries in recent
years, and the contraction in internal demand. In addition, the effect of the peso
depreciation, the policy of credit restraint, and the expected fall in real incomes
should lead to a decline in imports of 7 percent in U.S. dollar terms.
The Bank of Mexico wifi support the floating exchange rate regime through limited
intervention in the foreign exchange market The authorities envisage that the
strength of their economic program, together with external financial support will help
to stabilize financial markets and result in a significant correction of the recent
overshooting of the exchange rate.
For 1996, the authorities have indicated they will follow policies to lower inflation to
single digits and further reduce the external current account deficit to 3-3 1/2 percent
of GD?. With the return of financial and exchange market stability, investment could
be expected to recover which, together with continued export expansion, would
contribute to a rebound in real GD? growth to around 4 percent.
While specific proposals for 1996 will not be developed until the 1996 budget is
prepared in the second half of 1995, the authorities are committed to review tax
policies to at least maintain the surplus position of the public sector and improve the
equity of the tax system.
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Structural Reform Policies
Over the past several years, Mexico has made substantial progress in the area of
structural reform. The program consolidates and extends this progress in important
ways. It provides a reinforcement of the Government's strategy for privatization and
the granting of concessions to the private sector in areas previously reserved for the
public sector. In the past, the privatization efforts had focused mainly on commercial
enterprises (although some concessions have been granted for the operation of
highways). Beginning in 1995 privatization also wifi involve basic infrastructure (rail,
ports, airports, electricity generation, and radio and telecommunications). The
implementation of the new strategy wifi require some constitutional changes as well
as reforms in the regulatory environment which are already under way.
The authorities expect revenues from privatization and concession operations to be
about US$6 billion in 1995 and an additional US$6-8 billion in 1996-97. The
privatization proceeds wifi be used largely for the cancellation of the public external
debt.
International Financial Support
In addition to the IMFs US$17.8 billion stand-by credit, the United States is expected
to provide US$20 billion, the GlO central banks through the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) US$10 billion, and the commercial banks US$3 billion.
Addressing Social Costs
During the late 1980s and early 1990s there was a significant reduction in the number
of families living in extreme poverty, reflecting the strong economic growth and
increases in real wages in this period, complemented by a program of targeted social
expenditures. The authorities recognize, however, that the peso crisis and the
adjustment measures that it entails could complicate efforts to sustain the steady
improvement in the well-being of the poorest sectors in the short term. A number of
policy measures are being implemented to protect the poor from the adverse effects
of the adjustment process. While overall lending by the development banks is being
scaled back sharply, it wifi be focused more heavily on financing of agriculture
through specialized agencies that lend to small farmers. To limit the real wage
adjustment for the lowest wage earners, employers wifi be allowed to supplement
wages of those earning up to twice the minimum wage and to claim a corresponding
tax credit.
The Challenge Ahead
The Mexican authorities have embarked on a strong adjustment program to help deal
with the current crisis in financial and foreign exchange markets. The domestic
adjustment package, combining prudent fiscal and strong monetary and credit
policies, a disciplined incomes policy, and further structural reforms, provides an
appropriate policy response to current circumstances. Furthermore, the authorities
stand ready to strengthen the program as needed to achieve the program's objectives.
The support of the international financial community is crucial to the success of the
program.
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LETFER OF INTENT OF MEXICAN GOVERNMENT TO THE IMF
Mexico, D.F., Mexico
June 15, 1999
Mr. Michel Camdessus
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
Washington, D.C. 20431
Dear Mr. Camdessus:
1. The attached policy memorandum describes the economic policies and objectives
of the Government of Mexico and the Bank of Mexico for the period 1999-2000, in
support of which Mexico requests from the Fund an amount equivalent to SDR 3,103
million (120 percent of quota) in the form of a Stand-By Arrangement for the period
through end-November 2000. The economic program aims at consolidating the
substantial reform efforts initiated during the 1980s and the gains made during 1996-
98 following the 1995 financial crisis to set the economy on a higher, sustainable
growth path in conditions of low inflation that wifi expand employment
opportunities and foster higher living standards. The economic program wifi
maintain tight financial policies, while promoting structural reforms that are key to
increasing national savings, enhancing macroeconomic stability, and reducing
external vulnerability.
2. The economic program of the Government of Mexico has been a subject of
continuous and close dialogue with the Fund. Mexico considers it important to have a
program with the Fund in light of possible uncertainty concerning external
developments and to bolster confidence during the period of change in
Administration.
3. The Government and the Bank of Mexico believe that the policies set forth in this
letter are adequate to achieve the objectives of the program. Nevertheless, we stand
ready to take further policy measures if needed. During the period of the
arrangement, Mexico will consult with the Fund on the adoption of policy measures
that may be appropriate in accordance with existing practices. Over the arrangement
period, reviews of the program wifi be carried out with the Fund before end-
December 1999, end-March 2000, and end-June 2000.
Sincerely yours,
Guillermo OrtizJose Angel Gurria Trevillo Martinez
Secretary of Finance and Governor
Public Credit of Mexico Bank of Mexico
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LEITER OF INTENT OF SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT TO THE IMF
Seoul, Korea
December 3, 1997
Mr. Michel Camdessus
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
Washington, D.C. 20431
Dear Mr. Camdessus:
1. The attached Memorandum on the Economic Program outlines the policies that
Korea intends to implement over the next three years to address the fundamental
causes of its current financial difficulties, thereby restoring and sustaining market
confidence and returning the economy to a path of strong sustainable growth. In
support of this program, Korea hereby requests a three-year stand-by arrangement
from the International Monetary Fund in an amount equivalent to SDR 15.5 billion.
2. As the circumstances did not permit a full specification of the program, the
government has implemented strong prior actions to demonstrate its seriousness to
strictly implement its policy commitments. A full specffication of the program will be
put together with the assistance of an IMF team. The program wifi be reviewed by the
Executive Board in December 1997 and January 1998. The latter review will expand
the scope of performance criteria, set performance criteria for March and June 1998,
and set structural benchmarks. The main focus of the four additional quarterly
reviews (in February, April, July, and November) during the first year of the program
will also be determined at that time. The review under the emergency procedures wifi
be combined with the review under the arrangement in January 1998. There will be
semi-annual reviews in 1999 and 2000.
3. We believe that the policies outlined in the attached Memorandum will serve to
quicidy restore market confidence. We are putting in place a comprehensive policy
package to deal with insolvent and weakened financial institutions, to further
liberalize the Korean economy, and to improve corporate governance. These reforms
wifi be supported by prudent monetary and fiscal policies.
4. Accordingly, in the event the situation stabilizes, as we expect it will, Korea intends
to forego some of the subsequent purchases and make advance repurchases as soon
as conditions permit. Furthermore, the Korean authorities are aware that a new
facility, called for at the Manila summit of Asian Finance and Central Bank Deputies,
on November 19, for the provision of short-term financing to augment a stand-by
arrangement, is being prepared for consideration by the Executive Board of the
International Monetary Fund. As soon as such a facility becomes available to
members, Korea intends to request that its stand-by arrangement be amended so as to
permit the associated resources remaining to be purchased to come both from the
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credit tranches arid from the facility, in a manner consistent with the purposes and
modalities of the facility.
5. The Korean government is firrn1y committed to implement the policies outlined in
the attached memorandum and will ensure that the policies are adequate to achieve
the objectives of the program. The Korean government remains firmly committed to
take any additional measures that may be necessary for this purpose. During the
period of the proposed stand-by arrangement and thereafter, Korea will consult with
the Managing Director of the Fund on the adoption of any measures that may be
appropriate, at the initiative of either the Korean authorities or the Managing
Director, in accordance with the Fund's policies on such consultations. We wifi also
provide the Fund with such information that it requests on the progress made in
policy implementation and achievement of program objectives.
Yours sincerely,
Kyung-shik Lee
	
Chang-Yuel Lim
Governor	 Deputy Prime Minister and
Bank of Korea	 Minister of Finance and Economy
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LETTER OF INTENT OF SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT TO THE IMF
Seoul'
Korea
Dece11hl
24, i997
Mr. Michel Camdessus
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
Washington, D.C. 20431
Dear Mr. Camdessus:
In the immediate period ahead, Korea faces the urgent task of restoring market
confidence. To this end, the government is pursuing the following strategy: (1)
strengthening the economic program through advancing measures already agreed
under the stand-by arrangement and implementing additional measures designed to
enhance stabilization and structural goals; (2) discussing with foreign banks
possibilities of improving the rollover of short-term borrowing and gaining access to
medium-term market borrowing; and (3) discussing possibilities of additional and
advanced disbursements of official resources.
In support of the measures to strengthen stabilization and reform, we request that the
phasing of purchases under the arrangement be modified to allow for a purchase to
be made on December 30, 1997.
The measures to strengthen the program are concentrated in the following areas:
1. Monetary policy - to restore order in the foreign exchange market and provide
appropriate incentives for holding won-denominated assets, interest rates have been
raised substantially, reaching about 30 percent on December 24. Further increases wifi
be implemented, if necessary. At the same time, care is being taken to ensure that
unequal distribution of liquidity in the system that has developed in recent weeks
does not lead to a liquidity crunch in important sectors of the economy that could
cause bankruptcies of viable firms.
2. Capital market opening - the government will lift all capital account restrictions on
foreign investors' access to the government, corporate, and special bond markets as of
January 1, 1998, and wifi accelerate the announced schedule for liberalizing equity
inflows. We will, according to a timetable to be set in consultation with the IMF
mission in mid-January 1998, eliminate all barriers to capital inflows in the money
market
3. Financial sector restructuring - the government is developing and implementing a
comprehensive restructuring plan for the financial sector that will include the merger
and dosure of insolvent institutions. In this context, measures will be accelerated
wherever feasible, and will be guided by the procedures set out in our earlier letter,
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most notably that existing shareholders wifi bear the first burden. Details of the
restructuring strategy are being worked out with financial and technical support from
the World Bank and the AsDB under their structural lending operations.
4. Reserve management and exchange rate policy - we have taken further measures to
reduce recourse of banks to the BOK to cover their debt-service obligations, including
a further substantial increase in the penalty rate of BOK loans to commercial banks.
We intend to increase this rate progressively as needed in order to provide strong
incentives for banks to seek alternative sources for servicing their short-term debts.
As soon as the viability of the foreign exchange cashflow is restored, the separate
window will be abolished and banks will have to obtain their total foreign exchange
requirements in the market We intend to take this action at the earliest opportunity
in consultation with the Fund.
5. Trade policy - we wifi accelerate measures to open the economy to imports and
eliminate trade-related subsidies in order to increase competition and efficiency in the
domestic economy. We will make binding under WTO the liberalization of financial
services as agreed with the OECD.
6. Labor market policies - while the program aims to minimize the inevitable
slowdown in economic growth, we wifi aim to facilitate the necessary movement of
workers from declining firms to other employment possibilities. The government
expects to shortly announce its views on labor market and wage issues, as well as on
a fair sharing of the burden between employers and workers in the case of labor
redundancies.
7. Fiscal policy - the initial fiscal adjustment of the program will be maintained
despite higher costs to the government associated with the larger depreciation of the
won and with financial sector restructuring.
8. Data publication - we intend to publish periodically, after completion of
preparatory work, data on total external debt and its relevant components.
The measures to strengthen the program have the full support of the economic team
of the incoming government We will monitor the implementation of these measures
in close cooperation with the IMP, the IBRD, and the AsDB.
Yours sincerely,
Kyimg-shik Lee	 Chang-Yuel Lim
Governor	 Deputy Prime Minister and
Bank of Korea	 Minister of Finance and Economy
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LETFER OF INTENT OF SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT TO THE IMF
Seoul, Korea
May 2, 1998
Mr. Michel Camdessus
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
Washington, D. C. 20431
Dear Mr. Camdessus:
1. The inauguration of President Kim Dae-jung on February 25 launched a new
administration committed to the principles of a market economy and determined to
accelerate structural reform. The government's policies to restore financial stability,
backed up by the strong leadership of the President and social stability ensured by
the Tripartite Accord, have begun to regain the confidence of international investors.
The current account has turned to a substantial surplus and usable reserves have
increased to over US$30 billion. The conclusion of the restructuring of US$21.8 billion
of banks' short-term debt facilitated Korea's return to the international capital market
through a sovereign global bond issue of US$4 billion. The successful offering, four
months after the onset of the crisis, was well received by the market, demonstrating
investors' confidence in Korea's commitment to reforms.
2. While a corner has been turned in the current crisis, the impact on the real economy
is still severe and difficult challenges remain ahead. Many viable firms continue to
face a credit crunch; bankruptcies and unemployment are rising. The government is
resolved to take all necessary measures to support a sustainable recovery and to this
end, the focus of policies wifi now shift from the external side to structural reforms in
the real sector. The government wifi continue to implement fully its commitments
under the IMF-supported economic program. The main thrust of policies will be to
accelerate reforms to address the roots of structural inefficiencies.
3. The attached Memorandum on the Economic Program for the Second Quarterly
Review updates the Memorandum on the Economic Program of February 7, 1998.
Corporate restructuring and financial sector reforms are priorities on our reform
agenda as rapid progress in these areas are necessary prerequisites for a sound
economy. Major steps are being taken to strengthen the legal and institutional
framework to facilitate corporate restructuring through market discipline: improving
transparency; enhancing corporate' governance; liberalizing mergers and acquisitions;
opening to foreign investment; and improving bankruptcy procedures. Corporate
restructuring should be voluntary and based on market principles, and public funds
will not be used to bail out corporations. It is envisaged that banks will need to play a
central role in restructuring corporate debt and in strengthening corporate balance
sheets. The government is pushing ahead to restructure and recapitalize the banking
sector and to strengthen prudential regulations and supervision. We wifi continue to
work in close collaboration with the IMF and World Bank in our reform program in
these areas.
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4. Given the large financial resources needed to facilitate corporate restructuring and
the current weak state of the banking system, it is important to expedite capital
market development, particularly the development of equity and security markets
and mutual funds. We seek active support from the international financial
community and investors for this initiative. To maintain investor confidence,
transparency has been increased in a number of ways, especially through the
publication of our letters of intent, as well as by the regular release of statistical
information (including Bank of Korea's (BOK) usable reserves, net forward positions,
and external debt).
5. While accelerating structural reforms is essential to ensure a rapid recovery, the
government also recognizes the need to have flexibility in policy implementation and
make modifications to macroeconomic policies to take account of the evolving
situation. In particular, a somewhat larger fiscal deficit will be permitted to take
account of weaker growth and the ongoing structural adjustments. Interest rate
policy wifi be conducted in a flexible manner reflecting market conditions, subject to
the objective of maintaining stability in the foreign exchange market. To offset the
credit crunch and the serious financing difficulties experienced by viable small- and
medium-sized enterprises, the government will provide temporary assistance to these
enterprises to facifitate trade financing.
6. The process of structural reforms will entail social costs of enterprise bankruptcies
and unemployment. The government has strengthened the social safety net as part of
its contribution to the Tripartite Accord. The maintenance of social stability agreed
under the Tripartite Accord remains critical to keep the confidence of international
investors. We intend to keep under review the adequacy of the social safety net in
light of the evolving economic situation.
7. The government intends to seize the opportunity of a social consensus under the
new administration to fully overcome our present difficulties and return the economy
to a path of sustained growth.
Chol-Hwan Chon	 Kyu-sung Lee
Governor	 Minister of Finance and
Bank of Korea	 Economy
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LETTER OF INTENT OF SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT TO THE IMF
Seoul, Korea
July 24, 1998
Mr. Michel Camdessus
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
Washington, D. C. 20431
Dear Mr. Camdessus:
1. We are pleased that, during our discussions with the IMF over the past two weeks,
we have again reached a common understanding on the state of the Korean economy
and on the priorities for reform in the period ahead. These policies are described in
the attached Memorandum on the Economic Program. Since the last review in May,
macroeconomic policies have been eased to contain the extent of economic downturn.
At the same time, Korea has been intensifying its reform efforts in all major sectors of
the economy. Priority has been given to reform of the banking system, which is key to
the success of other restructuring efforts. Corporate reform is also gaining
momentum. The government has been working dosely with the World Bank and has
put in place a framework for corporate debt restructuring, induding procedures for
debt workouts. The government's corporate restructuring plan, which has been
agreed with the World Bank in the context of a Structural Adjustment Loan, is
attached to the Memorandum on the Economic Program.
2. Additionally, the voluntary restructuring of the large conglomerates is advancing
through the disposal of assets, attraction of foreign capital, and rationalization of
business operations. In recent weeks, ambitious plans have been announced for the
immediate privalization of five public enterprises, to be followed by the gradual
privatization of six others.
3. The domestic economy, however, appears to be falling further into recession and
consumer and investor confidence is at a low ebb. Unemployment has increased
faster than previously expected and more layoffs are expected to result from the
acceleration of restructuring. Externally, the weaker regional economic environment
has begun to have a negative impact on export growth.
4. With the strengthening of the external position, we have decided to shift the focus
of macroeconomic policies toward supporting an early recovery of domestic demand.
The government's priority is to take strong actions at this time to contain the
economic recession to a manageable level. On the fiscal side, the budget deficit will be
expanded from 1 3/4 percent to 4 percent of GDP. This is consistent with the
international consensus on fiscal flexibility as expressed in the recent Joint Manila
Framework/G7 Deputies Meeting in Tokyo. Higher government expenditures will be
used to bolster the social expenditure program, increase social overhead capital
investment, as well as to moderate the credit crunch in small- and medium-sized
enterprises, trade financing and the housing sector.
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5. The recent strengthening of the won has signaled a return of market confidence
and provides an opportunity for continued easing of monetary policy. The
government intends to take advantage of exchange rate stability to further reduce
interest rates in the period ahead.
6. Korea, under the strong leadership of President Kim Dae-jung, remains fully
committed to the ongoing reform process. Our policies for the remainder of 1998 are
set out in the attached Memorandum on the Economic Program for the third
Quarterly Review which updates the Memorandum on the Economic Program of
May 4, 1998. We will continue to work in close collaboration with the Fund and
World Bank on developing and implementing policies to strengthen our financial
system and industrial base so as to place Korea back on a path of strong and
sustainable growth.
Chol-Hwan Chon	 Kyu-sung Lee
Governor	 Minister of Finance and
Bank of Korea	 Economy
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LET]I'ER OF INTENT OF SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT TO THE IMF
Seoul, Korea
November 13,1998
Mr. Michel Camdessus
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
Washington, D.C. 20431
1. Almost a year has passed since Korea entered into a standby arrangement with the
IMF to cope with the foreign exchange crisis. Faced with depleted foreign reserves, a
rapidly depreciating currency and the risk of sovereign bankruptcy, it was inevitable
to tighten monetary policy and raise interest rates last December to help stabilize the
currency, along with the introduction of a rigorous reform program. Since that time,
Korea has made significant progress in strengthening the external position and in
advancing economic reform. Interest rates have fallen continuously in 1998, but
remained above pre-crisis levels until mid-year due to instabifity in international
financial markets. The exchange rate has stabilized in the range of W1300-1400 to the
U.S. dollar, and usable foreign reserves have surpassed US$45 billion. The first round
of financial sector restructuring was completed at the end of September, and
important corporate sector restructuring steps will be taken by the end of this year.
2. In the financial sector, 94 financial institutions, including five banks, have thus far
either been dosed or had their operations suspended. In an effort to stop the vicious
cycle of deteriorating asset portfolios and the ensuing credit crunch, the government
plans to mobilize fiscal resources totaling W 64 trillion won to support viable
financial institutions, out of which W 38 trillion has already been provided for
recapitalization and the disposal of nonperforming loans. This support has helped
major banks to improve their capital adequacy ratios, setting the stage for a
resumption of lending to the real sector that wifi help expedite economic recovery.
Meanwhile, the banks have intensffied their own rehabilitation efforts, induding
steps to reduce staff levels by 32 percent by the end of this year.
3. Progress has also been made in corporate sector restructuring. A number of
nonviable firms have been forced to exit, while the process of corporate workouts
with creditor banks has begun for viable firms. Large business conglomerates are
taking steps to reduce their debt leverage and improve their efficiency. Institutional
standards for corporate governance, transparency, and accountability have been
greatly improved. By the end of this year, the first phase of corporate restructuring
will have been completed.
4. This progress notwithstanding, the economic downturn has been more severe than
expected. The government is attempting to stem further economic contraction
through a combination of stimulative fiscal policy and accommodating monetary
policy. The National Assembly approved the Supplementary Budget in September to
allow the fiscal deficit to expand to around 5 percent of GDP in 1998. The draft
budget for 1999 also incorporates a fiscal deficit of 5 percent of GDP with public
investment spending to be concentrated in the first half of the year. The actual
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application of planned spending is being monitored on a weekly basis to make sure
that fiscal stimulus takes effect in a timely manner. Monetary policy has also been
eased. Call rates have declined well below pre-crisis levels, although lending rates
have declined less rapidly.
5. Although Korea has made significant gains in financial stabilization and structural
reform, the current instability in international financial markets is limiting access to
international capital. We are therefore undertaking various measures, including a
further buildup of foreign reserves, to protect Korea from any potential external risks.
6. The attached Memorandum on the Economic Program for the Fourth Quarterly
Review outlines the major policies for the coming months and updates the
Memorandum on the Economic Program of July 24, 1998. Korea, under the strong
leadership of President Kim Dae-Jung, remains committed to reform, and wifi
continue to implement financial and corporate restructuring while pursuing flexible
macroeconomic policies conducive to growth. The economy is expected to bottom out
in 1999, with positive growth resuming during the year.
Chol-Hwan Chon	 Kyu-sung Lee
Governor	 Minister of Finance and
Bank of Korea	 Economy
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LEITER OF INTENT OF SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT TO THE IMF
Seoul, Korea, November 24, 1999
Mr. Michel Camdessus
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
Washington, D.C. 20431
Dear Mr. Camdessus:
1. Under the strong and democratic leadership of President Kim Dae-jung, the Korean
economy has staged a remarkable rebound since entering into a stand-by
arrangement with the IMF in December 1997. This dramatic turnaround is evident on
a number of fronts: growth has recovered sharply in 1999, the unemployment rate has
fallen, investment is picking up, export growth is strong, and there has been a
significant increase in usable foreign exchange reserves to more than $68 billion. At
the same time, inflation remains subdued. Bolstered by the strengthening of the
external situation, Korea has repurchased funds drawn under the SRF ahead of
schedule, and its sovereign credit rating has been raised to investment grade.
2. The economic recovery has been aided by the progressive lowering of interest rates
and fiscal stimulus. In addition, the efforts made by the government to expand the
social safety net have helped reinforce social stability. Two supplementary budgets
have been introduced in 1999, and the consolidated central government budget
deficit is now targeted to be about 4 percent of GDP in 1999. With the economic
recovery now underway, the process of rebalancing macroeconomic policies is to
begin with the 2000 budget that was recently submitted to Parliament. Next year's
budget therefore envisages a reduction in the primary balance of the consolidated
central government by about 1-1½ percent of GDP.
3. Good progress has been made in consolidating and recapitalizing the banking
system, and reforms in the financial sector wifi increasingly focus on operational
improvements. The government has signed terms of investment with Newbridge
Capital for the sale of a majority stake in Korea First Bank. Efforts are also being
made to find an international team, including a chief executive officer, to take
management control of Seoul Bank with a view to preparing it for privatization. The
independence and autonomy of the Financial Supervisory Commission have been
enhanced through revisions to the Government Organization Act. New loan
classification and provisioning guidelines based on forward looking criteria will be
implemented by the end of 1999.
4. Greater emphasis is now being put on reforming nonbank financial institutions. In
this connection, the government recognizes that reform of the investment trust
industry is critical. A comprehensive package of measures is thus being implemented
with the aim of putting this sector on a sound financial footing, strengthening its
regulation and supervision, and addressing its immediate liquidity problems.
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5. The government reiterates its strong commitment to the process of corporate
restructuring. The dismantling of the Daewoo group is a major breakthrough in this
regard. Restructuring of the other top-5 chaebol will be accelerated; these
corporations wifi be required to complete their restructuring in a way that allows
them to focus their resources on core businesses. For the chaebol ranked 6-64, the
debt workout framework is being strengthened with the assistance of the World Bank
and a large number of workouts are underway. The relationship between business
and labor is now much more stable. In the public sector, a number of public
enterprises have been privatized or restructured, and many government bodies have
been downsized.
6. Korea's economic policy priorities in the period ahead are to broaden the ongoing
economic recovery and to complete structural reforms so as to lay the foundation for
sustainable economic growth and an enduring reduction in unemployment. To this
end, the Bank of Korea has announced its intention to maintain the current stance of
monetary policy for the time being while remaining vigilant to the possible
emergence of inflationary pressures. As noted above, the process of medium-term
fiscal consolidation is set to begin with the budget for 2000.
7. The attached Memorandum on Economic Policies for the Sixth Review outlines the
major policies for the coming months and updates the Memorandum on Economic
Policies of March 11, 1999. The government's corporate restructuring program, which
has been agreed with the World Bank in the context of a proposed Corporate and
Financial Sector Restructuring Loan, is attached to the Memorandum on Economic
Policies. During this review, the IMF and Korea agreed to revise Korea's
macroeconomic outlook to reflect the swifter-than-expected recovery. In addition,
both quantitative and structural performance criteria have been set for the period
through May 2000. The Korean government wifi continue to work in close
collaboration with the Fund.
8. Future reviews under the stand-by arrangement will continue to take place semi-
annually.
Chol-Hwan Chon	 Kang Bong-Kyun
Governor	 Minister of Finance and
Bank of Korea	 Economy
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LEYFER OF INTENT OF SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT TO THE IMF
Seoul, Korea
July 12, 2000
Mr. Horst Köhler
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
Washington, D.C. 20431
Dear Mr. Köhler:
1. Korea has experienced a strong economic recovery since entering into a stand-by
arrangement with the IMF in December 1997, thanks to the resolve of the Korean
people and the effective leadership of President Kim Dae-jung. There are ample signs
of a remarkable turnaround: economic growth has rebounded sharply; inflation has
remained under control; the unemployment rate has fallen; investment has picked
up; exports have expanded. The improved external situation has allowed Korea to
repurchase the funds drawn under the SRF ahead of schedule, and Korea's sovereign
credit rating has been raised to investment grade.
2. Korea's fast recovery has been facilitated by the government's enactment of policies
to provide fiscal stimulus and the lowering of interest rates. Moreover, the
government's efforts to expand the social safety net have helped to preserve social
cohesion, which is necessary for carrying out drastic reforms. With economic
recovery under way, the process of rebalancing macroeconomic policies began with
the budget for 1999 when the consolidated central government deficit was reduced to
2.7 percent of GDP. Fiscal policy for 2000 envisages an adjustment in the primary
balance of the consolidated central government by about 1½-2 percent of GDP,
returning Korea to a position of primary surplus.
3. Good progress has been made in consolidating and recapitalizing the banking
system, and reforms in the financial sector will increasingly focus on operational
improvements. The government has concluded the sale of a majority stake in Korea
First Bank to Newbridge Capital. A new chief executive officer of Seoul Bank has
been appointed, and privatization of this bank will be prepared, through
consultations with Deutsche Bank. The independence and autonomy of the Financial
Supervisory Commission have been enhanced through revisions to the Government
Organization Act. New loan dassification and provisioning guidelines based on
forward-looking criteria were implemented at the end of 1999.
4. As for reforming nonbank financial institutions, the government recognizes that
the reform of the investment trust industry is critical. A series of measures has been
implemented to improve the industry's financial soundness, to strengthen its
regulation and supervision, and to address its liquidity problems. New investments
in funds wifi be market-to-market from July 2000, setting the stage for more sound
and transparent investment management.
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5. The government remains fully committed to the restructuring of the corporate
sector. The dismantling of the Daewoo group was a milestone in this regard. The
debt-to-equity ratio of chaebols has been lowered significantly, and its progress will
be continuously monitored. The relationship between business and labor is now
much more stable. In the public sector, a number of public enterprises has been
privatized or restructured, and many government regulations have been abolished.
6. In implementing its economic policies in the period ahead, Korea places high
priority in maintaining the current economic expansion with macroeconomic stability
and deepening structural reforms in both the financial and corporate sector so as to
lay the foundation for sustainable economic growth. In setting monetary policy, the
Bank of Korea will pay close attention to the possible emergence of inflationary
pressures as well as the situation in financial markets. As noted above, the process of
medium-term fiscal consolidation has already begun with the budget for 1999. A
balanced budget is planned to be achieved by 2003.
7. The attached Memorandum on Economic Policies for the Seventh and Eighth
Review outlines the major policies for the coming months and updates the
Memorandum on Economic Policies of November 24, 1999. During this review, the
IMF and Korea agreed to revise Korea's macroeconomic outlook to reflect the faster
than expected recovery. In addition, both quantitative and structural performance
criteria have been set for the period through September 2000. The Korean government
will continue to work in close collaboration with the Fund in the period ahead.
8. All quantitative performance criteria for end-December 1999 and end-March 2000
have been met, and the two structural performance criteria for end-December 1999
have also been met With regard to the structural performance criteria for January 31,
2000 and March 31, 2000, although the necessary actions were not completed by the
due dates, they have now been completed, or will be completed soon, as outlined in
greater detail in Annex A of the attached Memorandum on Economic Policies. On
this basis, we request waivers of the structural performance criteria for January 31,
2000 and March 31, 2000.
9. This is the final review under the stand-by arrangement, and the arrangement will
expire on December 3, 2000.
Chol-Hwan Chon Hun-Jai Lee
Governor	 Minister of Finance
Bank of Korea	 and Economy
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Monday, April 20, 1998
Rep. James A. Leach, Chairman of the House Banking and Financial Services
Committee, has sent the attached memo on the International Monetary Fund to
Majority Leader Dick Armey:
MEMORANDUM
TO: THE MAJORITY LEADER
FROM: REP. JAMES A. LEACH, CHAIRMAN, COMMIITEE ON BANKING AND
FINANCIAL SERVICES
RE: THE IMF AND THE ARMEY CRITIQUE
I have read your thoughtful critique of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in
which you conclude by noting that you look forward to hearing the thoughts of your
colleagues. Here goes.
American National Interests and the IMF
I believe it is in America's national interest for Congress to promptly approve both
the $3.5 billion New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) and the $14.5 billion quota
increase for the IMF. At issue is not only the stability of the international financial
system and the ability of the IMF to respond to future crises, but the broader question
of whether the U.S. intends to be an engaged leader in global economic policy and
multilateral diplomacy in general.
While most critiques of the IMF have elements of merit, the problem is that
alternative policy options may be more expensive and less effective. The challenge is
to establish a policy that neither ignores economic problems such as those which have
arisen in Asia nor exclusively Americanizes their solution. In this context, the IMF
advances a prudential and relatively inexpensive approach to international problem
solving.
The IMP, after all, involves burdensharing - with over 80% of its total resources
coming from other countries - and the capacity to influence the shape of the
economic infrastructure in countries to which credit is extended.
Many people have used the term "bail out" in discussing IMF-led programs. But bail
out indicates that someone is getting something for nothing. This is wrong on two
fronts. First, the IMF is a lending, not an aid-granting institution. Second, no
government or international institution has the individual capacity to resolve the
crisis in Asia. Likewise, there is no single solution. It wifi take the cooperation of
governments, banks, commercial businesses, and, most of all, ordinary citizens to
solve this problem.
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Since 1968 Congress and the Executive Branch have agreed that transactions with the
IMF related to U.S. credit-line arrangements or the U.S. quota subscription are treated
as exchanges of monetary assets that do not affect the budget When the U.S. provides
resources to the IMF, it receives a liquid, interest-bearing claim on the IMF backed by
the Fund's substantial reserves, which include almost $40 billion in gold. While there
is an element of risk in any lending arrangement, to date no country has ever
defaulted on an IMF loan. The U.S. claim is thus like a deposit in a AAA-rated bank,
on which the U.S. is paid interest and which it can withdraw on short notice.
According to Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan - the most widely respected
independent central banker in the world today - there is "a small but not negligible
probability that the upset in East Asia could have unexpectedly negative effects on
Japan, Latin America, and eastern and central Europe that, in turn, could have
repercussions elsewhere, including the United States." By bolstering the financial
resources of the IMF, Congress will put in place an insurance policy ensuring that a
quick response to the crisis is possible if it deepens or widens further. Conversely,
failure to support the IMF would leave the U.S. and world economy vulnerable to
additional financial shocks in Asia or elsewhere. It would be seen abroad as a
repudiation of current American leadership and of the long-standing American
commitment to expanding global trade. Indeed, failure to support the IMF would
send destabilizing shock waves through the international financial system, with
dangerous knock-on effects for broader U.S. security and political interests.
For all of the world's problems, and perhaps because of some of them, this is a time of
opportunity for the United States in Asia. If America offers leadership, our ties and
influence in the region could be strengthened for decades to come. On the other hand,
if we turn a cold shoulder in this time of crisis, the consequences for American
political leadership and commercial activities in the region will be profoundly
negative for a long time to come.
Congressional Oversight and IMF Reform
You suggested in your memo that the IMF funding request was being considered
"without an informed public debate, conditions on its use, or even the possibility of
effective congressional oversight in the future.. •h1 With due respect, this is not the
case.
Beginning last November, the Banking Committee held the first of three extensive
hearings on the Asian financial crisis and the role of the IMF. The Committee heard
from over 30 witnesses, including proponents and opponents of U.S. participation in
the IMF. It was the considered judgment of the Committee that the IMF continues to
deserve U.S. support By a vote of 40-9, the Committee agreed to support new
funding for the IMF, with every Minority Member and two-thirds of the Majority
Members present in support Only eight Republicans and Congress' only socialist
objected.
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In addition to the Banking Committee, IMF funding was strongly supported on a
bipartisan basis by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, as well as the
full Senate, which by an overwhelming 84-16 vote induded IMF funding in the FY
1998 emergency supplemental appropriations bill.
With respect to the need for reform, virtually all Members agree that the IMF has
made mistakes, that improvements are needed in the way it operates, that its
deliberations should become more transparent, and that the private sector should
bear its share of the losses in countries being assisted by IMF loans. But there is also a
solid bipartisan consensus in Congress to use this funding opportunity to advance
real, lasting reforms at the IMF and within the international financial system. And I
can assure you that the Banking Committee will maintain its vigorous oversight of
the IMF as well as the World Bank.
IMF reform is precisely what the Banking Committee required in its authorization for
the NAB and IMF quota increase. The Administration is mandated to pursue
aggressively a broad spectrum of reforms: increasing the effectiveness of the IMF in
promoting market-oriented reforms, strengthening financial systems in developing
countries, developing internationally acceptable bankruptcy standards, fostering
burden-sharing by the private sector in resolving financial crises, and promoting
greater IMF transparency and accountability.
The bill approved by the Banking Committee (H.R. 3114) requires Treasury and the
Federal Reserve to initiate international negotiations to establish global standards of
accounting and corporate disclosure, as well as bankruptcy mechanisms and open
investment practices. The bill also institutionalizes consultation with the Secretary of
the Treasury on issues related to IMF reform and the health of the international
financial system - similar to the regular consultations required from the Chairman of
the Federal Reserve by the Humphrey-Hawkins Act - to ensure effective oversight
and enable Congress to evaluate progress in achieving IMF reform. These are realistic
reform objectives that deserve strong bipartisan support
In this regard, I would point out that the FY 1998 supplemental appropriations bifi
approved by House Appropriations Committee includes roughly 85% of the
conditions contained in H.R. 3114 and adds several other provisions related to trade
and transparency. While in my view they are imperfectly worded at this stage, these
provisions represent credible efforts to promote IMF reform. The supplemental
appropriations bifi passed by the Senate also contains substantive IMF reform
language.
Unworkable "Reforms" Would Effectively Prevent IMF Funding
Though you express grave doubts about supporting the IMF under any conditions,
you indicate support for an alternative measure, H.R. 3331, the "IMF Transparency
and Efficiency Act of 1998." While the objectives of the bill, which are to promote
improved IME transparency and openness, are generally reasonable, HR 3331 is
structured in a way that could indefinitely block U.S. participation in the NAB and
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quota increase. The requirement, for instance, that U.S. funding for the IMF include
an annual certification vote by Congress is an umbrage to other member states. It also
misconstrues the constitutional role of Congress in relation to the executive branch
and the role of legislative bodies in the international system.
H.R. 3331 also seeks to require that the IMF charge "market rates" of interest on its
loans. While quite reasonable, this suggestion is hardly novel. The IMF's lending rates
have been set as the weighted average of short-term interest rates in France,
Germany, Japan, the U.K., and the United States. As you may know, failing inflation
and stable G-7 monetary policies have tended to lower benchmark global bond
yields. Three- month money market rates in the five countries referenced above are
3.57%, 3.62%, 0.61%, 7.47%, and 5.45%, respectively. These rates reflect the cost of
potential financing to the Fund. In addition, the existing pricing policy is designed to
reflect the risk carried by the IMF on these loans. The IMF is exposed to less credit
risk than the private sector because the IMF is in a class by itself as a preferred
creditor, with enhanced leverage conferred by its official multilateral status. This is
why no country has defaulted on obligations to the Fund.
More generally, the IMF is in many ways analogous to a credit union. It was
established on the principle that member countries share a fundamental interest in
providing mutual support in preventing or containing disruptive financial crises and
preserving the stability of the international financial system. In this cooperative spirit,
all IMF members are obligated to contribute to the Fund's financial resources.
Likewise, with the one exception discussed below, the IMF's financial access policies
are designed to ensure that all members are treated uniformly. A general
presumption in favor of discriminatory pricing policies could lead to reduced support
for the institution, thus undercutting the basic tenets and mission of the IMF.
Nevertheless, one byproduct of increased global capital flows is that the amount of
financial assistance needed to be mobilized by the IMF for individual countries, in
order to stem liquidity crises and halt fast-moving financial contagion, has grown
ever larger. For example, the amount of resources provided to Mexico by the IMF,
$17.8 billion or roughly 700 percent of that country's quota, was enormous by IMF
standards but represented only about 20% of Mexico's financing requirements in 1995
for new money and to roll over maturing obligations. On the other hand, too much
potential financing exacerbates moral hazard concerns.
In recognition of this development and spurred by U.S. efforts, the IMF recently
adopted a new innovation that raises interest rates on extraordinary IMF financing
and includes an explicit risk premium, which increases as the length of the IMF's
exposure increases. The new Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) provides not only
for market rates of interest, but also premium rates some 300 basis points above the
Fund's normal cost of financing, with shorter maturities in circumstances where
exceptional IMF financing is required. Modeled on an investment banking approach
developed by the House Banking Committee during the Mexican peso crisis, and by
Treasury's eventual use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund during that crisis, the new
facility maximizes the incentive for a quick return by governments to reliance on
private market financing. It is available only in the most extreme liquidity crises and
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only in association with strong reform policy responses by borrowing governments.
In other words, H.R. 3331's call for the establishment of market rates ironically
represents a less rigorous prescription than the premium rates already negotiated by
the United States government
The IMF Advances U.S. Principles and Interests
For over 50 years, there has been solid bipartisan support for the IMF and the other
international financial institutions. The reason is simple: generally speaking, the IMF
has well served U.S. national interests.
By historical background, representatives of some 44 countries met in Bretton Woods,
New Hampshire, in 1944 as World War II was drawing to a dose with the goal of
rebuilding the international economic system, the collapse of which had helped lead
both to the Great Depression and the Second World War. The institutions they
proposed to create were the IMF, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATI'), which has now become the World Trade Organization
(WTO).
The Bretton Woods institutions were created to address the causes of depression, to
facilitate the rebuilding of Europe after World War II, and, most significantly, to
mitigate economic causes of war itself. Here, perspective should not be lost Any
reading of history would indicate that while by no means perfect, the IMF and its
sister institutions have advanced U.S. interests in maintaining a stable international
political and financial system that promotes global economic growth and open
markets. In fact, in the last two decades alone, world GDP has quadrupled and
international trade has quintupled.
While the world economy and international financial system have evolved
significantly since the creation of the IMF, and while a fixed exchange rate system has
largely given way to more flexible exchange relationships, the mission of the IMF has
remained much the same: to provide advice and a forum for cooperation on
macroeconomic and exchange rate policies, to facilitate the expansion and balanced
growth of international trade, and to provide highly conditional financial assistance
to countries facing temporary balance of payments problems.
Why is it sometimes appropriate for the IMF to provide temporary loans to countries
in distress? Because without access to conditional official financing, countries are
likely to respond to balance of trade or liquidity crises with competitive currency
devaluations, trade protectionism, and exchange controls. In addition, acute
economic distress in one country can create financial contagion that could threaten
the integrity of the international financial system and harm global growth. Certainly
the economic history of this century should teach Congress that the combination of
"beggar thy neighbor" currency devaluations, hostility to balanced trade, and a
collapse of the international financial system, jeopardizes our national security as well
as economic interests.
309
Appendix
As the greatest beneficiary of a vibrant and open world economy, the U.S. has a
compelling interest in the viability of the institutions that help assure international
financial stability. The leading one, the IMF, not only provides credit, but also uses its
authority to advance structural reforms, such as market-based economic policies,
trade liberalization, privatization, and prudential macroeconomic and banking
policies.
In good times, international organizations may appear to be irrelevant or expensive.
When there is a challenge, however, they can be indispensable. If the IMF didn't exist,
ad hoc multilateral arrangements would need to be created each time a crisis
occurred, possibly at much greater cost to the U.S. and without any guarantee of
success. Whatever mistakes in judgment are ascribed to it, the IMF stands as a
coherent alternative to international financial chaos.
Partly because of its efforts to restore financial stability in Asia, but mainly because
trade has expanded so extraordinarily in recent years, the IMF's financial capacities
are at an historically low level in relation to the challenges it faces. At present, the
IMF has about $45 billion in uncommitted liquid resources, but only $1045 bfflion of
this amount is available for crisis management because the remainder must be held in
reserve to accommodate potential withdrawals by IMF members. In addition, the IMF
has access to roughly $23 billion in existing credit line arrangements, for a total
lending capacity of $33-38 billion. By contrast, the IMF has committed some $35
billion in the last six months alone to financial stabilization efforts in Asia.
The Asian financial contagion is not the kind of problem from which an economy
even as large as ours is immune. According to John Makin, a resident scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute, the negative effects of the Asian financial crisis should
hit the U.S. economy by early summer, reducing the rate of growth in our economy
and increasing our trade deficit. Private sector economists with Chase Securities and
Salomon Smith Barney are also forecasting a notable slowdown in U.S. GDP growth
as a result of events in Asia. The negative effects on our economy could rise if Asian
economies and currencies are not stabilized.
Ignoring the problems in Asia and their potential spillover into other emerging
markets, such as
Latin America, east and central Europe and the Indian subcontinent, could produce
an economic calamity that would devastate our exports and place U.S. manufacturers
and farmers at a competitive disadvantage. It could also call into question U.S. global
leadership and undermine security and stability in East Asia, a region in which we
have fought three wars in the past 60 years.
Maintaining global financial stability and economic growth is self-evidently a vital
U.S. national interest. While the U.S. has the option simply to ignore the issue
entirely, the principal activist alternative to reliance on the IMF would be to attempt
to protect U.S. interests by going it alone, which would place the taxpayer at
substantially greater risk than the IMF does. But few in America or abroad want the
U.S. government to bear the burden of being the lender of last resort for the world.
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Reliance on the IMF implies not only shared global responsibility, but greater
likelihood of repayment and reform.
As an agent of market-oriented reform, the IMF is a far more effective instrument
than any one government. Because it has an international mandate and financial
leverage, it can require a country to accept reform conditions that no single
government has the capacity to require on its own. As for burdenshanng, you express
dismay in your memorandum that while the U.S. is expected to provide some $18
billion to the IMF, others will contribute roughly $94 billion ($19 bfflion to the NAB
and $75 billion for the quota increase). Actually, this is reason to be pleased, not
displeased, with the IMF. Contributions from the U.S. are matched on a better than
five to one ratio on a gross basis, or providing roughly four to one leverage as
measured by useable resources. By any measure, other countries are providing the
majority of resources to the IMF in support of macroeconomic goals and geo-strategic
interests of the United States.
Criticism of the IMF
As a lending institution which establishes conditions for loans it extends, the IMF is
continually the subject of criticism. Some is well-founded; most less so. IMP bashing
needs to be put into perspective. A decade ago, the IMF was pilloried from the left
and the right for advancing anti-inflation policies in Latin America that led to fiscal
and monetary restraint. The result of these policy changes, however, has been a
radical reduction in inflation rates throughout Latin America and a greater reliance
on the market, benefiting people at all levels of society.
As for the current IMF programs in East Asia, the focus of IMF-supported reforms is
on making economies more market-oriented through financial sector restructuring
and other structural reforms. According to the American Iron and Steel Institute, the
IMF's structural reform programs "contain important elements that, if fully complied
with, would achieve what 20 years of trade negotiations have failed to do: reduce the
role of government and open up key Asian economies to competition and market
forces." I know of very few economists and even fewer business leaders who don't
strongly support the IMF's efforts to advance greater market competition and reduce
the corruption that excessive governmental intervention invariably engenders.
it is true that eminent former public servants like George Shultz and the
distinguished Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman dissent from the precept that the IMF
advances U.S. principles and interests. But it is also true that an extraordinarily
impressive array of former public officials, business leaders, and economists -
including Carla Hills, Pete Peterson, Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Paul Voicker,
Maurice Greenberg, Robert Hormats, David Hale and many others - have come to the
opposite conclusion and urge Congress to provide the U.S. share of the IMF's
financing as quickly as possible.
The IMF and "Moral Hazard"
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The one criticism of the IMF-led stabilization effort in Asia that you raise which I
believe has some, but not necessarily compelling, legitimacy is the "moral hazard"
argument. In this context, "moral hazard?? is generally meant the risk that the
provision of financial assistance by the IMF encourages poor resource allocation by
loan recipients and imprudent lending policies by banks.
With respect to individual countries, the policy conditionality associated with IMF
lending - which requires macroeconomic and financial discipline as well as structural
change - helps to mitigate against these moral hazard concerns. Moreover, the
economic and social pain experienced by Mexico in 1994-95 and some East Asian
countries today is simply too wrenching for any country to wish upon itself. Recent
history also strongly suggests that countries in crisis resist turning to the Fund for
assistance until they are literally on the brink of default and the IMF is their last
option.
Interestingly, Chairman Greenspan has concluded that most bankers made mistakes
in Asia not because they thought the IMF would ride to the rescue, but because they
foolishly believed foreign governments would stand behind companies in "strategic
industries," in some cases because of crony capitalism. This assumption, together
with the quest for higher yields by investors, not a belief that an IMF rescue was in
the making, appears to be behind most of the imprudent bank lending to the region.
There is an overwhelming consensus in Congress that while the IMF may responsibly
act to stabilize economies, it is not the IMF's role to bail out banks. Capitalists should
not be shielded from mistakes of capital allocations.
In this context, it should be pointed out that international banks lost a great deal as a
result of this crisis. In recent weeks, a number of them, here and abroad, have been
forced to write off losses of half a billion dollars and more. In addition, commercial
banks are having to roll over their loans at lower than desired rates and at a time
when they would normally choose to allocate resources elsewhere. Foreign equity
investors have lost even more: nearly three-quarters of the value of their holdings in
some Asian markets. Many Asian companies and more than a few Asian banks are
likely to go bankrupt, and their lenders quite properly will also share in the losses.
Congressional Process Considerations
Finally, a note about process. It has been the position of Republican Leadership that
no bill should come to the floor that a majority of Republicans can't support This
may be a reasonable policy for a majority party, but care should be taken to recognize
that wisdom often dictates exceptions to generalized approaches. There is a credible
possibility an IMF bill could obtain majority support on the floor with 90% or so of
the Democratic vote and perhaps a third of the Republican one. A bipartisan majority
of this nature shouldn't be considered improper. Indeed, it would give Republican
312
Appendix
skeptics the chance to vote "no" in the context of a debate where all sides can
respectfully be heard.
If, on the other hand, Republican leadership doesn't allow the issue to be fairly
addressed or weighs IMF legislation down with controversial non-germane matters,
the likelihood is strong that thoughtful elements in the public will not be impressed
and that the Republican party will be held accountable for an anti-internationalist
sentiment that risks a weakening of economies around the globe, including that in the
United States.
cc: Members of the House of Representatives
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